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By	   the	   spring	   of	   1945,	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   the	   United	   States,	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  France	  commenced	  the	  difficult	  task	  of	  restoring	  order	  to	  a	  continent	   that	   had	   witnessed	   unprecedented	   death	   and	   destruction	   at	   the	  hands	   of	   the	   Nazis.	   This	   task	   proved	   to	   be	   most	   arduous	   in	   post-­‐Nazi	  Germany,	   where	   aerial	   bombings,	   mass	   rape	   and	   endemic	   hunger	   created	  inherently	   gendered	   experiences	   of	   defeat	   and	   occupation	   for	   a	   civilian	  population	  in	  which	  women	  largely	  outnumbered	  men.	  As	   the	   occupation	   took	   shape,	   the	   Soviet,	   British	   and	   American	  Military	   Governments	   granted	   German	   women	   in	   their	   Zones	   a	   relative	  degree	  of	   social	   and	  political	   agency	  by	   sanctioning	  women’s	   activities	   and	  organizations.	  The	  French	  Zone,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  one	  that	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  'forgotten	  Zone'	  in	  postwar	  historiography,	  did	  not	  follow	  suit.	  The	   lack	   of	   French	   occupation	   policy	   toward	   German	   women	  disempowered	  them	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  where	  the	  failure	  of	  denazification	  and	   cultural	   imperialist	   policies	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   sanctioned	   women’s	  agencies	   stripped	  women	  of	   their	   agency	   altogether.	   Postwar	  depopulation	  anxieties	  and	  Gaullist	  ambitions	  of	  French	  ‘grandeur’	  soon	  led	  to	  reforms	  in	  post-­‐Liberation	   family	   and	   immigration	   policy,	   furthermore.	   Designed	   to	  reconstruct	   the	   ideal	   'French	   race'	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   race,	   gender	   and	  nationalism,	  the	  French	  Zone	  became	  the	  base	  of	  a	  contentious	  repatriation	  program	  that	  radically	  subverted	  German	  motherhood.	  By	   charting	   the	   interaction	   between	   German	   women	   and	   French	  occupation	  policy-­‐	  or	  often	  lack	  thereof-­‐	  this	  dissertation	  charts	  the	  ways	  in	  which	   women	   under	   French	   occupation	   were	   socially	   and	   politically	  marginalized	   within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   the	   other	   Allies’	   occupations	  policies.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  excavates	  the	  lost	  narrative	  of	  forgotten	  agents	  in	  a	  forgotten	  Zone	  between	  1945	  and	  1949.	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Introduction	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   By	   the	   spring	   of	   1945,	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   the	   United	   States,	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  and	  France	  commenced	  the	  difficult	  task	  of	  restoring	  order	  to	  a	  continent	  that	  had	  witnessed	  unprecedented	  death	  and	  destruction	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Nazis.	  This	  task	   proved	   to	   be	  most	   arduous	   in	   post-­‐Nazi	   Germany.	   Ravaged	   by	   aerial	   bombs,	  civilian	  displacement	  and	  massive	   food	  shortages,	   the	  German	  people	  were	   forced	  to	   face	   the	   harsh	   realities	   and	   “direct	   experiences	   of	   war	   and	   defeat.”1	  It	   soon	  became	   evident,	  moreover,	   that	   the	   postwar	   experience	  was	   inherently	   gendered.	  By	  the	  spring	  of	  1945,	   there	  were	  thirty	  six	  million	  German	  women	  to	   just	  twenty	  eight	  million	  German	  men.2	  While	  the	  victors	  designed	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  programs	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   shattered	   German	   nation,	   German	   women	   were	  subjected	   to	  mass	   rape	   and	   endemic	   hunger,	   collective	   experiences	   that	   radically	  redefined	  their	  roles	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  at	  home.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Atina Grossmann, “Trauma, Memory, and Motherhood: Germans and Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-
Nazi Germany, 1945-1949”, Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe 
during the 1940s and 1950s, Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 94. 
2 Henry P. Pilgert, Women in West Germany: With Special Reference to the Policies and Programs of the 
Women’s Affairs Branch (Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952), 3-4, Archiv der 
deutschen Frauenbewegung (Hereafter referred to as AdF), Kassel, Germany.  
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The	   British,	   American	   and	   Soviet	   occupying	   powers	   each	   recognized	   that	  German	  women	  were	  central	  to	  their	  respective	  reconstruction	  programs	  and	  thus	  granted	   them	   relative	   degrees	   of	   agency	   by	   establishing	   women’s	   branches	   and	  sanctioning	   social	   and	   political	   women’s	   activities.	   The	   French	   occupiers,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  who	  administered	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  ‘forgotten	  Zone’	  of	  occupation	  in	  postwar	  historiography,	  chose	  not	  to	  factor	  German	  women	  into	  their	  reconstruction	   efforts.	   Unlike	   their	   British,	   American	   and	   Soviet	   counterparts,	   the	  French	  did	  not	  establish	  a	  women’s	  branch	  in	  their	  occupation	  administration,	  nor	  did	   they	   sanction	   women’s	   activities	   or	   authorize	   the	   formation	   of	   women’s	  organizations.	   This	   reluctance	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   inherently	   gendered	   nature	   of	  occupation	  resulted	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   specific	  policy	   toward	  women	   in	   the	  French	  Zone	  that	  in	  turn	  limited	  their	  social	  and	  political	  agency.	  	  	  	  
The	  French	  Zone	  as	  the	  Forgotten	  Zone	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
German	   women’s	   lack	   of	   agency	   under	   French	   occupation	   becomes	   clear	  when	   studied	   within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   the	   other	   occupiers’	   policies	   toward	  women.	  Driven	  by	  particular	  objectives,	  the	  Allies	  and	  the	  Soviets	  divided	  Germany	  into	  four	  occupation	  zones	  that	  engendered	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  (West	  Germany)	  and	  the	  German	  Democratic	  Republic	  (East	  Germany)	  in	  1949.	   By	   1948,	   the	   American,	   British	   and	   Soviet	   Zones	   had	   each	   realized	   that	  providing	   German	   women	   with	   a	   relative	   degree	   of	   agency	   would	   advance	   their	  occupation	   objectives	  while	   reinforcing	   their	   respective	   capitalist	   and	   communist	  spheres	   of	   influence.	   In	   the	   German	   Länder	   (states)	   of	   Hesse,	   Bavaria	   and	   north	  
	   	  
	   3	  
Baden-­‐Württemberg,	   the	   American	   Military	   Government	   modeled	   its	   occupation	  program	   heavily	   upon	   the	   ‘Four	   D’s’	   of	   the	   Potsdam	  Agreement-­‐	   demilitarization,	  denazification,	   democratization	   and	   decentralization-­‐	   in	   order	   to	   denazify	   and	  democratize	   the	   German	   people	   while	   countering	   the	   threat	   of	   Communist	  expansion	  in	  the	  East.3	  In	  Hamburg,	  Hanover,	  Schleswig-­‐Holstein,	  Lower	  Saxony	  and	  North	   Rhine-­‐Westphalia,	   the	   British	   Military	   Government	   sought	   to	   reconstruct	  German	   society	   through	   the	   reeducation	   of	   the	   population	   in	   order	   to	   reestablish	  continental	  order	  and	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  future	  economic	  cooperation.4	  In	  Thuringia,	  Saxony,	  Brandenburg	  and	  Mecklenburg-­‐Vorpommern,	  the	  Soviets	  began	  to	  establish	  a	   second	   world	   empire	   in	   which	   Communism	   would	   triumph	   over	   Nazism	   and	  Capitalism,	   one	   in	   which	   Stalin	   would	   attempt	   to	   exploit	   as	   many	   resources	   and	  technologies	   as	   possible	   while	   ‘liberating’	   Germans	   through	   a	   systematic	  propaganda	   apparatus. 5 	  Conscious	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   German	   women	   largely	  outnumbered	   German	   men,	   the	   British,	   American	   and	   Soviet	   occupiers	   factored	  women	  into	  their	  occupation	  plans	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  mobilize	  the	  entire	  population	  in	  their	  Zones	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  their	  respective	  occupation	  goals.	  	  	  The	   French,	   however,	   did	   not	   follow	   suit.	   In	   the	   southwest	   Länder	   of	  Württemberg,	   Baden,	   the	   Pfalz	   and	   the	   Saar,	   the	   French	   Military	   Government	  exploited	   Germany’s	   economic	   resources	   while	   exercising	   an	   ambitious	   cultural	  reeducation	  program	  that	   formed	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  Charles	  de	  Gaulle’s	  vision	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1968), xiii. 
4 Ian D. Turner, Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 
1945-1955 (Oxford: Berg, 1989), 4, 218. 
5 Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 1-2. 
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French	  ‘grandeur’,	  one	  in	  which	  France	  would	  culturally,	  militarily	  and	  economically	  surpass	   the	   rest	   of	   Europe.	   Having	   not	   been	   invited	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   Yalta	  Conference	   or	   the	   Potsdam	  Conference,	   the	   French	   interpreted	   the	   ‘Four	  D’s’	   in	   a	  different	   manner	   from	   their	   Allies.	   They	   concentrated	   specifically	   on	   the	  decentralization	  of	  all	  agencies	  and	   institutions	   in	   their	  Zone,	  such	  as	  banks,	   trade	  unions	   and	   transportation	   systems,	   to	   counter	   the	   spread	   of	   Nazi	   ideology.	   This	  insistence	   on	   decentralization	   hindered	   the	   emergence	   of	   centralized	   women’s	  agencies	   and	   organizations	   that	   were	   essential	   to	   the	   consolidation	   of	   women’s	  place	  in	  postwar	  society.	  Since	  women	  did	  not	  factor	  into	  post-­‐Liberation	  plans	  for	  French	   ‘grandeur’,	   as	   this	   dissertation	   will	   argue,	   the	   policies	   that	   governed	   the	  French	   Zone	   disempowered	  women	   in	   the	   social	   and	   political	   spheres	  while	   also	  subverting	  their	  traditional	  gender	  roles	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere.	  	  	  Despite	   elaborate	   occupation	   plans	   that	   were	   ultimately	   designed	   to	  transform	   France	   into	   a	   world	   power,	   the	   lack	   of	   scholarship	   on	   the	   French	  occupation	   of	   post-­‐Nazi	   Germany	   reveals	   that	   the	   French	   Zone	   has	   become	   the	  ‘forgotten	   Zone’	   of	   occupation	   in	   postwar	   historiography.6 	  The	   terse	   relations	  between	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  France	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	   its	   immediate	   aftermath	  explain	   this	   trend.	  While	   it	   is	  generally	   acknowledged	   that	  British,	  American	   and	  Soviet	   skepticism	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  French	  Zone	  sparked	  French	  resentment	  and	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  uniform	  and	  coordinated	  German	  reconstruction	  program,	  scholars	  have	  yet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Toby Thacker, Music after Hitler, 1945-1955 (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 7. 
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to	   study	   the	   ripple	   effect	   that	   France’s	   ‘marginal	   status’	   had	   on	   the	   exclusion	   of	  German	  women	  from	  the	  postwar	  story.	  	  The	  ‘Big	  3’	  were	  skeptical	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  de	  Gaulle’s	  French	  Provisional	  Government	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  Pétain’s	  Vichy	  Regime,	  not	  surprising	  considering	  that	   the	   Vichy	   collaborators	   had	   even	   fought	   against	   the	   Allies	   in	   North	   Africa	   in	  November	  1942.7	  Although	  General	  Eisenhower	  had	  given	  credit	  to	  the	  Free	  French	  for	  having	  been	  “of	  inestimable	  value	  in	  the	  campaign”	  during	  the	  Liberation,	  a	  lack	  of	  political	   and	  military	   legitimacy	  excluded	   them	   from	  participating	   in	   the	  D-­‐Day	  landings	   in	   June	   1944.8	  Josef	   Stalin,	   who	   had	   entered	   into	   pacts	   with	   Hitler	   until	  Operation	   Barbarossa	   in	   1941,	   was	   distrustful	   of	   the	   French	   Provisional	  Government	  and	  remarked	  that	  it	  was	  Pétain	  and	  not	  de	  Gaulle	  who	  symbolized	  “the	  real	  physical	  France.”9	  Franklin	  Delano	  Roosevelt	  also	  remained	  wary	  of	  the	  exiled	  Free	  French	  and	  had	   little	   faith	   in	  France’s	  ability	   to	  sustain	  the	   future	  occupation	  effort,	  even	  telling	  Churchill	   in	  February	  1944	  that	  he	  was	  “absolutely	  unwilling	  to	  police	  France”	  and	  that	  “France	  is	  [his]	  baby	  and	  will	  take	  a	  lot	  of	  nursing	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  it	  to	  the	  point	  of	  walking	  alone.”10	  	  Winston	  Churchill	  had	  been	  the	  one	  to	  defend	  French	  interests	  in	  the	  division	  of	  post-­‐Nazi	  Germany.	  In	  a	  November	  1944	  telegram	  to	  Roosevelt,	  he	  expressed	  his	  disappointment	  about	  American	  reluctance	  to	  allow	  the	  French	  to	  occupy	  Germany	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Robert Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 
282. 
8 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 296; 
Paxton, Vichy France, 90.  
9 Susan Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Joseph V. Stalin (Yale: Yale University Press, 2008), 188. 
10 Butler, My Dear Mr. Stalin, 188; Bianka J. Adams, From Crusade to Hazard: The Denazification of 
Bremen Germany (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 3.  
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alongside	   the	   ‘Big	   3’:	   “How	   will	   it	   be	   possible	   to	   hold	   down	   Western	   Germany	  beyond	   the	   present	   Russian	   occupation	   line?…	   All	   would	   therefore	   rapidly	  disintegrate	  as	  it	  did	  last	  time…	  I	  hope	  however	  that	  my	  fears	  are	  groundless.	  I	  put	  my	   faith	   in	   you.”11	  	  Without	   the	   French	   Zone	   acting	   as	   a	   buffer	   between	   Soviet	  influence	  and	  the	  West,	  Churchill	  feared	  that	  it	  would	  prove	  impossible	  to	  maintain	  the	   balance	   of	   power	   on	   the	   continent.	   During	   the	   Yalta	   Conference	   in	   February	  1945,	   Roosevelt	   announced	   that	   U.S.	   troops	  would	  withdraw	   from	  Germany	   after	  two	   years	   of	   occupation,	   causing	   Churchill	   to	   convince	   Roosevelt	   and	   Stalin	   to	  authorize	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  French	  Zone	   from	  carved	  out	  portions	  of	   the	  American	  Zone	  and	  the	  British	  Zone.12	  Although	  Stalin	  had	  made	  several	  attempts	  to	  exclude	  the	   French	   from	   joining	   the	   Allied	   Control	   Commission,	   the	   governing	   body	   of	  occupied	  Germany,	   the	  French	  nevertheless	   took	   their	  place	  amongst	   the	  Allies	   in	  the	  spring	  of	  1945.13	  	  Tensions	   between	   the	   ‘Big	   3	   and	   France’	   became	   especially	   evident	   during	  the	   signing	   of	   the	   German	   Act	   of	   Capitulation	   in	   Berlin	   on	   May	   8	   in	   Marshall	  Zhukov’s	   Karlshorst	   headquarters	   when	   General	   de	   Lattre,	   the	   French	   signatory,	  demanded	   that	   his	   interpreter	   hang	   the	   French	   flag	   next	   to	   those	   of	   the	   United	  Kingdom,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia:	  14	  	  I	   required	   that	   France	   should	   be	   represented	   at	   this	   ceremony	  with	   her	   flag	   in	   a	   place	   of	  equality	   with	   those	   of	   her	   Allies.	   He	   seemed	   surprised	   and	   somewhat	   annoyed	   by	   my	  request,	  but	  undertook	  to	  pass	  it	  on	  to	  his	  chiefs...	  And	  in	  fact	  it	  was	  a	  business!	  A	  diplomatic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Martin Gilbert, Churchill and America (New York: Free Press, 2005), 318. 
12 F. Roy Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 8-9. 
13 Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 
1049-1050. 
14 The concept of the ‘Big 3 and France’ was coined in John Young’s article, “The Foreign Office, the 
French and the Post-War Division of Germany, 1945-46”, Review of International Studies, vol. 12, no. 3 
(July 1986): 223-234. 
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affair	  to	  start	  with,	  for	  everyone	  was	  not	  in	  agreement.	  A	  Brigadier-­‐General,	  learning	  of	  my	  request,	   had	  even	   cried	  out	   ‘And	  why	  not	  China!’	   It	  was	  a	  practical	  matter	   above	  all,	   for	   a	  French	  flag	  could	  nowhere	  be	  found.	  The	  Russians	  decided	  to	  make	  one,	  with	  a	  piece	  of	  red	  stuff	  taken	  from	  a	  former	  Hitlerite	  banner,	  a	  white	  sheet	  and	  a	  piece	  of	  blue	  serge	  cut	  out	  of	  an	  engineer’s	  overalls…	  At	  last,	  at	  20.00,	  our	  national	  emblem	  was	  placed	  between	  those	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  a	  cluster	  surmounted	  by	  the	  Soviet	  flag.15	  	  De	  Gaulle	  recalls	  that	  even	  Hitler’s	  War	  Minister,	  Field	  Marshall	  Wilhelm	  Keitel,	  was	  resentful	  of	  France’s	  participation	   in	  Germany’s	  unconditional	  surrender:	   “On	  May	  9,	   General	   de	   Lattre	   took	   his	   place	   next	   to	   the	   military	   delegates	   of	   the	   Allied	  Powers,	  under	  a	  panoply	  under	  which	  the	  tricolor	  was	  next	  to	  their	  flags.	  During	  the	  final	  act	  of	  German	  capitulation,	  Field	  Marshall	  Keitel	  exclaimed,	  “What?	  The	  French	  too!”16	  These	   incidents	   reflect	   Allied	   skepticism	   toward	   France’s	   place	   as	   a	   victor	  and	  occupier,	  an	  attitude	  that	  has	  led	  to	  the	  near-­‐exclusion	  of	  the	  French	  Zone,	  the	  ‘forgotten	   Zone’,	   from	   the	   historiography	   on	   postwar	   Europe.	   In	   the	   masculine	  world	  of	   the	  victors,	  moreover,	  discussions	  about	  women	  in	   the	  postwar	  era	  were	  even	  more	  out	  of	  place	  than	  the	  hastily	  constructed	  French	  flag.	  	  	  
Forgotten	  Agents	  in	  a	  Forgotten	  Zone	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Despite	  an	  abundance	  of	  studies	  on	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  its	  immediate	  aftermath,	   the	   French	   occupation	   of	   Germany	   remains	   an	   under-­‐researched	   topic.	  By	   extension,	   little	   is	   known	   about	   German	   women’s	   experiences	   under	   French	  occupation.	  On	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  German	  Länder	  of	  Baden	  and	  Württemberg	  had	  a	  population	  of	  6.3	  million,	  a	  number	   that	  had	  decreased	   to	  5.8	  million	   by	   January	   1946	   due	   to	   the	   Holocaust,	   aerial	   bombings	   and	   civilian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny, The History of the First French Army (London: George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd., 1952), 517-518. 
16 Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de Guerre, Tome III, Le Salut, 1944-1946 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1959), 
187-188. 
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displacement.17	  Of	  this	  number,	  there	  were	  3.3	  million	  women	  to	  2.5	  million	  men.18	  By	   October	   1946,	   the	   ratio	   of	   women	   to	  men	   in	   the	   French	   Zone	  was	   128:100.19	  Since	  the	  postwar	  population	  was	  predominantly	  female,	  the	  lack	  of	  research	  about	  German	  women	  under	  French	  occupation	  suggests	  that	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	   the	  postwar	  civilian	  experience	  has	  been	  silenced.	  	  This	  dissertation	  will	  first	  describe	  the	  immediate	  postwar	  German	  situation,	  particularly	   in	   the	   western	   Zones,	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   inherently	   gendered	  experiences	  of	  rape,	   fraternization	  and	  hunger	  were	  especially	  harsh	  on	  women	  in	  the	   French	   Zone.	   Next,	   it	   will	   study	   the	   lack	   of	   French	   occupation	   policy	   toward	  German	  women	  within	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  British,	  American	  and	  Soviet	  cultural	  policy	   and	   denazification	   and	   democratization	   programs	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  women’s	  agencies	   in	  the	  French	  Zone	  stripped	  women	  of	   their	  social	   and	   political	   agency	   altogether.	   Finally,	   this	   dissertation	   will	   chart	   the	  interaction	  between	  race,	  gender	  and	  nationalism	  in	  French	  post-­‐Liberation	  family	  and	   immigration	  policy,	   an	   interplay	   that	   subverted	  German	  women’s	   roles	   in	   the	  domestic	  sphere	  by	  having	  radical	  consequences	  on	  motherhood.	  	  Since	  little	  has	  been	  documented	  about	  German	  women	  in	  the	  French	  Zone,	  and	   since	   relatively	   little	   is	   known	   about	   the	   French	   Zone	   more	   generally,	   the	  theoretical	   approach	   laid	   out	   in	   this	   dissertation	   will	   demonstrate	   that	   French	  occupation	  policy,	  or	  often	  lack	  thereof,	  created	  the	  conditions	  necessary	  to	  socially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Willis, The French in Germany, 107. 
18 Willis, 107. 
19 Elizabeth D. Heineman, What Difference does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and 
Postwar Germany (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 317. 
??





20 This dissertation is partially based on archival research at the Service historique de la Défense (SHD) in 
Vincennes, France, the Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes (MAEE) at La Courneuve, France, 
and the Archiv der deutschen Frauenbewegung (AdF) in Kassel, Germany. It is important to note that 
German women are seldom mentioned in the otherwise extensive records at the SHD and the MAEE, an 
omission that reveals much about French attitudes toward women during the occupation of post-Nazi 
Germany. The overall lack of sources on women has encouraged me to focus on how French policy 
interacted (or failed to interact) with women en lieu of on German women’s subjective experiences under 
occupation.  
21 “Bulletin d’Information No 28 du Détachement d’Armée de l’Atlantique,” July 11, 1945, Bureau études 
et information, Service historique de la Défense (Hereafter referred to as EMAT/SHD), Vincennes, France, 
10P 353.  
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  __________________________________________________________________________________	  
Forgotten	  Agents:	  	  
An	  Historiographical	  Overview	  
	  __________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
The	   historiography	   on	   the	   quadripartite	   occupation	   of	   Germany,	   though	  dynamic	   and	   constantly	   in	   flux,	   focuses	   mainly	   on	   the	   Cold	   War,	   German	  reconstruction	  and	  European	  integration.	  While	  there	  is	  a	  fair	  degree	  of	  research	  on	  German	   women	   under	   British,	   Soviet	   and	   American	   occupation,	   there	   is	  substantially	  less	  known	  about	  German	  women’s	  experiences	  in	  the	  French	  Zone,	  a	  major	   historiographical	   lacuna	   that	   obscures	   scholarly	   understanding	   of	   the	  postwar	  period	  altogether.	  Scholars	  have	  yet	  to	  produce	  a	  comprehensive	  study	  on	  the	   French	   occupation	   of	   Germany,	   and	   existing	   research	   on	   the	   French	   Zone	  focuses	  largely	  on	  Franco-­‐German	  economic	  relations	  and	  on	  French	  cultural	  policy.	  	  The	   first	   phase	   of	   historiography	  on	   the	  French	  Zone	  begins	  with	   Frank	  R.	  Willis’	   1962	   work	   The	   French	   in	   Germany,	   the	   only	   attempt	   at	   a	   comprehensive	  English	   language	  study	  on	  this	  subject	   to	  date.	  Following	  a	  near	  two	  decade	   lapse,	  the	  opening	  of	   the	  Archives	  de	   l’occupation	   française	  en	  Allemagne	  et	  en	  Autriche	  (The	  Archives	  of	  the	  French	  Occupation	  of	  Germany	  and	  Austria)	  in	  Colmar,	  France	  in	   the	  1980s	   catalysed	   the	   second	  historiographical	   phase,	   resulting	   in	   a	   series	   of	  French	  and	  German	   conferences	   and	   subsequent	  publications.22	  Several	   important	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Such conference publications include Claus Scharf and Hans-Jürgen Schröder, Die Deutschlandpolitik 
Frankreichs und die Französische Zone, 1945-1949: The Institute of European History (Wiesbaden: F. 
Steiner, 1983); The Institut Français de Stuttgart, Die französische Deutschlandpolitik zwischen 1945 und 
1949 (Tübingen, 1987); Rioux K. Manfrass, France-Allemagne 1944-1947, Cahier no. 13-14 de l’Institut 
d’histoire du temps présent, (déc. 1989). 
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contributions	   soon	   followed	   suit,	   including	  Klaus-­‐Dietmar	  Henke’s	   1981	  Politische	  
Säuberung	   unter	   französischer	   Besatzung,	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   purge	   of	   Nazi	   party	  members	   under	   French	   occupation,	   and	  Rainer	  Hudemann’s	   1988	  Sozialpolitik	   im	  
deutschen	   Südwesten	   zwischen	  Tradition	  und	  Neuordnung,	   1945-­‐1953,	   a	   study	   that	  argues	  that	  French	  occupation	  policy	  in	  south-­‐western	  Germany	  oscillated	  between	  tradition	  and	  reform.23	  	  The	   first	   phase	   of	   French	   historiography	   on	   the	   French	   occupation	   of	  Germany	   is	  of	  much	  narrower	  scope	   in	   that	   the	   former	  mostly	  centers	  on	  cultural	  policy.	  Jérôme	  Vaillant’s	  1981	  work,	  La	  dénazification	  par	  les	  vainqueurs:	  la	  politique	  
culturelle	  des	  occupants	  en	  Allemagne,	  1945-­‐1949,	  Corine	  Defrance’s	  1994	  work,	  La	  
politique	  culturelle	  de	  la	  France	  sur	  la	  rive	  gauche	  du	  Rhin,	  and	  Christophe	  Baginski’s	  1997	  work,	  La	  politique	  religieuse	  de	   la	  France	  en	  Allemagne	  occupée	  (1945-­‐1949),	  all	   filter	   the	   French	   occupation	   through	   a	   socio-­‐cultural	   lens.24	  Recent	   French	   and	  German	  works	   on	   the	   French	   occupation	   focus	   exclusively	   on	   cultural	   occupation	  policy	  as	  well	   and	  expose	   some	  of	   the	  major	   lacunae	   in	   the	  historiography	  on	   the	  French	   Zone.	   Laurence	   Thaisy’s	   La	   politique	   cinématographique	   de	   la	   France	   en	  
Allemagne	   occupée	   (1945-­‐1949),	   Corine	   Defrance’s	   Les	   Alliés	   occidentaux	   et	   les	  
universités	  allemandes,	  1945-­‐1949,	  Margarete	  Mehdorn’s	  Französische	  Kultur	  in	  der	  
Bundesrepublik	  Deutschland:	  Politische	  Konzepte	  und	  Zivilgesellschaftliche	  Initiativen,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Politische Säuberung unter französischer Besatzung (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1981); 
Rainer Hudemann, Sozialpolitik im deutschen Südwesten zwischen Tradition und Neuordnung 1945-1953 
(Mainz: Hase und Kohler Verlag, 1988).  
24 Jérôme Vaillant, La dénazification par les vainqueurs: la politique culturelle des occupants en Allemagne, 
1945-1949 (Lille: Presses Universitaires Lille, 1981); Corine Defrance, La politique culturelle de la France 
sur la rive gauche du Rhin (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1994); Christophe Baginski, 
La politique religieuse de la France en Allemagne occupée (1945-1949) (Villeneuve-d’Ascq: Presses 
Universitaires du Septentrion, 1997).  
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1945-­‐1970,	   and	   Stefanie	  Woite-­‐Wehle’s	   Zwischen	  Kontrolle	  und	  Demokratisierung;	  
Die	   Sportpolitik	   der	   französischen	   Besatzungsmacht	   in	   Südwestdeutschland	   1945-­‐
1950	  are	  fine	  examples	  of	  recent	  cultural	  historiography	  on	  the	  French	  occupation.25	  None	  of	  these	  works	  concentrate	  specifically	  on	  German	  women,	  however,	  and	  thus	  fail	   to	   reveal	   how	   the	   interaction	   between	   French	   occupation	   policy	   and	   German	  women	  shaped	  the	  social,	  cultural	  and	  political	  dynamics	  of	  the	  French	  Zone.	  	  Scholars	   had	   pointed	   out	   as	   early	   as	   1994	   that	   the	   French	   occupation	   has	  been	  excluded	  almost	  entirely	   from	  postwar	  narratives.	   In	   “A	  New	  Perspective	  on	  the	   French-­‐American	   Relations	   during	   the	   Occupation	   of	   Germany,	   1945-­‐1948”,	  Heike	  Bungert	  observes	  that	  most	  scholars	  “either	  view	  the	  gradual	  evolution	  of	  the	  Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   or	   concentrate	   almost	  exclusively	  on	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Great	  Britain”	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  “omit	  the	  French	  almost	   completely	   from	   accounts	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	  Germany.”26	  This	  emphasis	  on	  the	   interaction	  between	  American	  and	  Soviet	  policy	  does,	   indeed,	   devalue	   the	   role	   that	   France	   played	   in	   engendering	   the	   division	   of	  Germany	  into	  East	  and	  West.	  John	  W.	  Young’s	  1986	  article,	  “The	  Foreign	  Office,	  the	  French	  and	  the	  post-­‐war	  division	  of	  Germany	  1945-­‐46”,	  attempts	  to	  challenge	  this	  dominant	   Cold	   War	   narrative	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	   emergence	   of	   East	   and	   West	  Germany	  occurred	  because	  of	  French	  occupation	  policy	  instead	  of	  due	  to	  American	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Laurence Thaisy, La politique cinématographique de la France en Allemagne occupée (1945-1949) 
(Paris, Presses Universitaires Septentrion, 2006); Corine Defrance, Les Alliés occidentaux et les universités 
allemandes, 1945-1949 (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2000); Margarete Mehdorn, Französische Kultur in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Politische Konzepte und Zivilgesellschaftliche Initiativen, 1945-1970 
(Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2009); Stefanie Woite-Wehle, Zwischen Kontrolle und Demokratisierung; Die 
Sportpolitik der französischen Besatzungsmacht in Südwestdeutschland 1945-1950 (Schorndorf: Karl 
Hoffman, 2001).  
26 Heike Bungert, “A New Perspective on the French-American Relations during the Occupation of 
Germany, 1945- 1948”, Diplomatic History, vol. 18, iss. 3 (Summer 1994): 333-334. 
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or	   Soviet	   occupation	   objectives. 27 	  The	   French	   Military	   Government’s	   stubborn	  insistence	   on	   decentralizing	   German	   agencies,	   including	   transport,	   industry	   and	  financial	  organizations,	  led	  to	  “zonal,	  allied	  administrations-­‐	  rather	  than	  any	  central	  machinery...	   allowing	   Russia	   to	   ‘Sovietize’	   its	   occupation	   zone	   unhindered,	   whilst	  radically	   different	  policies	  were	  pursued	   in	   the	  West.”28	  Contrary	   to	   the	  Cold	  War	  paradigm,	  Rainer	  Hudemann’s	   1997	   article,	   “L’occupation	   française	   après	   1945	   et	  les	  relations	  franco-­‐allemandes”,	  argues	  that	  French	  occupation	  policy	  was	  designed	  to	   facilitate	   Franco-­‐German	   rapprochement.29	  Following	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Iron	  Curtain	   in	   1989,	   Hudemann	   argues,	   the	   ‘quasi-­‐taboo’	   on	   the	   Nazi	   occupation	   of	  France	   was	   shattered	   and	   scholars	   began	   to	   study	   the	   impact	   of	   French	   cultural	  policy	  on	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany.30	  In	  this	  vein,	  scholars	  were	  now	  able	  to	  analyze	  the	  cultural	  policies	  that	  shaped	  what	  F.	  Roy	  Willis	  calls	  ‘de-­‐germanization’	  and	   ‘francization’	   processes	   that	   were	   designed	   to	   denazify	   and	   reeducate	   the	  German	   population	   through	   rigorous	   exposure	   to	   cultural	   propaganda	   and	   high	  French	  culture.31	  	  Although	  there	  has	  been	  a	  relative	  degree	  of	  research	  conducted	  on	  French	  cultural	   policy,	   little	   is	   known	   about	   the	   interaction	   between	   French	   policy	   and	  German	   women.	   Did	   policy	   toward	   German	   women	   in	   the	   French	   Zone	   follow	   a	  distinct	   trajectory	   from	   British,	   American	   and	   Soviet	   women’s	   policy?	   If	   so,	   how	  were	  German	  women’s	  experiences	  under	  French	  occupation	  distinct	  from	  the	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Young, “The Foreign Office, the French and the post-war division of Germany 1945-46”, 223.    
28 Young, 223. 
29 Rainer Hudemann, “L’occupation française après 1945 et les relations franco-allemandes”, Vingtième 
Siècle. Revue d’histoire, no. 55 (juillet- septembre 1997): passim.  
30 Hudemann, “L’occupation française après 1945 et les relations franco-allemandes”, 58-59. 
31 Willis, 95, 163. 
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Zones?	  Did	  these	  experiences	  facilitate	  their	  exclusion	  from	  the	  postwar	  narrative?	  These	   unanswered	   questions	   underscore	   some	   of	   the	   historical	   omissions	   that	  complicate	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   events	   that	   shaped	   postwar	   Germany	   and,	  eventually,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany.	  	  	   Despite	   a	   fundamental	   lack	   of	   research	   on	   German	   women’s	   experiences	  under	   French	   occupation,	   there	   is	   a	   fair	   amount	   of	   research	   on	   German	   women	  under	  British,	  American	  and	  Soviet	  occupation.	  Studies	  on	   the	   immediate	  postwar	  situation	   have	   sparked	  much	   interest	   amongst	   scholars	   and	   the	   general	   public	   at	  large,	   particularly	   with	   regard	   to	   recent	   controversies	   surrounding	   the	   aerial	  bombing	  of	   civilian	   centers,	  postwar	  expulsion	  and	  displacement	  and	  mass	   sexual	  violence	   toward	  women.	  Robert	  Moeller’s	   research	  on	   the	  aerial	  bombing	  of	  cities	  during	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   challenges	   scholarly	   understanding	   of	   the	   victor-­‐perpetrator	   paradigm,	   as	   the	   aerial	   bombings	   of	   cities	   such	   as	   Coventry,	   London,	  Rotterdam,	  Berlin,	  Essen,	  Cologne,	  Hamburg	  and	  Munich	  were	  not	  considered	  war	  crimes	  at	  Nuremberg.32	  Another	  major	  historiographical	   trend	   is	   the	  mass	   rape	  of	  German	   women	   by	   occupation	   soldiers,	   particularly	   by	   the	   Red	   Army.	   Norman	  Naimark’s	   foundational	   research	  on	   the	  Russian	  occupation	  of	  post-­‐Nazi	  Germany	  suggests	  that	  the	  half	  century	  that	  followed	  the	  Soviet	  occupation	  was	  characterized	  by	   a	   ‘forced	   amnesia’,	   one	   that	   did	   not	   allow	   East	   Germans	   to	   “dwell	   on	   the	  difficulties	   of	   this	   period”	   since	   this	   would	   have	   challenged	   the	   Red	   Army’s	   self-­‐depiction	   as	   ‘liberators.’ 33 	  Although	   the	   mass	   violence	   that	   trailed	   the	   Soviet	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Robert Moeller, “On the History of Man-Made Destruction: Loss, Death, Memory, and Germany in the 
Bombing War;” History Workshop Journal, vol. 61, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 107-108.  
33 Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 2. 
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occupation	  continued	  to	  haunt	  Germans	  long	  after	  the	  immediate	  postwar	  situation,	  contentious	  subjects	  such	  as	  the	  rape	  of	  German	  women	  only	  became	  serious	  topics	  of	   study	  after	   the	   collapse	  of	   the	   Iron	  Curtain.34	  This	   certainly	   accounts	   for	   recent	  interest	   in	   memoirs	   such	   as	   the	   anonymous	   diary	   A	   Woman	   in	   Berlin,	   popular	  histories	   like	  Antony	  Beevor’s	  The	  Fall	  of	  Berlin	  1945,	   and	   documentaries	   such	   as	  feminist	  filmmaker	  Helke	  Sander’s	  controversial	  Liberators	  Take	  Liberties.	  	  Studies	   on	   sexual	   violence	   against	   women	   in	   postwar	   Germany	   have	   also	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  investigations	  on	  the	  social	  and	  sexual	  dynamics	  between	  German	  women	   and	   Allied	   and	   Soviet	   occupation	   soldiers.	   Perry	   Biddiscombe’s	   work,	  “Dangerous	   Liaisons:	   The	   Anti-­‐Fraternization	   Movement	   in	   the	   U.S.	   Occupation	  Zones	  of	  Germany	  and	  Austria,	  1945-­‐1948”,	  analyzes	  the	  often	  violent	  repercussions	  of	   fraternization	   between	   occupation	   soldiers	   and	   German	   and	   Austrian	   women,	  arguing	   that	  western	   civilization	  has	   typically	   characterized	  women	  as	   “vessels	   of	  sin,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  the	  sin	  was	  collaboration.”35	  Atina	  Grossmann’s	  Jews,	  Germans,	  
and	  Allies:	   Close	  Encounters	   in	  Occupied	  Germany	   analyzes	   the	  ways	   in	   which	   U.S.	  occupation	   soldiers,	   German	   civilians	   and	   Jewish	   refugees	   interacted	   with	   one	  another	   to	   create	   an	   ‘historic	   triangle’	   that	   totaled	   sixty	   percent	   of	   Berlin’s	  population	  by	  May	  1945.36	  Aerial	   bombings,	   rape	   and	   fraternization	   are	   not	   the	   only	   themes	   that	  dominate	  the	  historiography	  on	  postwar	  women,	  however.	  Allied	  and	  Soviet	  family	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Naimark, 2. 
35 Perry Biddiscombe, “Dangerous Liaisons: The Anti-Fraternization Movement in the U.S. Occupation 
Zones of Germany and Austria, 1945-1948”, Journal of Social History, vol. 34, no. 3 (Spring 2001): 612, 
632.  
36 Atina Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 2. 
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policy	   in	   occupied	   Germany	   also	   forms	   a	   critical	   juncture.	   Robert	   Moeller’s	  
Protecting	   Motherhood:	   Women	   and	   the	   Family	   in	   the	   Politics	   of	   Postwar	   West	  
Germany	   sheds	   light	   on	   the	   “perceived	   disequilibrium	   of	   gender	   relations”	   by	  studying	   the	   politicization	   of	   gender,	   its	   effect	   on	   postwar	   policymakers,	   and	   the	  familial	   and	   maternity	   reforms	   that	   formed	   the	   basis	   of	   West	   German	  reconstruction.37	  Hester	   Vaizey’s	   Surviving	   Hitler’s	   War:	   Family	   Life	   in	   Germany,	  
1939-­‐48	   argues	   that	   the	   sexist	   undercurrents	   of	   Nazi	   family	   policy	   prevented	  German	  women	   from	  becoming	   liberated	  while	  German	  men	  were	   fighting	  during	  the	   Second	   World	   War.38	  Tara	   Zahra’s	   The	   Lost	   Children:	   Reconstructing	   Europe’s	  
Families	  After	  World	  War	  II	  explores	  the	  plight	  of	  orphaned	  and	  displaced	  children	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  reveals	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Allies	  attempted	  to	  mediate	  this	  massive	  civilian	  crisis.39	  Studies	  on	  Allied	  and	  Soviet	  cultural	  policy	  and	  propaganda	  have	  also	  carved	  a	   unique	   niche	   within	   postwar	   historiography,	   especially	   with	   regard	   to	  denazification	   and	   reeducation.	   Cora	   Sol	   Goldstein’s	   Capturing	   the	   German	   Eye:	  
American	  Visual	  Propaganda	  in	  Occupied	  Germany	  studies	  the	  role	  of	  “cultural	  policy	  as	   strategic	   propaganda”	   in	   the	   U.S.	   Zone,	   research	   that	   is	   central	   to	   our	  understanding	  of	   the	  psychological	  warfare	   that	  dominated	   the	  early	  phase	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.40	  Jennifer	  Fay’s	  Theaters	  of	  Occupation:	  Hollywood	  and	  the	  Reeducation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Robert Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West 
Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 3. 
38  Hester Vaizey, Surviving Hitler’s War: Family Life in Germany, 1939-48 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010).  
39 Tara Zhara, The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe’s Families after World War II (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011).  
40 Cora Goldstein, Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in Occupied Germany 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 1-2. 
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Postwar	  Germany	  suggests	  that	  the	  American	  use	  of	  Hollywood	  film	  as	  a	  vehicle	  of	  reeducation	  and	  cultural	  indoctrination	  was	  “part	  of	  a	  larger	  politico-­‐cultural	  effort	  to	  remake	  Nazis	  into	  liberal	  democrats.”41	  Konrad	  Jarausch’s	  After	  Hitler:	  Recivilizing	  
Germans,	  1945-­‐1999	  argues	  that	  the	  ‘rupture	  of	  civilization’	  that	  followed	  the	  defeat	  of	  Nazism	  suspended	  German	  civilians	  between	  states	  of	  ‘catastrophe’	  and	  ‘tolerant	  civil	   society’	   while	   drawing	   on	   the	   difficulties	   of	   the	   postwar	   period.42	  Jaimey	  Fischer’s	   Disciplining	   Germany:	   Youth,	   Reeducation,	   and	   Reconstruction	   after	   the	  
Second	   World	   War	   posits	   that	   Allied	   emphasis	   on	   reeducating	   German	   youth	   in	  order	   to	   steer	   them	   away	   from	   the	   “now	   tainted	   Wilhelmine,	   Weimar,	   and	   Nazi	  periods”	   created	   a	   means	   of	   suppressing	   guilt,	   militant	   nationalism	   and	   gender	  tensions	  during	  the	  postwar	  period.43	  Finally,	  Konrad	  Jarausch	  and	  Michael	  Geyer’s	  
Shattered	   Past:	   Reconstructing	   German	   Histories	   offers	   insight	   into	   the	   contested	  legacies	   of	   Germans	   under	   Nazism;	   beginning	   with	   Stunde	   Null	   (Zero	   Hour)	   and	  ending	   with	   German	   Unification,	   Jarausch	   and	   Geyer	   trace	   the	   arc	   of	   German	  historiography	   while	   considering	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   events	   of	   the	   first	   and	  second	  halves	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  have	  shaped	  historical	  interpretation.44	  These	   historiographical	   trends	   expose	   a	   fundamental	   lack	   of	   literature	   on	  German	  women	   under	   French	   occupation	   in	   post-­‐Nazi	   Germany,	   a	   lacuna	   that	   in	  turn	   silences	   the	   inherently	  gendered	  experiences	  of	  defeat	   and	  occupation	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41  Jennifer Fay, Theaters of Occupation: Hollywood and the Reeducation of Postwar Germany 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), ivx. 
42 Konrad Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1999 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 4, 17. 
43 Jaimey Fischer, Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, and Reconstruction after the Second World 
War (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2007), 2, 4-5. 
44 Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), viii-ix. 
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French	  Zone	  and	  obscure	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  French	  policy	  toward	  German	  women,	  or	   lack	   thereof,	   ultimately	   shaped	  West	   Germany.	   The	   absence	   of	   comprehensive	  scholarship	  on	  this	  subject	  also	  poses	  a	  particular	  challenge	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	   French	   occupation	   administration’s	   attitudes	   and	   policies	   toward	   women	   in	  their	   Zone.	   In	   this	   regard,	   analyzing	  women	   in	   the	   French	   Zone	  within	   the	   larger	  context	   of	  German	  women’s	   experiences	   in	   each	  occupation	  Zone	  will	   allow	  us	   to	  assess	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   women	   under	   French	   occupation	   were	   socially	   and	  politically	  marginalized.	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  __________________________________________________________________________________	  
A	  Gendered	  Occupation:	  	  




By	  May	   1945,	   sixty	   percent	   of	   Berlin’s	   total	   population	   of	   2.6	  million	  was	  composed	   of	   women,	   refugees	   and	   occupation	   soldiers.45	  	   Seventy	   million	   cubic	  meters	   of	   the	   city	   had	   been	   reduced	   to	   rubble	   and	   aerial	   bombing	   had	   destroyed	  over	   fifty	   percent	   of	   homes.46	  A	   January	   10,	   1945	   Swedish	   newspaper	   article	  describes	  the	  shocking	  sight	  of	  war-­‐torn	  Berlin:	  “We	  are	  struck	  by	  the	  sight	  of	  ruins	  upon	  returning	   to	  Berlin	  after	  one	  year	  of	  absence...	   sometimes	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	  find	  the	  houses	  in	  which	  we	  lived	  several	  years	  earlier.	  The	  walls	  are	  collapsing	  to	  the	  point	  where	  they	  falling	  into	  neighboring	  buildings...	  We	  ask	  ourselves	  if	  it	  will	  even	  be	  possible	  to	  rebuild	  the	  city	  in	  the	  future.”47	  A	  February	  1,	  1945	  BBC	  article	  conveys	   similar	   conditions,	   reporting	   that	   “the	   people	   of	   Berlin,	   already	   in	   a	  miserable	  state	  due	  to	  Allied	  aerial	  attacks,	  are	  trembling	  from	  cold	  and	  are	  hungry.	  They	  have	  not	  had	  coal	  since	  last	  Sunday	  and	  are	  lacking	  more	  and	  more	  bread	  and	  potatoes.”48	  Amidst	   heaps	   of	   bombed	   out	   infrastructure	   and	   empty	   promises	   of	   food	  rations,	  Germans	  anxiously	  awaited	  the	  arrival	  of	  occupation	  troops.	  Berlin	  was	  not	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32-33. 
47 “Berlin en ruines”, StockholmsTidningen, January 10, 1945, EMAT/SHD: 7P161.  
48 Norman Macdonald, “Life in Berlin with Refugees from the East,” February 1, 1945, BBC, EMAT/SHD: 
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just	  a	  defeated	  city,	  Konrad	  Jarausch	  explains,	  but	  a	  “rupture	  of	  civilization”	  rife	  with	  mass	  rape,	  aerial	  bombings	  and	  food	  shortages.49	  Fear	  and	  uncertainty	  saturated	  the	  postwar	  climate	  as	  each	  civilian	  attempted	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  consequences	  of	   defeat	   and	   the	   expectations	   of	   occupation:	   “Would	   the	   Germans	   be	   allowed	   to	  survive	   at	   all,	   or	   would	   their	   liberated	   neighbors	   exact	   a	   bloody	   revenge	   for	   the	  crimes	  that	  had	  been	  committed	  against	  them?	  How	  would	  the	  occupation	  powers	  deal	  with	   this	   defeated	   people…	  would	   they	   grant	   them	   a	  minimal	   sustenance	   so	  that	   they	  might	   live	   on	   somehow?”50	  It	   quickly	   became	   evident	   that	   German	   girls	  and	  women	  were	   to	   receive	   very	   different	   answers	   to	   these	   questions	   than	   their	  male	  counterparts.	  	  	  
The	  Rape	  of	  German	  Women	  by	  Occupation	  Soldiers	  	   	   	   	  	   The	  harrowing	  experience	  of	   rape	   for	  German	  girls	  and	  women	  during	   the	  ‘liberation’	   of	   Berlin	   in	   April	   1945	   reveals	   the	   inherently	   gendered	   nature	   of	  occupation,	  one	  that	  was	  not	  easily	  understood	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  civilian	  population.	  Ernst	  Stecker,	  a	  Ruhr	  metalworker,	  recalls	  that	  “‘The	  German	  soldier	  fought	  for	  six	  years,	  the	  German	  woman	  for	  only	  five	  minutes!’	  That’s	  a	  fact	  from	  beginning	  to	  end.	  I	   was	   ashamed.” 51 	  The	   anonymous	   diarist	   of	   A	   Woman	   in	   Berlin	   recalls	   the	  immediate	   postwar	   situation	   differently.	   She	   describes	   the	   horrors	   that	  accompanied	   Soviet	   shock	   troops	   as	   they	   ravaged	   their	   way	   through	   Berlin	   and	  raped	  the	  young,	  the	  pregnant,	  the	  elderly	  and	  the	  sick:	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50 Jarausch, 4. 
51 Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, 67. 
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One	  of	  them	  grabs	  hold	  of	  me	  and	  shoves	  me	  into	  the	  front	  room,	  pushing	  the	  window	  out	  of	  the	  way…	  No	  sound.	  Only	  an	  involuntary	  grinding	  of	  teeth	  when	  my	  underclothes	  are	  ripped	  apart.	  The	  last	  untorn	  ones	  I	  had…	  I	  open	  my	  eyes.	  A	  stranger’s	  hands	  expertly	  pulling	  apart	  my	   jaws.	  Eye	   to	  eye.	  Then	  with	  great	  deliberation	  he	  drops	  a	  gob	  of	  gathered	  spit	   into	  my	  mouth…	  The	  corners	  of	  the	  mouth	  lift,	  tiny	  wrinkles	  radiate	  from	  the	  corners	  of	  his	  eyes.	  The	  man	  is	  smiling.52	  	  	  As	  her	  account	  unfolds,	  the	  diarist	  recalls	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  women	  tried	  to	  avoid	  being	   raped,	   including	   disguising	   themselves	   as	   men	   and	   scaring	   and	   injuring	  themselves	  in	  order	  to	  seem	  unattractive.	  Some	  women	  hid	  on	  the	  highest	  floors	  of	  bombed	  out	  apartment	  buildings	  in	  hopes	  that	  soldiers	  would	  be	  too	  lazy	  to	  climb	  numerous	  flights	  of	  stairs	  during	  their	  nighttime	  rape	  sprees;	  others	  took	  refuge	  in	  hospitals	   that	   doctors	   and	   nurses	   had	   pretended	   were	   leprosy	   and	   tuberculosis	  wards.53	  These	  techniques	  seldom	  worked,	  however,	  and	  nearly	  two	  million	  German	  women	  were	  raped	  by	  May	  1945.	  	  Soviet	  hate	  propaganda	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  catalyzing	  these	  massive	  waves	  of	  Red	  Army	  violence.	  Ilya	  Ehrenburg,	  a	  widely	  read	  Soviet	  journalist,	  wrote:	  “If	  you	  have	  not	  killed	  a	  German	  a	  day,	  you	  have	  wasted	  that	  day...	  If	  you	  kill	  one	  German,	  kill	  another-­‐	  there	  is	  nothing	  funnier	  for	  us	  than	  a	  pile	  of	  German	  corpses.”54	  Signs	  erected	  along	  roads	  encouraged	  Red	  Army	  soldiers	  to	  avenge	  Wehrmacht	  atrocities	  during	  their	  advance	  on	  Berlin	  with	  phrases	  such	  as	  “Soldier:	  You	  are	  in	  Germany,	  take	  revenge	  on	  the	  Hitlerites!”55	  As	  Robert	  Moeller	  points	  out,	  the	  rape	  of	  German	  women	  by	  the	  Red	  Army	  symbolized	  “the	  rape	  of	  the	  German	  nation”	  and	  became	  a	  means	  of	  avenging	  a	  people	  whose	  regime	  had	  murdered	  millions	  in	  the	  Holocaust	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and	  on	  the	  Eastern	  Front.	  56	  Atina	  Grossmann,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  historians	  to	  break	  the	  silence	   on	   the	  Red	  Army	   rapes	   in	   the	  1990s,	   suggests	   that	   the	  notorious	  Week	  of	  Mass	  Rapes	  in	  Berlin	  from	  April	  24	  to	  May	  8,	  1945	  served	  as	  a	  vehicle	  of	  humiliation	  to	  demoralize	  the	  German	  people.57	  Frederick	  Taylor	  claims	  that	  Soviet	  propaganda	  encouraged	  the	  Red	  Army	  to	  rape	  German	  women	  who	  had	  “sat	  safe	  at	  home	  while	  the	  men	  of	   the	  Wehrmacht	   ravaged	  Belarus,	   the	  Ukraine,	   the	  Caucasus,	   the	  plains	  before	  Moscow.”58	  Antony	  Beevor	  makes	  a	  different	  claim	  by	  arguing	   that	   the	  Red	  Army	  viewed	  German	  women	  as	  “sexual	  spoils	  of	  war”	  instead	  of	  as	  “substitutes	  for	  the	  Wehrmacht	   on	  which	   to	   vent	   their	   rage.”59	  Perhaps	   the	  mass	   rape	   of	   German	  girls	   aged	   as	   young	   as	   nine	   and	   women	   as	   old	   as	   ninety	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   the	  foundational	   stage	  of	   Soviet	  occupation	  policy,	   in	   that	  what	  began	  as	   the	   “forceful	  occupation	   of	   German	  women’s	   bodies”	   soon	   became	   the	   occupation	   of	   an	   entire	  nation.60	  Although	   the	   Red	   Army	   raped	   German	   women	   on	   mass	   scales,	   evidence	  suggests	  that	  there	  was	  mass	  sexual	  violence	  against	  women	  in	  the	  Western	  Zones	  as	  well.	  Scholars	  have	  yet	  to	  produce	  a	  comprehensive	  study	  on	  the	  rape	  of	  German	  women	  by	  French,	  American	  and	  British	  soldiers,	  however,	  and	  little	  is	  known	  about	  German	  women’s	  experiences	  with	  rape	  during	  the	  early	  phase	  of	  Allied	  occupation.	  While	  rape	  figures	  for	  the	  British	  Zone	  are	  unknown,	  the	  U.S.	  Army’s	  Judge	  Advocate	  Division	  dealt	  with	  a	  reported	  five	  hundred	  cases	  of	  rape	  each	  week	  from	  January	  to	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April	   1945.61	  Rape	   also	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   common	   in	   the	   French	   Army	   as	   the	  French	   advanced	   through	   western	   Germany	   during	   the	   final	   wartime	   offensive.	  Norman	   Naimark	   argues	   that	   of	   all	   the	   Western	   Zones,	   the	   “poor	   discipline	   and	  rapacity”	  of	  French	  occupation	  soldiers	  most	  closely	  paralleled	  the	  poor	  conduct	  of	  the	  Red	  Army	  during	  the	  initial	  phase	  of	  the	  occupation	  when	  “German	  women	  were	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  indiscriminate	  rampaging	  that	  they	  faced	  in	  the	  Eastern	  zone.”62	  The	  sheer	  chaos	   that	  ensued	   the	  French	  occupation	  of	  German	   towns	  and	  villages	  may	   be	   a	   reason	   why	   the	   rape	   of	   civilians	   is	   poorly	   documented.	   Civilian	  evacuations	   and	   mass	   reprisals	   under	   General	   de	   Lattre	   de	   Tassigny,	   the	  Commander	  of	   the	  French	  Army,	   led	   to	   the	  displacement	  and	  expulsion	  of	   tens	  of	  thousands	   of	   German	   civilians-­‐	   including	   25,000	   people	   from	   the	   towns	   of	  Reichenau,	  Gailingen	  am	  Rhein,	  Weichs	  and	  Randen-­‐	  upheavals	  that	  likely	  left	  many	  people	  with	  no	  means	  of	  reporting	  crimes.63	  Despite	  an	  overall	  lack	  of	  rape	  figures,	  an	   April	   10,	   1945	   Mandatory	   Directive	   Notice	   circulated	   throughout	   the	   French	  Army	   reveals	   that	   de	  Lattre	  was	   very	  much	   aware	  of	   frequent	   incidents	   of	   sexual	  violence	  against	  German	  women.	  Clause	  9	  of	   the	  Directive	   forbids	  French	  soldiers	  from	   circulating	   throughout	   occupied	   territory	   at	   night	   without	   justified	   cause,	  matter-­‐of-­‐factly	  stating	  that	  “these	  are	  the	  most	  efficient	  means	  of	  avoiding	  acts	  of	  violence	  against	  women.”64	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Overall	   rape	   figures	   for	   the	   French	   occupied	   territories	   remain	   unknown,	  however	   studies	   conducted	   by	  Marc	   Hillel,	   Manfred	   Bosch	   and	   Hermann	  Werner	  confirm	  that	  there	  were	  at	  least	  385	  rapes	  in	  Constance,	  600	  rapes	  in	  Bruchsal	  and	  500	  rapes	  in	  Freudenstadt	  by	  French	  occupation	  soldiers.65	  In	  Koblenz,	  the	  Regional	  President	   recorded	   that	   the	   number	   of	   “injury	   to	   persons	   through	   occupation”	  totaled	   three	   thousand	   civilians,	   of	   which	   the	   number	   of	   women	   is	   unknown;	   in	  Cochem	   an	   der	   Mosel,	   French	   occupation	   soldiers	   fathered	   twenty	   two	   babies	  through	  rape.66	  Yet	  of	  all	  these	  cases,	  the	  Stuttgart	  Rape	  Incident	  remains	  the	  most	  notorious.	  	  In	   July	   1945,	   a	   storm	   of	   controversy	   swept	   over	   the	   world	   after	   it	   was	  reported	   that	   French	   colonial	   occupation	   soldiers	   from	   Morocco	   under	   General	  Eisenhower’s	   command	   had	   raped	   between	   two	   thousand	   and	   five	   thousand	  German	  women	  in	  the	  Stuttgart	  subway;	  the	  incident	  was	  later	  dismissed	  following	  a	  U.S.	  Senate	  hearing	  on	  July	  17,	  1945	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  there	  was	  no	  subway	  in	  Stuttgart	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  the	  accused	  soldiers	  were	  never	  court-­‐martialed.67	  A	  July	  7,	  1945	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  reports	  that	  the	  Stuttgart	  Inquiry	  found	  no	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  rape	  accusations,	  although	  another	  article	  of	  August	  11,	  1945	  titled	  “Rape	   Story	   Dispute	   Grows	   in	   Stuttgart”	   suggests	   that	   the	   notoriety	   of	   the	   case	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Biddiscombe, “Dangerous Liaisons”, 635. 
66 Taylor, 147. 
67 The Stuttgart Rape Incident remains a point of contention amongst scholars, in that the incidents that 
transpired remain unclear. The U.S. Senate quickly dismissed the allegations during a hearing of July 17, 
1945 by stating that there had not been a subway in Stuttgart at the time (United States Congress, 
Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates, vol. 91, part 6 (U.S. Government Printing Office: 1945), 
7739). Karen Hagemann states that Moroccan soldiers raped 1,198 women and murdered four in the U-
Bahn in Stuttgart but that the case was later disproved by U.S. and British authorities (Karen Hagemann, 
Home/front: The Military, War, and Gender in Twentieth-Century Germany (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 149). 
Norman Naimark makes a passing reference to the “mass rapes in Stuttgart” but does not comment on their 
authenticity (Naimark, 138).  
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intensified	   as	   the	   occupation	   began	   to	   take	   shape.68	  Although	   the	   inquiry	   was	  officially	  dismissed,	  the	  contentious	   legacies	  of	  the	  Stuttgart	  Rape	  Incident	  suggest	  that	  the	  backlash	  surrounding	  the	  rape	  of	  women	  by	  ‘nonwhite’	  occupation	  soldiers	  was	   very	   much	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	   racist	   legacies	   of	   the	   Rhineland	   occupation	  following	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  	  The	   legacies	   of	   sexual	   violence	   against	   women	   under	   occupation	   can	   be	  charted	   semantically.	   The	   German	   word	   Fisimatenten,	   for	   example,	   a	   term	   that	  derives	   from	  the	  French	  phrase	   “visitez	  ma	   tente”	   (“visit	  my	   tent”),	   sheds	   light	  on	  the	  dynamic	  between	  the	  occupier	  and	  the	  occupied.	  This	  phrase	  originates	  from	  the	  time	   of	   the	   Napoleonic	  Wars	   when	   French	   occupation	   forces	   courteously	   invited	  people	   into	   their	   tents;	   the	   term	  was	   later	   used	   by	   French	   occupation	   soldiers	   to	  coerce	   German	   women	   to	   engage	   in	   sexual	   activity.69	  Parenthetically,	   the	   violent	  legacies	  of	   the	  occupation	  of	  post-­‐Fascist	   Italy	  by	  French	  colonial	  soldiers	  can	  also	  be	   traced	   through	   semantics.	  The	   rape	  of	   Italian	  women	   in	  Monte	  Cassino	   in	  May	  1944	  by	  Goumiers,	  Moroccan	  soldiers	  who	  fought	  in	  the	  French	  colonial	  army,	  led	  to	  the	   Italian	   word	   marocchinate,	   which	   is	   now	   synonymous	   with	   “an	   orgy	   of	  violence.”70	  These	  terms	  reveal	  the	  way	  in	  which	  ‘race’	  and	  ‘gender’	  often	  intersect	  in	   postwar	   contexts.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   post-­‐Nazi	   Germany,	   defeat	   was	   not	   simply	  accompanied	  by	  anxieties	  about	  occupation	  but	  also	  by	  anxieties	  about	  who	  would	  be	  doing	  the	  occupying.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 “Rape Story Unsupported, 6th Army Group Says Stuttgart Inquiry Finds No Basis For It,” New York 
Times, July 7, 1945, p. 4; “Rape Story Dispute Grows in Stuttgart,” New York Times, August 11, 1945, p. 
10.  
69 I would like to thank Frau Maria Grote, my German teacher at the Goethe-Institut Montreal, for bringing 
this interesting point to my attention. A more detailed, albeit brief, explanation of this term can be found in 
Herman H. Parret and Jacques Bouveresse, Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981), 104. 
70 Taylor, 146. 
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The	   contentious	   legacies	   of	   the	   post-­‐First	   World	   War	   occupation	   of	   the	  German	  Rhineland	  reinforced	  racist	  perceptions	  of	  colonial	  soldiers	  in	  the	  post-­‐Nazi	  period.	  These	   attitudes	   reveal	   that	  German	  women’s	   collective	   experience	  of	   rape	  was	  as	  much	  racialized	  as	  it	  was	  gendered.	  This	  was	  especially	  true	  of	  the	  Rhineland	  Occupation	  of	  1919	  to	  1923,	  during	  which	  the	  presence	  of	  French	  colonial	  soldiers	  in	  the	  Triple	  Entente’s	  occupation	  armies	  stirred	  much	  anxiety	  amongst	  the	  German	  population.	   The	   deployment	   of	   La	   Force	   Noire-­‐	   French	   colonial	   troops	   from	  Morocco,	  Algeria	  and	  Senegal-­‐	  into	  the	  Rhineland	  following	  the	  Great	  War	  was	  met	  by	   vehement	   criticism	   by	   the	   German	   population	   who	   then	   began	   a	   racist	  propaganda	  campaign	  called	  the	  ‘Black	  Horror	  on	  the	  Rhine’	  to	  discredit	  the	  French	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  their	  fellow	  victors.71	  During	  postwar	  negotiations	  between	  the	  Triple	  Entente	  and	  the	  Central	  Powers	  in	  Spa,	  Belgium	  in	  1918,	  Marshall	  Ferdinand	  Foch,	  the	   Supreme	   Commander	   of	   the	   Allied	   Armies,	   refused	   to	   guarantee	   German	  delegates	   that	   the	  French	  would	  not	  deploy	  colonial	   soldiers	   into	   the	  Rhineland.72	  German	  Foreign	  Minister	  Wilhelm	  Solf	  had	  told	  his	  emissaries	  to	  discourage	  the	  use	  of	  French	  and	  American	  ‘coloured	  troops’	  and	  had	  even	  asked	  the	  Swiss	  to	  mediate	  the	  issue	  in	  November	  1918.73	  The	  German	  delegation	  restated	  their	  concern	  at	  the	  Paris	  Peace	  Conference	  in	  1919	  by	  stating	  that	  “colored	  troops	  should	  not	  be	  made	  a	  part	  of	  the	  army	  of	  occupation.”74	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Keith L. Nelson, “The ‘Black Horror on the Rhine’: Race as a Factor in post-World War I Diplomacy”, 
The Journal of Modern History, vol. 42, no. 4 (Dec., 1970): 609. 
72 Reiner Pommerin, “The Fate of Mixed Blood Children in Germany”, German Studies Review, vol. 5,  
no. 3 (Oct. 1982): 316. 
73 Nelson, “The ‘Black Horror on the Rhine’, 609. 
74 Nelson, 609. 
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These	   protests	   fell	   on	   deaf	   ears,	   and	   by	   the	   winter	   of	   1919	   there	   were	  200,000	   French	   occupation	   soldiers	   on	   the	   Rhine,	   42,000	   of	   whom	   were	   French	  North	  African.75	  	  Upon	  learning	  that	  the	  French	  were	  deploying	  colonial	  occupation	  troops	  into	  the	  Rhineland,	  Lord	  Derby,	  the	  British	  ambassador	  in	  Paris,	  remarked,	  “I	  cannot	   think	   of	   anything	   more	   calculated	   to	   irritate	   the	   Germans.” 76 	  Further	  correspondence	  between	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  and	  Georges	  Clemenceau	  in	  the	  Council	  of	   Four	   at	   Versailles	   suggests	   that	   even	   Clemenceau	   had	   been	  wary	   of	   deploying	  colonial	  troops	  into	  the	  Rhineland:	  	  	   Woodrow	  Wilson:	  	   	   I	  have	  been	  told	  that	  the	  French	  government	  has	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   the	  intention	  of	  sending	  Senegalese	  into	  the	  left	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   bank.	  Is	  this	  true?	  	  
Georges	  Clemenceau:	  	   	   There	  is	  exactly	  a	  battalion	  there	  now,	  but	  I	  plan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   to	  retire	  them,	  for	  I	  believe	  as	  you	  do	  that	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   would	  be	  a	  grave	  error	  to	  occupy	  the	  left	  bank	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   with	  black	  troops.77	  	  	  	  The	  French	  High	  Command	  treated	  colonial	   soldiers	   like	   “second-­‐class	  citizens”	   to	  the	  point	  where	  “even	  the	  graves	  of	  black	  troops	  in	  French	  military	  cemeteries	  were	  segregated	   from	   those	   of	   white	   troops”,	   an	   attitude	   that	   mirrored	   the	   German	  population’s	   perception	   that	   “coloured	   races	   rightly	   occupied	   a	   lower	   level	   of	  civilization	  and	  culture	  than	  the	  white	  race.”78	  To	  German	  civilians,	  the	  presence	  of	  colonial	  occupation	  troops	  was	  the	  ultimate	  symbol	  of	  total	  and	  humiliating	  defeat.	  Consequently,	   the	   German	   media	   began	   to	   circulate	   vicious	   propaganda	   against	  these	   ‘nonwhite’	   soldiers	   in	   order	   to	   heighten	   fears	   about	   the	   potential	   spread	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Ibid., 609. 
76 Sally Marks, “Black Watch on the Rhine: A Study in Propaganda, Prejudice and Prurience”, European 
Studies Review, vol. 13, no. 3 (July 1983): 297.  
77 This memorandum is from the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and has been published in 
Nelson’s article, “The ‘Black Horror on the Rhine’”, 609. 
78 Peter Collar, The Propaganda War in the Rhineland: Weimar Germany, Race and Occupation after 
World War I (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2013), 105.  
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parasites,	   leprosy	   and	   venereal	   disease.79	  It	   soon	   became	   evident,	   however,	   that	  colonial	   soldiers	   seldom	   attacked	   German	   women	   during	   the	   occupation.	   Even	  Margarete	   Gärtner,	   the	   director	   of	   the	   Rheinische	   Frauenliga	   (Rhenish	   Women’s	  League)	   and	   mastermind	   behind	   much	   of	   the	   racist	   propaganda	   that	   was	   in	  circulation	  during	   the	  Black	  Horror,	  admits	   that	   there	  had	  only	  been	  one	  hundred	  and	  thirty	  attacks	  against	  German	  girls	  and	  women	  during	  the	  occupation.80	  During	  a	   tour	   of	   the	   Rhineland	   in	   1921,	   American	   writer	   Lewis	   Gannet	   recalls	   a	  conversation	  with	  a	  Rhenish	  police	   commissioner	  who	   informed	  him	   that	   colonial	  soldiers	   were	   peaceful	   and	   disciplined;	   it	   had	   been	   the	   white	   French	   troops,	   the	  commissioner	  pointed	  out,	  who	  had	  treated	  the	  German	  people	  poorly.81	  The	   racist	   legacies	   of	   the	   Black	   Horror	   shaped	   civilian	   expectations	   of	   the	  postwar	  occupation	  of	  Germany	  in	  1945,	  too.	  The	  unsolved	  mystery	  of	  the	  Stuttgart	  Subway	  Incident	  suggests	  that	  the	  episode	  may	  have	  been	  fabricated	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  heighten	  racial	  anxieties	  or	  that	  the	  U.S.	  Army	  had	  anxiously	  concealed	  the	  violent	  crimes	   that	   had	   occurred	   under	   Eisenhower’s	   command.	   A	   German	   pastor’s	  recollection	  of	  the	  conduct	  of	  French	  colonial	  soldiers	  near	  Freiburg	  runs	  contrary	  to	   that	   of	   the	   Stuttgart	   allegations,	   however:	   “The	   first	   enemy	   troops	  who	  passed	  through	   the	   village	   (25	   April)	   were	   Moroccans	   under	   the	   command	   of	   French	  officers.	  They	  descended	  the	  routes	  leading	  into	  Schauinsland	  in	  somewhat	  ragged	  order...	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  men	  was	  in	  general	  correct,	  since	  the	  officers	  kept	  them	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under	   the	   strictest	   discipline.” 82 	  Yet	   despite	   their	   disciplined	   conduct,	   biting	  propaganda	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Black	  Horror	  continued	  to	  circulate	  throughout	  the	  Western	  Zones.	  Nazi	  sympathizers	  and	  right	  wing	  Germans	  were	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  perpetuating	   racist	   stereotypes	   about	   ‘nonwhite’	   occupation	   soldiers.	  Members	   of	  
Werwolf,	   the	   underground	   Nazi	   guerilla	   movement	   that	   operated	   in	   the	  Western	  Zones,	  spread	  rumours	  about	  the	  rape	  of	  German	  women	  by	  ‘nonwhite’	  occupation	  soldiers	  in	  hopes	  that	  lingering	  Nazi	  ideology	  about	  ‘racial	  purity’	  would	  encourage	  the	   occupied	   population	   to	   shift	   the	   blame	   for	   defeat	   onto	   French	   colonial	   and	  African	   American	   occupation	   soldiers.83	  In	   many	   ways,	   this	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	  continuation	   of	   the	   nationalist	  myths	   and	   racial	   intolerance	   that	   drove	   the	   rise	   of	  National	  Socialism	  after	  the	  Great	  War.	  	  	  Racial	  intolerance	  toward	  colonial	  soldiers	  was	  not	  just	  rampant	  amongst	  the	  German	   population,	   however.	   The	   strict	   manner	   by	   which	   the	   French	   Army	  disciplined	   its	   colonial	   troops	   reflects	   France’s	   own	   struggle	   with	   conceptions	   of	  ‘race’	   during	   the	   denouement	   of	   French	   imperialism.	   The	   decline	   of	   the	   Empire,	  which	  reinforced	  what	  Eric	   Jennings	  calls	  a	  “form	  of	  colonialism	  steeped	   in	  social-­‐Darwinist	  determinism	  and	  rooted	  in	  a	  reductionist,	  organic	  understanding	  of	  other,	  usually	   ‘primitive’,	   societies	   and	   ‘races’”,	   had	   unacceptable	   consequences	   on	  interactions	  between	  German	  women	  and	   ‘nonwhite’	  occupation	  soldiers	   from	  the	  perspectives	   of	   the	   U.S.	   and	   French	   Armies.84	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   U.S.	   occupation	  Army,	   which	   was	   a	   ‘Jim	   Crow	   army’	   according	   to	   Heide	   Fehrenbach,	   racism	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Taylor, 146. 
83 Biddiscombe, Werwolf !, 50, 260,  
84 Eric Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain’s National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and 
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segregation	   affected	   the	   “social	   dynamics	   and	   perceptions	   of	   the	   American	  occupation,	   both	   among	   American	   soldiers	   and	   between	   American	   occupiers	   and	  Germans.”85	  While	  there	  were	  many	  women	  who	  used	  Nazi	  racial	  hygiene	  to	  justify	  aborting	  the	  artfremd	  (alien	  offspring)	  that	  had	  been	  fathered	  by	   ‘Negro’	  or	   ‘North	  African’	   occupation	   soldiers,	   there	   were	   also	   many	   instances	   of	   cordial	   relations	  between	   ‘nonwhite’	   soldiers	   and	   German	   women.86	  An	   October	   1946	   article	   in	  
Ebony,	  a	  widely	   read	  African	  American	  magazine,	   reported	   that	   the	  eight	  hundred	  black	   GIs	   stationed	   in	   the	   American	   sector	   of	   Berlin	   found	   “more	   friendship	   and	  equality	  in	  Berlin	  than	  in	  Birmingham	  or	  on	  Broadway.”87	  Similarly,	  a	  September	  16,	  1946	   article	   in	   Newsweek	   recalls	   that	   “European’s	   racial	   tolerance	   had	   posed	   a	  problem	  for	  Americans	  that	  will	  not	  be	  forgotten	  with	  the	  war	  or	  with	  the	  return	  of	  Negro	  soldiers	  from	  service	  overseas.”88	  In	  the	  segregated	  bars	  and	  establishments	  of	   the	  U.S.	  Zone,	   for	  example,	   the	  alleged	  violation	  of	  German	  women	  by	  black	  GIs	  became	  a	  convenient	  means	  for	  white	  GIs	  to	  reinforce	  racial	  hatred	  and	  to	  physically	  assault,	   court-­‐martial	   and	  even	  execute	  black	  GIs.89	  In	  a	   similar	  vein,	  German	  men	  were	   equally	   as	   racist	   toward	   ‘nonwhite’	   occupation	   soldiers	   and	   resentful	   of	   the	  interracial	   relationships	   that	   developed,	   often	   labeling	   women	   who	   became	  involved	   with	   black	   occupation	   solders	   Negerliebchen	   (nigger	   lover).90	  Although	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Heide Fehrenbach, “Black Occupation Children and the Devolution of the Nazi Racial State,” After the 
Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe, Rita Chin et al., eds. (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2009), 33.  
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Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 47.  
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University Press, 2003), 108.  
88 Goedde, 110.  
89 Ibid., 109.  
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evidence	   suggests	   that	   African	   American	   GIs	   and	   French	   colonial	   occupation	  soldiers	   seldom	   raped	   or	   physically	   attacked	   German	   women,	   white	   occupation	  soldiers	  viewed	  relations	  between	  ‘nonwhite’	  soldiers	  and	  women	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  racial	  hierarchy.	  	  Although	  scholars	  have	  yet	  to	  produce	  a	  comprehensive	  study	  on	  the	  rape	  of	  German	  women	   by	   Allied	   soldiers,	   it	   becomes	   evident	   that	   sexual	   violence	   in	   the	  Western	   Zones	   often	   intersected	   with	   race	   and	   gender.	   While	   ‘race’	   was	   de-­‐categorized	   and	   was	   dropped	   from	   the	   contemporary	   German	   lexicon	   after	   the	  collapse	  of	  Nazism,	  as	  Rita	  Chin	  and	  Heide	  Fehrenbach	  point	  out,	  perceived	  threats	  toward	  the	  occupier	  and	  the	  occupied’s	  conceptions	  of	  racial	  superiority	  meant	  that	  ‘race’	  was	  deeply	  embedded	  within	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  occupation.91	  White	  soldiers	  likely	   justified	  sexual	  violence	  against	  women	  by	  relying	  on	  the	  pretense	  that	  they	  were	   simply	   “fighting	   the	   good	   fight”	   in	   an	   enemy	   land	   while	   targeting	   and	  persecuting	   ‘nonwhite’	  occupation	  soldiers	   for	  alleged	   instances	  of	   rape.92	  German	  civilians,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   used	   racism	   to	   justify	   the	   shame	   and	   humiliation	   of	  defeat	  and	  occupation.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  allegations	  were	  based	  on	  instances	  of	  fraternization	  between	  ‘nonwhite’	   soldiers	   and	   German	   women,	   a	   subject	   that	   broaches	   the	   obscure	  division	   between	   consensual	   sex	   and	   postwar	   prostitution.	   As	   Robert	   Moeller	  remarks,	   fraternization	   between	   the	   victors	   and	   the	   defeated	   made	   it	   difficult	   to	  determine	  whether	   “women	   in	   the	  western	   zones	   had	   resisted	   too	   little	   or	   not	   at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Rita Chin and Heide Fehrenbach, “Introduction: What’s Race Got to Do With It? Postwar German 
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all.”93	  He	   elaborates	   that	   “sympathy	   for	   the	   rape	   victims	   of	   British,	   French,	   and	  American	   soldiers	   [was]	   blurred	   with	   suspicion	   that	   women	   had	   succumbed	   to	  blandishments	   and	   material	   benefits	   offered	   by	   the	   victors.” 94 	  The	   inherently	  gendered	   experience	   of	   occupation	   forced	   many	   women	   into	   difficult	   and	   often	  deadly	   predicaments.	   More	   often	   than	   not,	   fraternizing	   with	   occupation	   soldiers	  became	  the	  sole	  means	  of	  surviving	  the	  nightmarish	  realities	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  	  	  
Fraternization:	  An	  Allied	  Conundrum	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   The	   Allies	   had	   certain	   expectations	   “conditioned	   by	   deep-­‐seated	   clichés”	  about	   the	   defeated	   people	   they	   encountered	  when	   they	   entered	  Germany:	   “While	  the	  French	  disliked	   the	  Wehrmacht’s	   arrogance	  during	   the	  occupation,	   the	  British	  resented	   the	   random	   terror	   of	   the	   Luftwaffe,	   and	   the	   Russians	   suffered	   from	   the	  devastation	   of	   the	   genocidal	   war,	   the	   Americans	   had	   much	   less	   reason	   to	   hate	  because	   the	   fighting	   did	   not	   reach	   their	   shores	   and	   they	   had	   entered	   the	   conflict	  late.”95 	  German	   expectations	   of	   the	   occupiers	   also	   stemmed	   from	   clichés	   and	  stereotypes	  whose	  “prejudices	  against	  the	  sophisticated	  yet	  weak	  French,	  bumbling	  but	   gallant	   English,	   and	   childlike	   and	   vengeful	   Russians”	   set	   the	   stage	   for	  interactions	   between	   the	   victors	   and	   the	   vanquished,	   particularly	   regarding	  fraternization	  between	  German	  women	  and	  occupation	  soldiers.96	  	  Wartime	   rape	   and	   fraternization	   are	   not	   mutually	   exclusive.	   Elisabeth	  Heineman	   argues	   that	   fraternization	   is	   “the	   putatively	   ‘other’,	   but	   frequently	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difficult-­‐to-­‐disentangle	   side	   of	   the	   rape	   story.”97	  The	   often-­‐transcendent	   boundary	  between	   forced	   sex	   and	   consensual	   sex	  within	   the	   context	   of	   occupation	  makes	   it	  difficult	   to	   distinguish	   between	   who	   is	   raped	   and	   who	   resorts	   to	   fraternization,	  often	   semi-­‐willingly,	   in	   order	   to	   survive.98	  As	   recounted	   throughout	   A	  Woman	   in	  
Berlin,	  many	  German	  women	  prostituted	   themselves	   in	   exchange	   for	   food,	   shelter	  and	   protection	   from	   gang	   rape	   and	   violence.	   Fraternizing	  with	   the	   occupier	   often	  marked	  an	  attempt	  to	  regain	  a	  relative	  degree	  of	  normalcy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  severe	  food	  and	   resource	   shortages:	   “They	   foraged	   for	   fresh	   food	   in	   the	   countryside...	   They	  sewed	   scraps,	   fixed	   worn	   clothes	   and	   shoes,	   searched	   for	   food	   and	   fuel...	   They	  struggled	  to	  keep	  control	  of	  children	  and	  teenagers	  in	  a	  city	  where	  boys	  frolicked	  in	  the	  ruins	  and	  girls	  quickly	  learned	  that	  a	  relationship	  with	  an	  occupier	  was	  the	  best	  way	  to	  support	  their	  mothers.”99	  	  Fraternization	   was	   not	   simply	   an	   exchange	   of	   sexual	   services	   for	   goods,	  however.	   The	   dynamic	   between	   occupation	   soldiers	   and	   women	   underwent	   a	  dramatic	   shift	   during	   the	   course	   of	   the	   occupation,	   one	   that	   Cora	   Goldstein	  describes	  as	  the	  ‘feminization	  of	  fraternization’:	  The	   image	   of	   the	   Trümmerfrau	   existed	   side	   by	   side	  with	   the	  more	   ambiguous	   one	   of	   the	  attractive	   and	  often	  deceptive	   young	  Fräulein	   in	   the	  American	   consciousness.	   Rather	   than	  punishing	  Germans	  for	  their	  atrocities	  during	  the	  war,	  American	  GIs	  became	  providers	  and	  protectors,	   first	   literally	   for	   the	   women	   they	   dated,	   and	   later	   figuratively	   for	   what	   they	  perceived	  to	  be	  an	  emasculated,	  starving	  population.100	  	  Before	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  fraternization	  had	  generally	  meant	  that	  people	  from	  different	   backgrounds,	   religions	   or	   social	   classes	   would	   come	   together	   amicably.	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This	   changed	   when	   the	   Allies	   began	   to	   sympathize	   with	   the	   starving	   and	  predominately	   female	   postwar	   German	   population	   in	   1945.	   By	   this	   time,	   the	  ‘feminization	  of	  fraternization’	  had	  begun	  to	  facilitate	  “a	  shift	  from	  one	  traditionally	  male	   gender	   role-­‐	   conqueror-­‐	   to	   another-­‐	   protector	   and	   provider”,	   a	   process	   that	  victimized	  a	  former	  enemy	  people.101	  	  Although	  Germans	   in	   the	  U.S.	   Zone	  were	   the	  most	  dramatically	   ‘feminized’,	  which	   led	   to	   higher	   incidents	   of	   fraternization	   in	   the	   American	   Zone	   than	   in	   the	  neighboring	  British	   and	  French	  Zones,	   German	  women’s	   initial	   experiences	  under	  American	   occupation	   were	   quite	   difficult.	   A	   German	   reporter	   observes	   that	   “The	  Americans	   have	   demonstrated	   no	   compassion	   or	   pity	   toward	   our	   women	   or	  children...	   the	   population	   of	   the	   village,	  mostly	   composed	   of	  women	   and	   children,	  has	  been	  subjected	  to	  pillaging	  and	  abuse	  by	  American	  troops.”102	  Early	  occurrences	  of	   fraternization	   between	  GIs	   and	  German	  women	  were	   viewed	   as	   physically	   and	  morally	  detrimental	  to	  U.S.	  troops,	  as	  General	  Lucius	  D.	  Clay,	  General	  Eisenhower’s	  Deputy	  of	  German	  Affairs,	  recalls	  in	  his	  memoir:	  	  	  An	   early	   order	   prohibiting	   fraternization,	   required	   under	   our	   directives,	   prevented	   the	  normal	   “boy	   meets	   girl”	   process,	   and	   the	   soldier	   who	   could	   not	   be	   kept	   away	   from	   the	  opposite	   sex	  was	   forced	   to	  meet	  German	  girls	   in	  dark	  halls	   and	   alleys	   and	  under	   cover	   of	  darkness.	  Obviously	  only	  the	  lowest	  type	  of	  girl,	  the	  tramp,	  would	  meet	  with	  soldiers	  under	  such	  conditions.	  Drinking	  and	  venereal	  diseases	  increased.	  Our	  Allies	  experienced	  the	  same	  problem,	   and	   the	   fraternization	   rule	  was	   lifted	   by	  mutual	   agreement	   in	   the	  Allied	   Control	  Council	  in	  September	  1945.	  Special	  Services	  then	  began	  to	  invite	  carefully	  screened	  German	  girls	  to	  the	  clubs	  provided	  for	  our	  soldiers.	  However,	  the	  reputation	  left	  by	  the	  tramps	  made	  attracting	  decent	  girls	  a	  difficult	  and	  slow	  process.	  Our	  regulations	  prohibited	  the	  serving	  of	  food	  to	  Germans	  in	  our	  military	  installations	  and	  hence	  the	  soldiers	  could	  offer	  the	  German	  girls	   only	   liquor.	   It	  was	   some	   time	   before	   clubs	  were	   provided	  where	   soldiers	   could	   take	  girls	  and	  obtain	  food	  and	  soft	  drinks	  for	  them.103	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Goedde, 202. 
102 “L’attitude des américains dans les villages allemands qu’ils occupent,” unknown newspaper, January 3, 
1946, EM/SHD: 7P161.  
103 Lucius D. Clay, Decisions in Germany (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1950), 62. 
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The	   ‘German	   tramp’	   is	   a	   reference	   to	   none	   other	   than	   the	   German	   Fräulein,	   a	  conniving,	  dangerous	  seductress	  who	  became	  a	  focal	  point	  of	  Allied	  propaganda	  in	  the	   early	  months	   of	   the	   occupation.	   An	   occupation	   primer	   distributed	   to	   the	   3rd	  Armor	  Division	  Troops	   in	  May	  1945	  warns	  GIs	  of	   the	  dangers	  of	   fraternizing	  with	  
Fräuleins	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   keep	   troops	   ‘healthy’:	   “Your	   attitude	   toward	  women	   is	  wrong-­‐-­‐	   in	   Germany.	   You’ll	   see	   a	   lot	   of	   good-­‐looking	   babes	   on	   the	   make	   there.	  German	  women	  have	  been	  trained	  to	  seduce	  you.	  Is	  it	  worth	  a	  knife	  in	  the	  back?”104	  Although	   fraternization	   was	   initially	   perceived	   as	   a	   dangerous	   threat	   to	  American	  occupation	  objectives,	  the	  fraternization	  ban	  was	  seldom	  enforced	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Zone	  and	  thus	  allowed	  GIs	  to	  romance	  and	  flirt	  with	  German	  women	  freely.	  An	  autobiography	  published	  during	  the	  occupation	  reveals	  that	  fraternization	  had	  been	  generally	   tolerated	   provided	   that	   GIs	   “sleep	  with	   ‘em	   but	   don’t	   shake	   hands”	   and	  that	   they	   “don’t	   stay	   for	   breakfast.”105	  Colonel	   John	   J.	   Koneazny	   recalls	   a	   similar	  process	   in	   his	   occupation	   diary:	   “We	   had	   forgiven	   the	   Germans,	   or	   at	   least	   their	  pretty	   Fräuleins,	   for	   their	   war	   crimes	   and	   soon	   became	   their	   lovers.	   We	   were	  members	  of	  the	  victorious	  army	  and	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  and	  the	  British	  and	  the	  French	  are	   the	   only	   people	   in	   the	   world	   that	   treat	   our	   enemies	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  Geneva	  Convention.”106	  	  Fraternization	   was	   not	   unique	   to	   GIs,	   however.	   It	   occurred	   in	   the	   British	  Zone,	  too,	  though	  not	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Zone.	  A	  June	  21,	  1947	  article	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 12th Army Group, German Occupation Booklet, “Don’t Be a Sucker in Germany!”, May 1945, 3rd 
Armored Division History Foundation. 
105 Heineman, What Difference does a Husband Make?, 147. 
106 Colonel John J. Koneazny, Behind Friendly Lines: Tales from World War II (Burnstown: General Store 
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in	   Der	   Abend	   reveals	   that	   British	   soldiers	   and	   German	   women	   were	   fraternizing	  with	   one	   another	   long	   before	   the	   British	  Military	   Government	   formally	   lifted	   the	  fraternization	  ban	   in	   June	  1947.107	  The	  dynamic	  between	  German	  civilians	  and	  the	  British	  Military	  Government	  was	  generally	  cordial.	  One	  German	  woman	  recalls	  that	  “on	  the	  part	  of	   the	  English	  soldiers	  there	  was	  not	   the	  slightest	  misconduct	   toward	  the	   German	   civilian	   population.” 108 	  Severe	   food	   shortages	   and	   difficult	   living	  conditions	  in	  the	  British	  Zone	  made	  fraternizing	  with	  American	  soldiers	  much	  more	  appealing	  to	  German	  women,	  however,	  as	  GIs	  had	  more	  food	  and	  resources	  at	  their	  disposal	  with	  which	  to	  woo	  the	  objects	  of	  their	  affection.109	  One	  German	  man	  recalls	  that	  American	  soldiers	  “were	  easily	  able	  to	  meet	  their	  great	  demand	  for	   ‘Frolleins’	  with	   cigarettes	   and	   chocolate,	   despite	   the	   official	   ‘fraternization	   ban.’”110	  Another	  German	  man	  bitterly	  complains	  that	  “For	  six	  years	  we	  risked	  our	  lives	  for	  them	  and	  now	  they’re	  running	  around	  with	  the	  Americans.”111	  The	  use	  of	  degrading	  terms	  like	  
Schokoladenhure	   (chocolate	   whore)	   to	   describe	   women	   who	   fraternized	   with	  occupation	   soldiers	   in	   exchange	   for	   commodities	   like	   chocolate	   bars	   reflects	  German	  men’s	   interpretation	   of	   this	   process	   as	   a	   humiliating	   symbol	   of	   defeat.112	  Conversely,	   the	  American	   and	  British	   blends	   of	   fraternization	  were	   not	   echoed	   in	  the	  French	  Zone,	  where	  fraternization	  assumed	  a	  uniquely	  pervasive	  character.	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The	  French	  encountered	  a	  new	  enemy	  when	  they	  occupied	  and	  demilitarized	  Nazi	  Germany	  during	  the	  spring	  of	  1945.	  This	  enemy,	  the	  German	  woman,	  was	  not	  necessarily	  armed	  but	  morally	  threatening.	  Like	  in	  the	  British	  and	  American	  Zones,	  a	  fraternization	  ban	  had	  been	  put	  into	  effect	  as	  early	  as	  April	  10,	  1945.113	  A	  French	  occupation	   manual	   distributed	   to	   all	   French	   occupation	   soldiers	   served	   as	   a	  reminder	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  fraternizing	  with	  the	  German	  people	  while	  in	  “an	  enemy	  country”:	  	   FRENCH	  SOLDIER	  	  	   	   	   	  Every	  German,	  of	  every	  age,	  and	  every	  sex,	  is	  an	  enemy:	  	  	   	   	   	  	   	   -­‐	  The	  child,	  the	  woman,	  the	  elderly	  who	  attract	  pity	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  Nazi	  agents.	  	   	   	   	   	  -­‐	  The	  antifascists	  in	  prisons	  are	  Party	  agents,	  camouflaged	  and	  waiting	  for	  revenge...	  	  -­‐	  The	  woman	  who	  smiles	  at	  you.	  -­‐	  Your	  hatred	  and	  victor	  superiority	  stem	  from	  your	  attitude,	  but	  not	  excessively	  or	  violently,	  as	  pillage	  and	  rape	  are	  serious	  military	  misconducts	  punishable	  by	  death.114	  	  Despite	   strict	   regulations	   that	   prohibited	   rape	   and	   fraternization,	   the	   dynamic	  between	   German	   women	   and	   French	   soldiers	   followed	   a	   distinct	   trajectory	   from	  those	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  British	  Zones.	  German	  civilians	  were	  expected	  to	  billet	  French	  occupation	   soldiers	   in	   their	   homes,	   which	   had	   dramatic	   consequences	   on	   social	  interactions	  between	  occupiers	  and	  occupied.	  One	  German	  man	  recalls	  developing	  a	  close	  friendship	  with	  the	  French	  civil	  servant	  he	  was	  billeting;	  the	  Frenchman	  had	  even	   looked	  after	  his	   children	  while	   the	   lady	  of	   the	  house	  had	  gone	   into	   labor,	   an	  example	   that	   journalist	   Rebecca	   West	   calls	   “fraternization	   with	   greater	   accuracy	  than	   the	   process	   known	   by	   that	   name	   in	   the	   British	   and	   American	   Zones,	   which	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often	   seemed	   to	   have	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   Latin	   word	   for	   brother.”115	  This	  seemingly	   cordial	   dynamic	   seems	   to	   have	   influenced	   the	   French’s	   laissez-­‐faire	  attitude	   toward	   fraternization	   altogether.	   Frederick	   Taylor	   argues	   that	   the	   “usual	  French	   common	   sense	   in	   sexual	  matters”	  meant	   that	   “very	   little	   official	   attention	  was	  paid	  to	  liaisons	  between	  their	  soldiers	  and	  German	  women.”116	  As	   one	   German	   journalist	   observed	   in	   1947,	   fraternization	   in	   the	   French	  Zone	  became	  an	  entirely	  different	  phenomenon	  from	  its	  American	  counterpart:	  	  Fraternization	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  brand	  does	  not	  exist.	  The	  ‘Fraulein-­‐poilu	  liaison’	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  public	  affair	  as	  the	  GI-­‐Fraulein	  romance;	  moreover,	  it	  is	  not	  based	  on	  candies	  and	  cigarettes.	   The	   Frenchman	   and	   the	   German	   girl	   do	   not	   meet	   in	   the	   streets…	   Frenchmen	  marry	   Germans	   without	   much	   publicity.	   The	   French	   common	   sense	   wherever	   relations	  between	  the	  sexes	  are	  concerned	  prevented	  them	  from	  making	  fools	  of	  themselves.117	  	  Unlike	   its	   neighboring	   zones,	   the	   French	   were	   discreet	   about	   their	   relationships	  with	  German	  women	  and	  the	  French	  Military	  Government	  often	  turned	  a	  blind	  eye	  from	   such	   affairs.118	  The	   lenient	   manner	   by	   which	   these	   liaisons	   were	   regarded	  stems	  from	  French	  attitudes	  toward	  sex	  and	  romance.	  The	  duality	  between	  love	  and	  sex	  in	  French	  society	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  “ideal	  of	  conjugal	  sexuality”	  during	  the	  pre-­‐war	  Third	  Republic,	  Elizabeth	  Roudinesco	  argues:	  “The	  bourgeois	  generated	  his	  offspring	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  marital	  bed,	  but	  he	  gave	  free	  reign	  to	  his	  instincts	  only	  with	   prostitutes.	   He	   mixed	   together	   hygiene	   with	   the	   defense	   of	   the	   race,	   loved	  pleasure,	  but	  dreaded	  its	  maladies;	  syphilis	  and	  hysteria	  struck	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  his	  expectations	  of	  progress,	  his	   traditions,	  his	  hereditary	  patrimony.”119	  Robert	  A.	  Nye	  posits	  that	  the	  perception	  of	  ‘marital	  heterogenitality’	  became	  a	  ‘cultural	  myth’	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in	  interwar	  France,	  one	  that	  was	  reinforced	  by	  “two	  kinds	  of	  eroticism—the	  marital	  and	  the	  illicit.”120	  In	  many	  ways,	  this	  public	  attitude	  toward	  love	  and	  sex	  shaped	  the	  French	   occupiers’	   attitudes	   toward	   German	  women.	   Although	   the	   French	  Military	  Government	  was	  very	  much	  concerned	  with	  reaffirming	  France’s	  place	  as	  a	  world	  power	  by	  strengthening	  the	  ‘French	  race’,	  as	  this	  dissertation	  will	  later	  demonstrate,	  fraternization	  between	   soldiers	   and	   civilians	  was	  not	   perceived	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	  French	   occupation	   effort.	   Consequently,	   the	   French	   Military	   Government	   seldom	  enforced	  its	  non-­‐fraternization	  policy,	  and	  those	  who	  were	  caught	  were	  rarely	  fined	  or	  punished.121	  	  Despite	   lax	   anti-­‐fraternization	   policy	   in	   the	   French	   Zone,	   liaisons	   between	  French	  soldiers	  and	  German	  women	  sparked	  a	  violent	  backlash	  by	  German	  civilians	  and	   returning	   Wehrmacht	   soldiers	   who	   often	   inflicted	   punitive	   measures	   upon	  these	  women.	  Lists	  of	  women	  who	  fraternized	  were	  circulated	  throughout	  the	  Zone,	  and	  many	  women	  who	  fraternized	  were	  violently	  attacked	  and	  made	  victim	  to	  the	  humiliating	  practice	  of	  haircutting.122	  Haircutting	  was	  by	  no	  means	  an	  innovation	  of	  post-­‐Nazi	  Germany,	  however.	  It	  was	  also	  common	  in	  Liberation	  and	  post-­‐Liberation	  France,	   where	   French	   civilians	   and	   returning	   prisoners	   of	   war	   engaged	   in	  haircutting	  rituals	  to	  publically	  humiliate	  Frenchwomen	  who	  had	  collaborated	  with	  Nazi	  Wehrmacht	  soldiers	  during	  the	  Occupation.123	  Haircutting	  was	  also	  a	  common	  form	  of	  punishment	   in	  Weimar	  Germany	  and	  Nazi	  Germany.	   It	  was	  widely	  carried	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out	   by	   German	   civilians	   during	   the	   Rhineland	   occupation	   in	   1919	   to	   discourage	  German	  girls	  and	  women	  from	  fraternizing	  with	  Entente	  occupation	  troops;	   it	  was	  also	  used	  to	  punish	  and	  humiliate	  German	  women	  who	  were	  involved	  with	  ‘racially	  impure’	   male	   workers	   during	   the	   Third	   Reich.124	  Since	   fraternization	   became	   the	  ultimate	   symbol	   of	   German	   defeat,	   haircutting	   created	   a	   convenient	   means	   of	  expressing	  bitterness	  and	  shame.	  As	  the	  occupation	  began	  to	  take	  shape,	  German	  women	  in	  the	  Western	  Zones	  fraternized	  with	  occupation	  soldiers	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  transcend	  the	  harsh	  realities	  of	  defeat.	   Elizabeth	  Heineman	   argues	   that	   fraternization	   also	   became	   a	   key	   factor	   in	  distinguishing	  West	   German	  women’s	   experiences	   from	   those	   of	   the	   East:	   “While	  rape	  became	  a	  metaphor	   for	   the	   Soviet	  Union’s	   treatment	  of	   eastern	  Germany	   (at	  least	   in	   western	   accounts),	   fraternization	   symbolized	   the	   ambiguous	   appeal	   of	  western-­‐	   especially	   U.S.-­‐	   culture,	   financial	   support,	   and	   political	  models.”125	  While	  German	   women	   willingly	   and	   semi-­‐willingly	   fraternized	   with	   American	   GIs	   in	  exchange	   for	   food,	   shelter	   and	   protection,	   German	   women	   and	   French	   soldiers	  liaised	   more	   pervasively,	   which	   in	   turn	   attracted	   little	   attention	   from	   French	  occupation	  officials.	  	  Fraternization	  motives	  become	  especially	  clear	  when	  studying	  the	  mass	  food	  shortages	  that	  submerged	  the	  postwar	  German	  population	  into	  desperate	  states	  of	  hunger.	  Formerly	  an	  enemy	  people,	   the	  German	  population	  now	  depended	  heavily	  on	   the	   victors	   for	   survival.	   This	   hunger	   proved	   to	   be	   most	   gnawing	   and	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demoralizing	  in	  the	  French	  Zone,	  however,	  and	  thus	  offers	  insight	  into	  the	  reasons	  why	  German	  women	  remained	  passive	  and	  marginal	  under	  French	  occupation.	  	  
	  
The	  Hunger	  Crisis	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
The	   winter	   of	   1946-­‐1947	   was	   synonymous	   with	   agonizing	   hunger.	   The	  British	  Director-­‐General	  of	  the	  UN	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  had	  predicted	  a	  global	  food	  crisis	  as	  early	  as	  1940:	  “We	  are	  only	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  what	  looks	  like	  a	   long	  grim	  struggle,	   in	  which	   food	  may	  be,	   as	   it	  was	   in	   the	   last	  war,	   the	  decisive	  factor	   for	   victory.” 126 	  The	   Supreme	   Headquarters	   Allied	   Expeditionary	   Force	  (SHAEF)	  set	  the	  official	  postwar	  German	  ration	  at	  2,000	  calories	  to	  match	  those	  of	  the	   Allied	   countries	   in	   anticipation	   of	   peacetime	   food	   shortages;	   sustaining	   this	  ration	   soon	   proved	   impossible,	   however,	   and	   the	   ration	   was	   reduced	   to	   1,550	  calories.127	  The	  harsh	  winter	  and	   lack	  of	   sufficient	  Allied	  preparation	   led	   to	  actual	  rations	   that	   were	   far	   below	   sustenance	   level.	   Zonal	   rations	   plummeted	   as	  temperatures	  dipped	  below	  freezing	   level,	   leading	  to	  rations	  of	  950	  calories	   in	  the	  American	  Zone,	  850	  calories	  in	  the	  British	  Zone	  and	  450	  calories	  in	  the	  French	  Zone.	  	  The	   German	   winter	   of	   1946-­‐1947,	   one	   of	   the	   harshest	   on	   record,	   led	   to	  interruptions	   in	   shipping	   and	   food	   imports	   as	   well	   as	   devastating	   coal	   shortages	  that	  left	  people	  unable	  to	  heat	  the	  remnants	  of	  their	  bombed	  out	  homes.	  Many	  of	  the	  major	  waterways	  and	  ports,	  including	  the	  Rhine,	  the	  Main,	  the	  Neckar	  and	  the	  Elbe,	  were	   completely	   frozen	   with	   shipping	   capacities	   reduced	   to	   a	   mere	   forty-­‐five	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percent	  of	  their	  prewar	  levels.128	  In	  the	  major	  shipping	  hub	  of	  Hanover,	  for	  example,	  ninety	  percent	  of	  the	  city	  had	  no	  access	  to	  water,	  only	  twenty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  houses	  had	   electricity,	   and	   sixty	   percent	   of	   infrastructure	   had	   been	   destroyed	   by	   aerial	  bombs.129	  	  It	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  the	  hunger	  crisis	  was	  harshest	  in	  the	  British	  Zone,	  whose	  population	  was	  113.5	  percent	  higher	  than	  its	  prewar	  number	  due	  to	  an	  influx	  of	  prisoners	  of	  war,	  refugees	  and	  displaced	  persons.130	  With	  the	  largest	  population	  to	  administer,	  the	  British	  Military	  Government	  struggled	  to	  feed	  the	  Germans	  in	  its	  Zone	  who	  had	  once	  relied	  almost	  entirely	  on	  food	  imports;	  this	  task	  was	  especially	  cumbersome	  considering	  that	  the	  British	  could	  only	  provide	  each	  citizen	  with	  400	  calories	  from	  resources	  readily	  available	  in	  their	  Zone.131	  People	  in	  the	  British	  Zone	  were	   also	   freezing	   to	   death.	   In	  December	   1946,	   one	   thousand	  Germans	   had	   been	  arrested	   for	   stealing	   coal	   from	   trains;	   by	   March	   1947,	   this	   number	   had	   risen	   to	  seventeen	  thousand.132	  A	  nutritional	  survey	  conducted	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  1946	  by	  Sir	  Jack	  Drummond	  revealed	  that	  the	  official	  ration	  of	  1,550	  calories	  per	  day,	  half	  of	  what	  Britons	  were	  receiving	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  was	  producing	  symptoms	  of	  hunger	   edema,	   malnutrition	   and	   stunted	   infantile	   growth	   in	   the	   German	  population.133	  There	   had	   not	   been	   such	   appalling	   conditions	   since	   the	   Napoleonic	  Wars,	  noted	  Regional	  Commissioner	  Vaughan	  Berry	   in	  his	   January	  1947	  report.134	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Despite	   that	   the	   British	   Nutrition	   Committee	   had	   officially	   recommended	   an	  absolute	  minimum	  of	  1,500	  calories	  to	  sustain	  life,	  Berry	  noted	  in	  May	  1947	  that	  the	  ration	  had	  plummeted	  to	  850	  calories,	  remarking	  that	  “the	  ration	  for	  one	  individual	  for	  one	  week	  can	  be	  comfortably	  contained	  on	  an	  ordinary	  dinner	  plate.”135	  The	   food	   situation	   was	   marginally	   better	   in	   the	   American	   Zone,	   though	  Germans	  were	   on	   the	   verge	   of	   starvation	   there,	   too.	   A	   1947	   survey	   revealed	   that	  seventy	   percent	   of	   Germans	   residing	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	   British	   Zones	   believed	   that	  there	  were	  marked	   differences	   between	  American	   and	  British	   food	   policy;	   of	   this	  number,	  92.4	  percent	  favoured	  American	  food	  policies	  over	  those	  of	  the	  British.136	  By	  August	   1945,	   the	   official	   ration	   of	   1,550	   calories	   could	   not	   be	  maintained	   and	  was	   officially	   lowered	   to	   1,180	   calories	   in	   May	   1946.137	  	   This	   ration	   was	   seldom	  enforced,	  however,	  and	  only	  950	  calories	  were	  actually	  distributed	  to	  Germans	  by	  July	   1945.138	  The	   British	   and	   American	   caloric	   allocations	   were	   less	   than	   half	   of	  what	  was	   recommended	  by	  nutritionists	   to	  prevent	  malnutrition	  and	  disease.	  The	  Allies	   were	   not	   prepared	   to	   mediate	   such	   a	   large-­‐scale	   food	   crisis,	   General	   Clay	  recalls,	  one	  that	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  severe	  detriment	  to	  the	  German	  population	  and	  to	  the	  Allied	  reconstruction	  program:	  	  For	  three	  years	  the	  problem	  of	  food	  was	  to	  color	  every	  administrative	  action,	  and	  to	  keep	  the	  German	  people	  alive	  and	  able	   to	  work	  was	  our	  main	   concern.	  From	   the	   first	   I	  begged	  and	  argued	   for	   food	  because	   I	  did	  not	  believe	   that	   the	  American	  people	  wanted	  starvation	  and	  misery	   to	   accompany	   occupation,	   and	   I	   was	   certain	   that	   we	   could	   not	   arouse	   political	  interest	   for	   a	   democratic	   government	   in	   a	   hungry,	   apathetic	   population...	   The	   need	   to	  provide	  food	  and	  thus	  prevent	  disease	  and	  unrest	   in	  the	  population	  behind	  the	  battle	   lines	  was	   recognized	   throughout	   the	  war,	   and	  SHAEF	  had	  brought	   to	  Germany	   for	   this	  purpose	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600,000	   tons	   of	   grain.	   This	   supply	   was	   not	   to	   be	   used	   lightly,	   because	   we	   did	   not	   know	  where	  and	  how	  more	  could	  be	  obtained	  for	  the	  forthcoming	  winter.139	  	  Although	  the	  mass	  food	  shortage	  was	  as	  much	  a	  humanitarian	  crisis	  as	  a	  roadblock	  to	   reconstruction,	   Clay	   was	   concerned	   that	   a	   starving	   population	   in	   the	  Western	  Zones	  would	   give	   Germans	   no	   choice	   between	   “becoming	   a	   Communist	   on	   1,500	  calories	  and	  a	  believer	  in	  democracy	  on	  1,000.”140	  American	  public	  opinion	  seemed	  to	  agree.	  An	  article	  published	  in	  the	  Stars	  and	  Stripes	  on	  15	  April,	  1946	  called	  “Feed	  Germany	  or	  Move	  Out,	   8	  Editors	   Say”	   reported	   that	   “Germany	  must	  be	   sent	  more	  food	   if	   the	   U.S.	   is	   to	   continue	   the	   occupation	   and	   compete	   successfully	   with	  communism	   in	   postwar	   Germany.”141	  As	   the	   situation	   deteriorated,	   the	   American	  Military	  Government	  divided	  their	  grain	  stock	  in	  November	  1945,	  keeping	  300,000	  tons	  in	  their	  reserve	  while	  sending	  250,000	  tons	  to	  the	  British	  Zone	  and	  15,000	  tons	  to	  the	  French	  Zone;	  since	  Germans	  in	  the	  British	  and	  French	  Zones	  “were	  existing	  on	  a	  ration	   lower	  than	  in	  our	  zone”,	  Clay	  recalls,	   “starving	  Germans	  wherever	   located	  would	  delay	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  our	  objectives.”142	  	  The	  food	  shortage	  was	  most	  dire	  in	  the	  French	  Zone,	  where	  the	  daily	  ration	  plummeted	  to	  450	  calories	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  crisis.143	  At	  less	  than	  half	  of	  American	  and	  British	  rations,	  the	  French	  ration	  was	  barely	  above	  starvation	  level.	  Mass	  food	  shortages	   had	   already	   become	   a	   concern	   for	   French	   administrators	   before	   the	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arrival	  of	  winter,	  however.	  James	  Kerr	  Pollock,	  an	  advisor	  to	  the	  American	  Branch	  of	  the	  Central	  Control	  Council	  under	  General	  Clay,	  recalls	  a	  visit	  he	  received	  from	  two	  French	   officers	   and	   two	   German	   officials	   on	   July	   1,	   1946	   who	   made	   “a	   moving	  appeal...	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  starving	  Germans	  in	  the	  French	  Zone”:	  	  They	  wondered	  why	  we	  could	  not	  send	  them	  from	  the	  American	  zone	  ten	  thousand	  tons	  of	  potatoes	  which	  were	  needed	  to	  maintain	  life	  in	  this	  benighted	  portion	  of	  the	  French	  zone	  of	  occupation.	   I	   assured	   the	   very	   sincere	   Germans	   that	   it	   was	   not	   because	   of	   any	   lack	   of	  humanity	  that	  such	  transfers	  from	  our	  zone	  to	  the	  French	  zone	  could	  not	  be	  allowed...	  I	  also	  told	  them	  that	  the	  responsibility	  for	  feeding	  the	  Germans	  in	  the	  French	  zone	  rested	  with	  the	  French	   Military	   Government	   and	   that	   we	   had	   worked	   consistently	   for	   the	   elimination	   of	  zonal	  boundaries,	  but	  had	  not	  secured	  the	  support	  of	  the	  French...	  It	  seemed	  a	  bit	  odd	  to	  me	  that	  the	  French	  should	  have	  brought	  their	  Germans	  over	  to	  us	  to	  beg	  for	  food.144	  	  By	   1947,	   conditions	   had	   become	   insufferable.	   An	   Information	   Bulletin	   to	   the	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   of	   the	   French	   Zone	   reports	   that	   during	   the	   winter	   of	   1946-­‐1947,	  the	  black	  market	  was	  expanding,	  fruit	  and	  vegetables	  were	  being	  picked	  long	  before	  they	  were	  ripe,	  and	  half	  of	  the	  coal	  en	  route	  to	  the	  French	  Zone	  never	  arrived	  because	   it	   had	   been	   stolen.145	  The	   severe	   drought	   and	   French	   Cereal	   Crisis	   that	  followed	   led	   to	   mass	   grain	   shortages	   in	   France,	   making	   it	   even	   more	   difficult	   to	  import	  food	  into	  the	  French	  Zone.	  The	  drought	  caused	  grain	  production	  to	  fall	  from	  6.8	   million	   tons	   in	   1946	   to	   3.3	   million	   tons	   in	   1947;	   much	   of	   this	   grain	   was	  unsalvageable	   and	   fed	   to	   cattle,	   which	   led	   to	   a	   decrease	   in	   French	   bread	   rations	  from	  three	  hundred	  to	  two	  hundred	  grams	  per	  day.146	  The	   French	   occupation	   administration’s	   mismanagement	   of	   the	   food	   crisis	  stirred	   vehement	   criticism	   from	   its	   U.S.	   counterparts.	   Pollock	   foreshadows	   the	  plight	  of	  Germans	  in	  the	  French	  Zone	  in	  a	  diary	  entry	  dated	  October	  22,	  1945:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144  James Kerr Pollock, Besatzung und Staatsaufbau Nach 1945: Occupation Diary and Private 
Correspondence, 1945-1948  (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), 250. 
145 “Sujet de l’Allemagne occidentale”, August 19, 1947, SL/MAEE: 11/1. 
 146 John Killick, The United States and European Reconstruction, 1945-1960 (Edinburgh, Keele University 
Press, 1997), 69.  
	   	  
	   46	  
The	  French	  should	  never	  have	  been	  given	  territory	  on	  the	  east	  side	  of	  the	  Rhine	  in	  the	  first	  place...	  What	  they	  have	  done	  in	  their	  present	  zone	  is	  enough	  to	  show	  their	  inability.	  It	  is	  one	  thing	   to	   control	   German	   reconstruction	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   prevent	   a	   revival	   of	   military	  strength.	  It	  is	  another	  thing	  to	  mistreat	  human	  beings	  on	  whom	  you	  must	  rely	  for	  a	  revival	  of	  responsible	   democratic	   government.	   Thousands	   will	   starve	   to	   death	   this	   winter	   in	   the	  French	  zone.147	  	  Pollock’s	  claim	  that	  the	  French	  had	  planned	  to	  intentionally	  starve	  civilians	  in	  their	  Zone	  provides	  a	  possible	  explanation	  about	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  hunger	  crisis	  was	  especially	   devastating	   in	   the	   French	   Zone.	   Yet,	   there	   are	   also	   other	   causes	   to	  consider.	  Nazi	  economic	  and	  financial	  policies	  also	  played	  a	  role	  in	  engendering	  this	  crisis,	  Rainer	  Hudemann	  argues,	   as	   they	   likely	   caused	   the	  black	  market	   to	  expand	  dramatically	   in	   the	   final	   months	   of	   the	   war.148	  In	   addition,	   the	   French	   Military	  Government	   enforced	  policy	   to	   collect	  German	   goods	   and	   cattle	   and	   ship	   them	   to	  France	  in	  August	  1945,	  quasi-­‐reparation	  payments	  that	  likely	  further	  aggravated	  the	  food	   crisis.149	  The	   Morgenthau	   Plan	   also	   catalyzed	   the	   food	   crisis,	   James	   Bacque	  contends,	  in	  that	  its	  reduction	  of	  German	  fertilizer	  production	  from	  two	  million	  tons	  to	   eight	   hundred	   thousand	   tons	   crippled	   German	   agricultural	   production.150	  The	  postwar	   expulsion	   of	   fifteen	   million	   Germans	   from	   the	   Sudetenland	   and	   former	  eastern	  provinces	   also	  meant	   that	   twenty-­‐five	   percent	   of	   fertile	   farming	   land	  was	  redistributed	  to	  Poland	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  as	  agreed	  at	  Potsdam.151	  	  Little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  food	  crisis	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Zone,	  especially	  with	  regard	  to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   Soviet	   occupation	   administration	   managed	   the	   crisis	   in	  relation	  to	  themselves.	  It	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  food	  was	  used	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  control,	   as	   Soviet	   “officials,	   intellectuals	   and	   manual	   labourers”	   received	   2,485	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calories	   a	   day	   while	   “those	   categorized	   as	   ‘useless’-­‐	   that	   is	   to	   say	   the	   old,	   the	  unemployed	   and	   the	   politically	   incorrect-­‐	   were	   lucky	   to	   get	   1,248.” 152 	  Food	  distribution	  was	  administered	  less	  calculatedly	  in	  the	  American	  Zone,	  albeit	  that	  the	  American	   occupiers	  were	   better	   fed	   than	   the	   German	   population.	   German	   actress	  Anneliese	  Uhlig	  recalls	  that	  the	  GIs	  “had	  beautiful	  teeth,	  they	  were	  so	  healthy,	  clean,	  well	  fed”;	  another	  German	  recalls	  that	  one	  would	  not	  see	  “starved	  faces	  furrowed	  by	  strain	  and	  exertion	  anymore,	  but	  soldiers	  who	  appeared	  extraordinarily	  rested	  and	  well-­‐cared	  for.”153	  American	  attitudes	  toward	  food	  rationing	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Zone	  stirred	  much	  criticism	  from	  the	  Allies,	  especially	  from	  the	  French	  press,	  who	  disproved	  of	  the	  Americans’	  disproportionately	  generous	  treatment	  of	  German	  prisoners	  of	  war.	  An	   April	   12,	   1945	   article	   in	   the	   Associated	   Press	   reports	   that	   American	   workers	  protested	  against	  German	  prisoners’	  five	  daily	  meals	  while	  they	  only	  received	  three,	  a	   complaint	   that	   caused	   the	  U.S.	  Army	   to	  eliminate	   snacks	   from	   in	  between	  meals	  and	   to	   reduce	   the	   number	   of	   sweets. 154 	  Even	   General	   Eisenhower	   publicly	  reprimanded	   American	   GIs	   for	   their	   “cordial	   treatment”	   of	   German	   POWs	   in	  May	  1945,	  stating	  that	  such	  treatment	  was	  a	  direct	  violation	  of	  his	  orders.155	  The	  extreme	  shortage	  of	  food	  and	  resources	  in	  the	  British	  Zone	  meant	  a	  less	  comfortable	  lifestyle	  for	  the	  British	  occupation	  administration.	  Here,	  dwindling	  coal	  and	   resources	  were	   cautiously	   safeguarded	   in	   anticipation	   for	   the	   coming	  winter	  while	  “ink	  froze	  in	  inkwells...	  an	  officer’s	  cup	  of	  tea	  froze	  on	  his	  desk...	  thousands	  of	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workers	   sat	   in	   idleness	   in	   cold	   dark	   homes	   on	   a	   food	   ration	   hardly	   adequate	   to	  sustain	  life.”156	  The	  experiences	  of	  the	  British	  Military	  Government	  starkly	  contrast	  those	  of	  the	  French	  occupation	  administration.	  While	  the	  former	  often	  went	  without	  food	   and	   resources	   in	   order	   to	   feed	   the	   starving	  German	  population,	   Karen	  Adler	  argues	   that	   the	   French	   Ravitaillement	   Program	   allocated	   up	   to	   3,600	   calories	   per	  day	  to	  French	  administrators	  in	  Germany,	  a	  ration	  that	  was	  much	  higher	  than	  any	  in	  France	  where	  ration	  cards	  were	  in	  circulation	  until	  the	  end	  of	  1949.157	  	  French	   occupiers	   and	   German	   civilians	   lived	   seemingly	   parallel	   existences.	  The	  lavish	  lifestyles	  of	  the	  French	  Military	  Government	  first	  under	  General	  de	  Lattre	  and	  then	  under	  General	  Pierre-­‐Marie	  Koenig	  were	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  hardships	  that	   plagued	  postwar	  German	   society.158	  De	   Lattre	   hosted	   elaborate	   soirées	   in	   his	  villa	   in	  Lindau	  and	   frequently	  brought	   the	  National	  Opera	  Company	   from	  Paris	   to	  give	   private	   performances	   during	   his	   eleven-­‐week	   stay	   in	   the	   occupied	  territories. 159 	  Koenig	   had	   just	   as	   expensive	   tastes.	   Having	   established	   his	  headquarters	   in	   the	   charming	   spa	   town	   of	   Baden-­‐Baden,	   whose	   “orchestra	  continued	  to	  play	  Waldteufel	  waltzes	  in	  the	  polished	  ballroom	  of	  the	  Casino,	  and	  its	  whole	  atmosphere	  of	  luxuriant	  repose	  was	  quite	  alien	  to	  the	  misery	  of	  bombed-­‐out	  Ludwigshafen	  or	  Mainz,	  or,	  perhaps	  more	  pertinently,	  to	  the	  hardships	  remaining	  in	  Brest,	  Caen,	  or	  Rouen”,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  French	  Military	  Government	  lived	  apart	  from	  the	  harsh	  realities	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.160	  This	  did	  not	  change	  when	  Koenig	  moved	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from	  Baden-­‐Baden	  to	  a	  luxurious	  villa	  on	  the	  Rhine	  near	  Frankfurt	  in	  August	  1947,	  which	   stirred	   heated	   criticism	   from	   leftist	   circles	   in	   Paris	   who	   were	   put	   off	   by	  similarities	  between	  Koenig’s	  administration	  and	  Vichy,	  whose	  capital	  had	  also	  been	  in	  a	  spa	  town.161	  French	  occupation	  personnel	  were	  also	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  hunger	  crisis.	  They	   were	   provided	   with	   special	   ration	   cards	   to	   shop	   for	   overpriced	   French-­‐imported	  produce,	   alcohol,	   tobacco,	   clothing	  and	  household	   supplies	   in	  one	  of	   the	  four	  hundred	  économats	  shops	  across	  the	  Zone	  and	  in	  the	  French	  sector	  of	  Berlin,	  a	  shopping	  experience	  that	  Karen	  Adler	  calls	  “an	  ideological	  implantation	  of	  France	  in	  the	  midst	  of	   former	  enemy	  territory.”162	  Despite	   the	   large	  number	  of	  économats	   in	  the	   French	   Zone,	   German	   civilians	  were	   forbidden	   from	  entering	   these	   shops	   and	  were	  forced	  to	  find	  other	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  food	  crisis.163	  	  	  A	  predominately	  female	  postwar	  population	  meant	  that	  the	  hunger	  crisis	  had	  specific	  ramifications	  on	  German	  women.	  The	  gendered	  nature	  of	  occupation	  meant	  that	  German	  women	  were	  often	  dealt	   the	   task	  of	   “negotiating	   the	   impossible	   food	  situation”,	  Alice	  Weinreb	  argues,	  while	  mass	  hunger	  forced	  Germans	  to	  accept	  total	  defeat.164	  The	  harsh	  realities	  of	  the	  immediate	  postwar	  period	  also	  placed	  women	  in	  what	   Petra	   Goedde	   calls	   a	   “paradoxical	   position”,	   in	   that	   they	   provided	   for	   their	  families	   while	   depending	   on	   occupation	   soldiers	   for	   basic	   necessities	   and	  foodstuffs.165	  Atina	  Grossmann	  argues	  that	  since	  women	  were	  often	  more	  negatively	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affected	   by	   the	   hunger	   crisis	   than	  men,	   the	   food	   crisis	   also	   became	   a	   convenient	  means	  of	  punishing	  women	  for	  their	  involvement	  in	  Nazi	  organizations;	  they	  were	  often	   given	   Himmelsfahrkarte,	   low	   level	   rations	   cards	   that	   were	   so	   meager	   they	  were	  nicknamed	  ‘ticket	  to	  heaven’	  cards.166	  The	  endemic	  hunger	  that	  swept	  through	  the	  Western	  Zones	  makes	  it	  evident	  why	   fraternization	   between	   German	   women	   and	   Allied	   soldiers	   became	   so	  commonplace	  during	  the	  immediate	  postwar	  period.	  For	  some	  women,	  resorting	  to	  prostitution	  in	  exchange	  for	  food,	  protection	  and	  shelter	  became	  the	  only	  means	  of	  transcending	   the	  harsh,	  gendered	  realities	  of	  defeat	  and	  occupation	   in	  which	   rape	  and	  starvation	  were	  seemingly	  inevitable.	  Amidst	  heaps	  of	  rubble	  and	  bombed	  out	  infrastructure,	   German	  women	   “queued	   for	   a	   handout	   of	   butter	   and	   dry	   sausage,	  while	   men	   emerged	   only	   to	   line	   up	   for	   an	   issue	   of	   schnapps”,	   a	   reality	   Antony	  Beevor	   finds	   ironic	   following	   twelve	  years	  of	   sexist	  Nazi	   family	  policy.167	  By	  1947,	  German	   anthropologist	   Hilde	   Thurnwald	   noted	   in	   her	   study	   of	   four	   hundred	   and	  ninety-­‐eight	   Berlin	   families	   that	   “women	   have	  moved	   into	   the	   central	   position	   as	  providers.”168	  A	  predominately	   female	  population	  meant	   that	  German	  women	  now	  assumed	   the	   roles	   of	   provider	   and	   protector	   in	   addition	   to	   those	   of	   mother	   and	  caretaker	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  secure	  the	  welfare	  of	  children,	  the	  elderly	  and	  the	  sick	  in	  addition	  to	  themselves.	  The	  near-­‐starvation	  of	  Germans	  in	  the	  Western	  Zones	  posed	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	   Allied	   occupation	   objectives.	   Low	   food	   rations	   could	   very	   well	   undermine	   the	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  __________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	   German	  Women	  under	  French	  Occupation	  
	  __________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  “We	   missed	   a	   unique	   opportunity	   in	   1945:	   had	   we	   become	   the	   head	   of	  Europe,	  Germany	  would	  have	  followed,”	  stated	  an	  August	  1947	  French	  occupation	  report:	   “Instead	   of	   defense	   and	   security	   policies,	   we	   wanted	   to	   see	   ourselves	  practice	   ‘grand	  European	  politics’	  and	  attempted	  to	  create	  a	  European	  community	  while	   paying	   little	   attention	   to	   our	   national	   borders	   (in	   reference	   to	   the	   Soviet	  Union)…	   This	   international	   angle	  makes	   certain	  measures...	   seem	   like	   errors	   that	  have	   been	   ultimately	   detrimental	   to	   France	   herself.” 171 	  The	   ‘grand	   European	  politics’	  (la	  grande	  politique	  européenne)	  to	  which	  this	  report	  is	  referring	  is	  no	  doubt	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  ‘French	  Thesis’,	  a	  set	  of	  French	  occupation	  objectives	  that	  roused	  much	   resentment	   from	   France’s	   American,	   British	   and	   Soviet	   counterparts. 172	  French	   social	   and	   political	   occupation	   objectives	  were	   threefold:	   first,	   they	  would	  “remold	   that	   section	   of	   the	   German	   people”	   by	   implementing	   a	   denazification	  program	  that	  was	  distinct	  from	  their	  Allies’;	  next,	  they	  would	  reeducate	  the	  German	  population	   through	   rigorous	   cultural	   indoctrination	   and	   exposure	   to	   high	   French	  culture;	   finally,	   they	   would	   democratize	   German	   society	   through	   the	   revival	   of	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political	   life.173	  These	   occupation	   schemes,	   however	   ambitious,	   had	   entirely	   failed	  by	  1949.	  	  The	   ‘French	   Thesis’	   also	   had	   unique	   consequences	   on	   German	   women.	   Its	  interpretation	   of	   the	   ‘Four	   D’s’	   laid	   down	   at	   Potsdam-­‐	   demilitarization,	  decentralization,	   denazification	   and	   democratization-­‐	   became	   central	   to	   German	  women’s	  experiences	  under	  French	  occupation,	  in	  that	  the	  French	  interpretation	  of	  these	   principles	   created	   the	   conditions	   necessary	   to	   socially	   and	   politically	  disempower	  women	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  	  
The	  ‘Big	  3’	  and	  France	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
The	  French	  Military	  Government	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  Germans	  were	  capable	  of	  exercising	  democratic	   judgment	  or	  carrying	  out	   reconstruction.	  This	   skepticism	  necessitated	  a	  program	  to	  secure	  French	  economic	  and	  military	  interests	  in	  order	  to	  “lay	   down	   with	   an	   indestructible	   firmness	   the	   bases	   of	   a	   Franco-­‐German	  rapprochement,	   which	   is	   indispensable	   for	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   Europe.”174	  The	  ‘French	   Thesis’,	   first	   introduced	   to	   the	   Allies	   by	   French	   Foreign	  Minister	   Georges	  Bidault	   at	   the	   London	   Conference	   in	   September	   1945,	  was	   designed	   to	   safeguard	  France	   from	   future	   German	   aggression	   and	   to	   secure	   French	   economic	   interests	  through	  the	  exploitation	  of	  German	  resources.	  In	  May	  1945,	  Bidault	  announced	  at	  a	  San	  Francisco	  press	  conference	  that	  the	  French	  Army	  planned	  to	  occupy	  the	  Rhine	  from	   the	   Swiss	  border	   to	  Remagen	   to	  prevent	   future	  German	  aggression	   and	  also	  demanded	  that	  the	  coal-­‐rich	  Saar	  be	  placed	  under	  French	  control	  and	  that	  the	  iron	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ore-­‐rich	   Ruhr	   be	   internationalized.175	  By	   buffering	   the	   Rhine	   and	   placing	   German	  resources	   under	   French	   control,	   the	   French	   hoped	   to	   decentralize	   the	   German	  economy	  and	  to	  extract	  economic	  reparations	  from	  the	  French	  Zone	  to	  finance	  the	  occupation	  effort.	  France	  needed	  “to	  be	  assured	  that	  French	  forces	  will	  be	  stationed	  permanently	   from	  one	  end	  of	   the	  Rhine	  to	   the	  other,”	  De	  Gaulle	  stated	  on	   January	  25,	  1945.176	  Like	  Georges	  Clemenceau	  before	  him,	  de	  Gaulle	  wished	  to	  make	  the	  left	  bank	  of	  the	  Rhine	  into	  a	  German	  buffer	  to	  prevent	  future	  hostilities.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  ‘French	  Thesis’	  was	  a	  continuation	  of	  French	  foreign	  policy	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War.	   Decentralization	  was	   to	   play	   a	   large	   role	   in	   determining	   the	   course	   of	   the	  French	  Military	  Government’s	  German	   reconstruction	  program.	  The	  French	  began	  to	  veto	  Allied	  and	  Soviet	  proposals	  to	  establish	  centralized	  German	  agencies	  at	  the	  London	   Conference	   of	   Foreign	   Ministers	   in	   1945,	   a	   strategy	   that	   sparked	   much	  hostility	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  ‘Big	  3.’177	  As	  Pollock	  explains	  in	  a	  diary	  entry	  of	  October	  11,	  1945,	  the	  lack	  of	  French	  cooperation	  during	  postwar	  planning	  deterred	  German	  recovery:	   “Are	   the	   French	   going	   to	   be	   allowed	   to	   stymie	   the	   reconstruction	   of	  Germany	   along	   the	   national	   lines	   laid	   down	   at	   the	   Potsdam	   Agreement?	   I	   have	  always	  thought	  it	  a	  mistake	  to	  make	  the	  French	  an	  equal	  controlling	  partner	  in	  the	  occupation	  of	  Germany,	  and	  what	  they	  are	  doing	  now	  both	  in	  their	  zone	  and	  on	  the	  Central	  Control	  Council	  lends	  support	  to	  my	  view.”178	  General	  Clay	  shared	  a	  similar	  view,	  as	  he	  believed	   that	  French	  opposition	   toward	  Allied	  and	  Soviet	  proposals	   to	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centralize	   German	   agencies,	   such	   as	   transportation	   systems	   and	   banks,	   was	   a	  detriment	   to	   postwar	   reconstruction.	   He	   recalls	   a	   heated	   conversation	   at	   the	  London	  Conference	  between	  the	  French	  and	  Russian	  representatives	  on	   the	  Allied	  Control	  Council,	  General	  Koeltz	  and	  General	  Sokolovsky,	  following	  Koeltz’s	  veto	  of	  a	  proposal	  to	  establish	  a	  central	  transportation	  system	  and	  authorize	  the	  formation	  of	  trade	  unions:	  	  
General	  Sokolovsky:	  “Our	  governments	  agreed	  on	  this	  point	  at	  the	  Potsdam	  Conference...	  We	  must	  meet	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  Transport	  Department.”	  	  	  
General	  Clay:	  “I	  feel	  the	  problem	  right	  now	  is	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  how	  we	  are	  going	  to	  govern	  Germany.	  If	  the	  Control	  Council	  isn’t	  going	  to	  establish	  German	  administrative	  machinery	  it	  might	  as	  well	  fold	  up	  as	  a	  governing	  agency	  and	  become	  a	  negotiating	  agency.	  	  	  	   	  	  
General	  Koeltz:	  “I	  am	  perfectly	  agreed	  that	  there	  should	  be	  an	  American,	  French,	  British,	  and	  Soviet	  Council	  (which	  was	  in	  fact	  what	  the	  Transport	  Directorate	  was)	  but	  I	  can’t	  agree	  that	  the	  Germans	  should	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  it...	  The	  objects	  of	  the	  administration	  of	  Germany	  will	  be	  the	  decentralization	  of	  political	  structure	  and	  the	  developing	  of	  local	  responsibilities.	  Thus	  trade	  unions	  are	  political	  structures	  and	  will	  be	  decentralized.”179	  	  French	   reluctance	   toward	   centralized	   agencies	   became	   a	   recurring	   theme	   in	  postwar	  negotiations.	  This	  became	  especially	  evident	  when	  Vyacheslav	  Molotov,	  the	  Russian	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   opposed	   British	   and	   American	   support	   of	  returning	   the	   Saar	   to	   France	   in	   July	   1946.180	  Koenig	   then	   vetoed	   an	   American	  proposal	  to	  fuse	  together	  British	  and	  American	  economic	  activity	  in	  August	  1946	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  centralizing	  the	  economies	  would	  foster	  German	  militarism.181	  French	  insistence	  on	  enforcing	  the	  decentralization	  provision	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  four	  very	  separate	  occupation	  administrations,	  each	  of	  which	  was	  free	  to	  interpret	  and	  implement	  the	  Potsdam	  Provisions	  as	  they	  saw	  fit.	  In	  the	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French	   Zone,	   this	   would	   have	   serious	   repercussions	   on	   reeducation	   efforts.	  Composed	   jointly	   of	   a	   decentralized	   denazification	   apparatus	   and	   a	   benighted	  cultural	  program,	  these	  were	  initiatives	  in	  which	  German	  women	  played	  no	  part.	  	  	  	  
	  The	  Failures	  of	  Denazification	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   By	  1948,	  British,	  American	  and	  French	  denazification	  initiatives	  had	  failed.	  A	  January	  22,	  1947	  interview	  in	  The	  Stars	  and	  Stripes	  between	  Josef	  Stalin	  and	  Elliott	  Roosevelt,	   the	   son	   of	   the	   late	   President	   Roosevelt,	   confirms	   that	   Allied	  denazification	  policies	  had	  been	  unsuccessful:	  	  12-­‐	  QUESTION:	  “Does	  the	  failure,	  in	  the	  American	  and	  British	  zones	  of	  Occupied	  Germany,	  of	  carrying	  out	   the	  denazification	  program	  give	  serious	  cause	   for	  alarm	  to	   the	  government	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union?”	  	  STALIN:	  “No,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  a	  cause	  for	  serious	  alarm,	  but	  of	  course,	  it	  is	  not	  pleasant	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  that	  this	  part	  of	  our	  common	  program	  is	  not	  being	  put	  into	  effect.”182	  	  Denazification	   was	   a	   massive	   undertaking.	   The	   Military	   Governments	   had	   to	  determine	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  Germans	  had	  been	  active	  and	  passive	  perpetrators,	  an	  ambitious	  undertaking	  on	  which	  there	  was	  no	  precedent	  to	  rely.	  At	  Potsdam,	  the	  ‘Big	   3’	   had	   agreed	   that	   denazification	   would	   entail	   the	   total	   destruction	   of	   the	  National	  Socialist	  Party	  and	  its	  organizations,	  the	  repeal	  of	  all	  Nazi	  laws,	  the	  arrest	  and	  punishment	   of	   all	  war	   criminals,	   and	   the	   removal	   of	   all	  members	   of	   the	  Nazi	  party	   from	   public	   and	   semi-­‐public	   office.183	  In	   keeping	   with	   Potsdam,	   the	   Allied	  Control	  Council	   passed	  Control	  Council	   Law	  No.	  10	  on	  December	  20,	   1945,	  which	  was	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Punishment	  of	  Persons	  Guilty	  of	  War	  Crimes,	  Crimes	  against	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Peace	   and	   against	  Humanity.184	  On	  October	  12,	   1946	   the	  Council	   passed	  Directive	  No.	  38	  which	  established	  criteria	  for	  assessing	  five	  levels	  of	  German	  guilt:	  (1)	  major	  offenders;	   (2)	   offenders	   (activists,	  militarists	   and	  profiteers);	   (3)	   lesser	   offenders;	  (4)	   followers;	   (5)	   persons	   exonerated. 185 	  Denazification	   policies	   became	   quite	  unpopular	  in	  the	  Western	  Zones,	  as	  Patricia	  Meehan	  jests:	  “The	  Germans	  had	  a	  joke	  about	   Hitler’s	   ‘Thousand-­‐Year	   Reich’:	   twelve	   years	   of	   Nazism	   and	   888	   years	   of	  denazification.”186	  To	   the	  Allies,	  Nazism	  was	  not	  simply	  an	   ideology	  or	  a	  political	  affiliation.	   It	  was	   an	   inherently	   evil	   worldview	   generated	   by	   the	   decay	   of	   German	   civility	   and	  morality.	   An	   American	   occupation	  manual	   informs	   U.S.	   personnel	   that	   “there	   are	  only	  good	  and	  bad	  elements	  in	  the	  German	  character,	  the	  latter	  of	  which	  generally	  predominate.”187	  Similar	   sentiments	   were	   echoed	   throughout	   the	   British	   Military	  Government.	   A	   memorandum	   by	   General	   Macready,	   Regional	   Commissioner	   of	  Hanover,	   reminds	   British	   staff	   that	   “Nazism	   is	   more	   than	   a	   political	   creed-­‐	   it	   is	  designed	   to	   appeal	   to	   all	   the	   inherent	   German	   characteristics	   of	   militarism	   and	  domination...	  The	  next	  Hitler	  will	  not	  necessarily	  be	  a	  Nazi.”188	  	  	   American	  denazification	  policy	  was	  the	  most	  thorough	  and	  rigorous	  of	  all	  the	  Zones	   in	   that	   it	   was	   “more	   articulate,	   verbalized	   and	   legalistic	   than	   those	   of	   the	  other	   three	   Allies.”189 	  Each	   German	   was	   required	   to	   fill	   out	   a	   Fragebogen,	   a	  repetitive	   and	   notoriously	   unpopular	   questionnaire,	   before	   applying	   for	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employment;	   experts	   then	   carefully	   studied	   each	   questionnaire	   in	   order	   to	  distinguish	  between	  Nazis	   and	  non-­‐Nazis.190	  By	   the	   end	  of	  1945,	   the	  Public	   Safety	  Office	   had	   analyzed	   1.7	   million	   Fragebogen	   and	   had	   refused	   300,000	   Germans	  employment	  while	  deeming	  100,000	  of	   them	  to	  be	  Nazis.191	  These	   figures	  seem	  to	  contradict	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  interactions	  between	  American	  GIs	  and	  German	  civilians,	  however.	   An	   article	   published	   in	   the	  New	  York	  Herald	  Tribune	   on	   April	   27,	   1946,	  called	  “Docile	  Germans	  and	  GI	  Morale:	  Occupation	  Policies	  Puzzle	  Soldiers	  Who	  Find	  Ex-­‐Enemies	  Are	  Willing	  To	  Work	  for	  Them	  and	  Offer	  No	  Resistance”,	  suggests	  that	  the	  dynamic	  between	  GIs	  and	  Germans	  was	  actually	  quite	  civil:	  	  GI	   Joe	   and	   his	   officer	   sit	   down	   to	   their	   meals,	   waited	   on	   by	   Germans,	   while	   a	   German	  orchestra	  plays	  dinner	  and	  supper	  music	  in	  almost	  every	  mess	  hall...	  Either	  by	  design	  or	  by	  accident,	  the	  German	  attitude	  of	  docility	  and	  the	  willingness	  to	  work-­‐	  and	  to	  work	  harder	  for	  the	  American	  Army	  than	  the	  average	  soldier...	  is	  doing	  more	  ...	  to	  unconsciously	  persuade	  the	  military	   personnel	   that	   they	   have	   a	   small	   stake	   in	   remaining	   here.	   There	   is	   no	   feeling,	  generally,	  that	  the	  Germans	  are	  a	  menace.192	  	  	  	   The	   British	   denazification	   program	   was	   less	   elaborate	   than	   its	   American	  counterpart.	   The	   British	   Military	   Government	   simply	   removed	   centralized	  institutions	   that	   could	   potentially	   spread	   Nazi	   ideology,	   including	   communication	  devices,	   school	   curricula	   and	   cinemas;	   they	   also	   distributed	   denazification	  questionnaires,	   though	   less	   lengthy	   than	   those	   in	   the	   U.S.	   Zone,	  which	  were	   then	  analyzed	   by	   the	   Public	   Safety	   Office. 193 	  In	   January	   1946,	   the	   British	   created	  Denazification	   Panels	   and	   entrusted	   Germans	   with	   the	   task	   of	   carrying	   out	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denazification	   themselves.194The	   American	   Military	   Government	   was	   skeptical	   of	  British	   denazification	   policy,	   as	   Pollock	   expresses	   in	   a	   June	   11,	   1948	   Summary	  Report,	  in	  that	  it	  encouraged	  putting	  “men	  who	  had	  bad	  Nazi	  records…	  in	  prominent	  public	   positions.”	  195	  These	   policy	   differences	   did	   not	   guarantee	   the	   success	   of	   the	  U.S.	  denazification	  program,	  however.	  Like	  its	  British	  counterpart,	  it	  failed	  by	  1948.	  	  The	  French	  approached	  denazification	  more	  leniently.	  French	  denazification	  policy	   diverged	   from	   that	   of	   its	   neighboring	   Zones,	   Rainier	   Hudemann	   argues,	   in	  that	   the	   French	   attempted	   to	   achieve	   “efficient	   democratization”	   by	   placing	  more	  emphasis	  on	  personal	  responsibility	  and	  less	  on	  ambiguous	  categories	  like	  “German	  guilt.”196	  From	  1945	  to	  1949,	  the	  French	  Military	  Government	  tried	  and	  convicted	  a	  small	   number	   of	   Nazis,	   surprising	   considering	   that	   the	   French	   had	   the	   smallest	  population	   to	   administer	   with	   the	   highest	   number	   of	   occupation	   personnel.197	  Initially,	  the	  French	  delegated	  the	  task	  of	  denazification	  to	  Germans,	  who	  reviewed	  77,924	  individuals	  and	  dismissed	  one	  third	  of	  this	  number	  from	  public	  office	  during	  the	   first	   six	   months	   of	   the	   occupation.198	  This	   approach	   proved	   to	   be	   especially	  effective	   in	  Württemberg-­‐Hohenzollern	  when	   the	  German	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  (SPD)	  proposed	  its	  own	  denazification	  program	  to	  the	  French	  Military	  Government	  in	  October	  1945.199	  Spearheaded	  by	  SPD	  member	  Otto	  Kunzel,	  the	  program	  followed	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an	  administrative	  process	  that	  gave	  parties	  no	  right	  of	  appeal	  and	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  seventy-­‐five	  percent	  of	  Germans	   from	  public	  office.200	  Although	  the	  success	  of	   this	  program	  inspired	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  Union	  (CDU)	   in	  Pfalz	   to	  carry	   out	   similar	   denazification	   initiatives,	   the	   French	   Military	   Government	   soon	  replaced	  it	  with	  the	  Spruchkammerverfahren,	  a	  tribunal	  process	  that	  heard	  a	  total	  of	  669,068	  cases.201	  Of	   these	  cases,	  Clemens	  Vollnhals	  estimates	   that	   there	  were	  only	  13	   sentenced	   ‘major	   offenders’,	   938	   ‘offenders’,	   12,826	   ‘lesser	   offenders’	   and	  298,789	  ‘followers.’202	  The	  other	  half	  of	  the	  cases	  was	  dropped.	  	  Although	  French	  denazification	  policy	  seemed	  lax	  in	  comparison	  to	  American	  and	  British	  programs,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  post-­‐Liberation	  France	  had	  its	  own	  war	  criminals	   to	   try.	   In	   fact,	  French	  épuration	   (purification)	  was	   the	  most	  thorough	  and	  extensive	  war	  crimes	   trial	  after	  Nuremberg.203	  Julian	   Jackson	  argues	  that	   the	  mass	  waves	   of	   violence	   that	   followed	   the	   Liberation	   in	   August	   1944	   and	  Victory	   Day	   in	   May	   1945,	   periods	   that	   witnessed	   2,400	   and	   5,000	   deaths	  respectively,	  must	  be	  interpreted	  as	  “acts	  of	  war	  rather	  than	  examples	  of	   ‘people’s	  justice.’”204	  The	   violent	   purging	   of	   collaborators	   became	   part	   of	   a	   process	   that	  Jackson	   calls	   épuration	   sauvage,	   one	   that	   provided	   the	   French	   with	   a	   means	   of	  punishing	  war	  criminals	   in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  dark	   legacies	  of	  Vichy	  before	   de	   Gaulle	   established	   a	   legal	   framework	   to	   punish	   these	   offenders.205	  Yet,	  Germans	  in	  the	  French	  Zone	  did	  not	  easily	  accept	  the	  tenets	  of	  épuration.	  Elise	  Julien	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points	   out	   that	   the	   French	   Military	   Government’s	   denazification	   policies	   did	   not	  necessarily	   guarantee	   that	   punishing	   a	   ‘lesser’	   or	   ‘nominal’	   offender	  with	   a	   heavy	  fine	   and	   jail	   sentence	   would	   effectively	   denazify	   them. 206 	  Konrad	   Jarausch	  substantiates	  this	  claim	  by	  arguing	  that	  Germans	  who	  underwent	  a	  process	  of	  ‘self-­‐denazification’	  often	  did	  so	  out	  of	  shame	  and	  humiliation	  rather	  than	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  acknowledge	  Nazi	  atrocities.207	  	  The	  emphasis	  on	  what	  Willis	  calls	  the	  “French	  sense	  of	  individuality”	  and	  the	  willingness	  “to	  treat	  each	  case	  on	  its	  individual	  merits,	  rather	  than	  be	  bound	  by	  the	  tighter	  classifications	  of	  the	  American	  zone”	  may	  offer	   insight	   into	  the	  reason	  why	  French	  denazification	  efforts	   failed.208	  It	   is	  also	  possible	   that	   the	  French	   insistence	  on	   decentralizing	   German	   agencies	   led	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   centralized	   denazification	  apparatus	  that	  in	  turn	  created	  a	  disconnect	  between	  the	  French	  administration	  and	  the	   population	   over	   which	   they	   attempted	   to	   exert	   control.	   The	  most	   compelling	  explanation	   for	   the	   failure	  of	  denazification,	   I	  argue,	   lies	   in	  cultural	  policy	  and	   the	  manner	   by	  which	   the	   French	   attempted	   to	   funnel	   their	   resources	   into	   arbitrating	  culture	   in	   their	   Zone.	   Yet,	   like	   the	   total	   failure	   of	   denazification,	   the	   overzealous	  cultural	  policies	  of	   the	  French	  Zone	  became	  another	   failed	  attempt	   to	   remold	  and	  reeducate	  the	  German	  people.	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Arbitrating	  Culture	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
The	  French,	  who	  had	   long	   seen	   themselves	   as	   the	   arbiters	   of	   high	   culture,	  found	   themselves	   in	   a	   peculiar	   position	   in	   1945.	   Having	   “come	   within	   an	   ace	   of	  extinction,”	  Robert	  Gildea	  explains,	  de	  Gaulle	  believed	  that	  “the	  way	  to	  restoring	  the	  honour	  and	  greatness	  of	  France	   lay	  through	  the	  participation	   in	  the	   final	  defeat	  of	  Germany.”209	  Through	  their	  marginal	  status	  as	  a	  ‘lesser	  occupier’	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  their	  victors	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   two	   new	   world	   powers,	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	   Soviet	  Union,	   France’s	   self-­‐perception	   as	   the	   “guardian	   of	   the	   Western	   tradition	   of	  
civilization”	  was	   being	   thrown	   off-­‐kilter.210	  Yet,	   the	   desire	   to	   safeguard	   western	  civilization	  remained	  as	   rampant	  as	  ever	   in	   the	  French	  occupation	  administration.	  While	   France	   began	   to	   gradually	   lose	   control	   over	   its	   colonies,	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Foreign	   Affairs	   in	   Paris	   crafted	   an	   elaborate	   cultural	   program	   called	   the	  Mission	  
Culturelle	   (Cultural	   Mission)	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   implant	   high	   French	   culture	   onto	  German	   soil.	   This	   marked	   an	   attempt	   to	   reestablish	   French	   global	   dominance	   by	  resorting	   to	   a	   policy	   of	   cultural	   imperialism,	   a	   strategy	   that	   distinguished	   France	  from	   the	   other	   occupiers.	   Cultural	   imperial	   policies	   were	   not	   only	   designed	   to	  triumph	   over	   German	   culture,	   however,	   but	   to	   surpass	   that	   of	   the	   European	  continent	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  pursuit	  of	  realizing	  Gaullist	  visions	  of	  French	  ‘grandeur’.	  	  It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   the	   French	   occupation	   of	   Germany	  was	   a	   ‘cultural	  occupation’	  as	  early	  as	  1948	  by	  British	  historian	  Percy	  W.	  Bidwell.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  culture	   in	   the	   French	   Zone,	   Bidwell	   argues,	   stems	   from	   a	   commitment	   made	   at	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Potsdam	   to	   reeducate	   Germans	   in	   order	   to	   “transform	   the	   outlook	   of	   life,	   the	  Weltanschauung	   of	   millions	   of	   adolescent	   and	   adult	   Germans,	   and	   if	   possible	   to	  convert	   aggressive	   nationalism	   into	   a	   spirit	   of	   peaceful	   cooperation.”211	  In	   many	  ways,	   French	   cultural	   policy	   was	   “marked	   by	   a	   sincere	   belief	   that	   learning	   and	  culture	  can	  produce	  civilized	  men.”212	  Cora	  Goldstein	  claims	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  French	  cultural	  policy	  was	  to	  “show	  that	  France	  was	  the	  cultural	  hegemon	  of	  Europe,	  and	  to	  attract	  Germans	  to	  the	  culture	  of	  Western	  Europe.”213	  Initially	  supported	  by	  General	  de	   Lattre,	   the	   French	   Military	   Government	   had	   hoped	   that	   the	  Mission	   Culturelle	  would	   export	   high	   French	   culture	   to	   the	   French	   Zone	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   about	   a	  ‘French	   Renaissance.’214 	  These	   cultural	   policies	   intensified	   once	   de	   Lattre	   was	  replaced	  by	  General	  Koenig	   and	  his	   three	   associate	   generals,	  Associate	  General	   of	  Berlin	   Louis-­‐Marie	   Koeltz,	   Commander	   of	   the	   Troops	   of	   Occupation	   Goislard	   de	  Monsabert,	  and	  Administrator	  General	  Emile	  Laffon,	  the	  latter	  whom	  was	  dismissed	  by	   Koenig	   due	   to	   his	   left-­‐leaning	   sympathies	   and	   tendency	   to	   treat	   the	   ‘German	  Question’	  more	  objectively.215	  	  	   Cultural	   policy	   was	   by	   no	   means	   an	   innovation	   of	   the	   French	   Military	  Government,	   however.	   Cora	   Goldstein	   points	   out	   that	   “each	   military	   government	  attempted	  to	  project	  the	  cultural	  paradigms	  of	   its	  nation,	  and	  to	  offer	  credible	  and	  positive	   programs	   to	   guide	   German	   cultural	   rebirth.”216	  In	   the	   Soviet	   Zone,	   the	  Soviet	   Military	   Administration	   in	   Germany	   (SMAD)	   declared	   that	   it	   would	   bring	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about	  the	  “mobilization	  of	  art	  as	  part	  of	  the	  struggle	  against	  Fascism	  and	  of	  the	  re-­‐education	   of	   the	   German	   people	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   true	   democracy”	   in	   order	   to	  regenerate	   culture	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   Nazism.217	  The	   substitution	   of	   German	   art,	  museums,	  newspapers	  and	  music	  with	  Soviet	  culture	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  an	  inevitable	  clash	  between	  Communism	  and	  Capitalism,	  creating	  a	  formidable	  opposition	  against	  which	   western	   occupation	   policy	   would	   square.	   The	   reopening	   of	   the	   German	  Museum	   of	   Hygiene	   after	   its	   destruction	   in	   the	   bombing	   of	   Dresden	   in	   February	  1945,	   for	   example,	   attracted	  620,000	  visitors	   and	  allowed	  Soviet	   occupiers	   to	  use	  “hygienic	   propaganda”	   to	   organize	   a	   public	   exhibit	   about	   typhus,	   dysentery	   and	  venereal	   disease.218	  Soviet	   cultural	   policy	   extended	   into	   the	   educational	   sphere	   as	  well,	  as	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  Central	  Library	  Archives	  of	  Contemporary	  History	  meant	  that	  countless	  books,	  journals	  and	  photographs	  were	  now	  under	  Soviet	  control	  and	  could	  be	  censored	  accordingly.219	  Soviet-­‐revised	  German	  history	  curricula	  replaced	  contemporary	   history	   in	   schools	   and	   universities	   and	   emphasized	   the	   Russian	  Revolution,	   Marxist	   doctrine	   and	   Socialist	   Party	   ideology;	   in	   addition,	   professors	  and	   lecturers	  who	  were	   hostile	   toward	   the	  Communist	   regime	  were	  barred	   entry	  from	   higher	   institutions	   and	   were	   required	   to	   pass	   a	   Soviet-­‐administered	   exam	  before	   seeking	   employment.220 	  The	   radical	   restructuring	   of	   cultural	   and	   social	  norms	   in	   the	   Soviet	   Zone	   catalyzed	   the	   mass	   reeducation	   of	   Germans	   in	   a	   more	  systematic	  fashion	  than	  the	  cultural	  policies	  of	  the	  Western	  Zones.	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In	   the	   American	   Zone,	   OMGUS	   commissioned	   a	   cultural	   program	   that	  indoctrinated	   western	   liberal	   ideology	   into	   the	   minds	   of	   Germans	   in	   order	   to	  counter	  the	  spread	  of	  communist	  ideology.221	  Between	  1945	  and	  1949,	  twenty-­‐eight	  ‘America	  Houses’	  were	  established	  across	  the	  U.S.	  Zone,	  which	  housed	  public	  lecture	  rooms,	   film	   screenings	   and	   libraries. 222 	  The	   German	   youth	   were	   invited	   to	  participate	  in	  youth	  choirs,	  Christmas	  pageants	  and	  costume	  parties	  with	  American	  GIs,	   and	  universities	   in	   the	  U.S.	   Zone	  purged	  Nazi	   faculty	  members	   and	  organized	  guest	   lectures,	   conferences	   and	   reading	   groups.223	  The	   International	   Youth	   Book	  Exhibition	   organized	   in	   Stuttgart	   on	   September	   27,	   1946,	   for	   example,	   attracted	  20,000	   Germans,	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   them	   twenty	   years	   old	   and	   younger,	   and	   the	  American	   Little	   Theatre	   of	   Berlin	   produced	   numerous	   plays	   in	   collaboration	  with	  the	  British	  Little	  Theatre	  of	  Berlin	  from	  1945	  to	  1946.224	  	  Cinema	   became	   a	   central	   component	   of	   American	   cultural	   policy.	   Jennifer	  Fay	  posits	   that	   the	  U.S.	  occupiers	  used	  American	   ‘film	  culture’	   to	   “make	  a	  show	  of	  U.S.	   military	   and	  moral	   superiority	   and	   to	   offer	   American	   culture	   as	   a	   model	   for	  imitation”;	  by	  occupying	  German	  cinemas,	  furthermore,	  the	  Americans	  were	  able	  “to	  cast	  a	  population	   in	  a	  role	  commensurate	  with	   its	  defeat.”225	  From	  August	  1945	  to	  August	   1946,	   Germans	  purchased	  10.5	  million	   tickets	   for	  American	  movies	   in	   the	  U.S.	  sector	  of	  occupied	  Berlin;	  of	  this	  number,	  each	  Berliner	  watched	  an	  average	  of	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three	  American	   films,	  and	  movie	   theatres	   in	   the	  U.S.	  Sector	   increased	   from	  four	   in	  August	   1945	   to	   fifty-­‐six	   by	   October	   1946.226	  Since	   Hollywood	   films	   took	   up	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   total	   screen	   time	   in	   German	  movie	   theatres,	   it	   is	   evident	   that	   occupied	  Germany	  became	  “an	  outpost	  of	  Hollywood.”227	  Film	  thus	  became	  a	  powerful	  means	  of	   cultural	   indoctrination,	  as	   the	   “experiential	   tropes,	  genres,	   structures	  of	   feeling,	  and	   images	   of	   democratic	   life”	   featured	   in	   Hollywood	   movies	   reflected	   the	  democratic	   worldview	   and	   modes	   of	   conduct	   that	   the	   U.S.	   occupiers	   hoped	   to	  stimulate	  in	  the	  German	  population.228	  	  British	  cultural	  policy	  was	  less	  intrusive	  than	  that	  of	  the	  American	  and	  Soviet	  Zones.	   The	   British	   Foreign	   Office,	   which	   hoped	   to	   bring	   about	   a	   cultural	  rapprochement	  with	  Germans	  in	  their	  Zone,	  chose	  not	  to	  tamper	  too	  radically	  with	  German	   culture.229	  The	   British	   cultural	   program	   was	   composed	   of	   the	   Education	  Services	   Branch,	   which	   controlled	   German	   education,	   the	   Information	   Services	  Branch,	  which	  censored	  and	  controlled	  the	  press,	  radio,	  theatre	  and	  music	  through	  the	   Press	   Branch,	   the	   Press	   Production	   Branch,	   the	   Broadcasting	   Branch	   and	   the	  Cultural	   Relations	   Branch. 230 	  Cultural	   activities	   in	   the	   British	   Zone	   included	  ‘Elizabethan	   Week’,	   which	   took	   place	   from	   August	   21	   to	   September	   5,	   1948	   in	  Allied-­‐occupied	   Berlin,	   an	   event	   that	   showcased	   Elizabethan	   art	   exhibits,	  Renaissance	   theatre	   and	   sixteenth	   and	   seventeenth	   century	   musical	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performances.231	  The	  Sir	  Robert	  Mayer	  Concerts	  for	  Children	  Series,	  the	  opening	  of	  a	   Music	   Library	   in	   Hamburg,	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   reading	   and	   conference	  rooms	   in	   Information	   Centres	   across	   the	   Zone	   also	   mark	   attempts	   to	   reeducate	  Germans	   under	   British	   occupation	   through	   cultural	   media.232	  In	   addition,	   a	   Book	  Selection	   Committee	   selected,	   translated	   and	   printed	   books	   for	   distribution	   to	  Germans	  throughout	  the	  British	  Zone,	  an	   initiative	  that	  was	  especially	  appreciated	  by	  the	  civilian	  population	  since	  the	  German	  prewar	  book	  production	  level	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  in	  the	  world	  in	  1932.233	  The	  French	  mobilized	  culture	   in	  a	  different	   fashion	   from	  their	  Allies.	  While	  the	   French	   occupation	   administration	   oversaw	   the	   Division	   of	   Public	   Education,	  which	   controlled	   school	   curricula	   and	   youth	   education,	   and	   the	   Division	   of	  Information,	  which	  controlled	  the	  press,	  publications,	   the	  cinema,	  propaganda	  and	  censuses,	   the	  Mission	  Culturelle,	   run	  by	  Félix	  Lusset,	   the	  French	  cultural	  attaché	   in	  Germany,	   became	   the	   largest	   reeducation	   effort	   in	   the	   Zone.234	  Rainer	   Hudemann	  argues	  that	  French	  cultural	  policy	  was	   far	  more	  advanced	  than	   its	  Allies’	  since	  the	  sudden	   influx	   of	   art	   exhibits,	   theatre	   productions,	   music	   festivals	   and	   scholarly	  publications	   allowed	   Germans	   to	   “reopen	   contact	   with	   the	   artistic,	   literary,	   and	  intellectual	  world	  that	  had	  been	  unavailable	  to	  them	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade.”235	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Yet,	   these	   initiatives	   did	   not	   mark	   the	   first	   time	   the	   French	   attempted	   to	  project	  cultural	  superiority	  over	  the	  German	  people.	  The	  French	  had	  designed	  and	  implemented	   a	   similar	   cultural	   policy	   called	   pénétration	   pacifique	   to	   culturally	  indoctrinate	   the	   Rhenish	   people	   during	   the	   Rhineland	   Occupation	   following	   the	  First	   World	   War.	   The	   people	   of	   the	   Rhineland,	   Peter	   Collar	   argues,	   were	   being	  “flooded	   with	   French	   cultural	   propaganda	   of	   all	   kinds:	   theatre	   plays,	   films,	   art	  exhibitions,	  concerts,	  books	  and	  lecture	  courses.”236	  Even	  a	  Napoleonsfeier,	  a	  festival	  that	  celebrated	  Napoleon’s	  reign,	  had	  been	  organized	  as	  an	  ultimate	  demonstration	  of	   French	   culture,	   curious	   considering	   that	  Napoleon	  was	  one	  of	   the	  very	   reasons	  why	  German	  nationalism	  had	  developed	  in	  the	  first	  place.237	  The	  cultural	  policies	  of	  the	   French	  Zone	   can	   thus	  be	   seen	   as	   a	   continuation	  of	   the	   cultural	   policies	   of	   the	  Rhineland	   occupation.	   French	   cultural	   policy	  was	   not	   simply	   designed	   to	   reorder	  and	  reconstruct	  postwar	  German	  society;	  its	  ultimate	  goal	  was	  to	  bring	  about	  what	  F.	  Roy	  Willis	  calls	  a	   ‘French	  Renaissance’	   to	   ‘francize’	  Germans	  and	  turn	  them	  into	  Frenchmen.238	  By	   placing	  Molière,	   Claudel	   and	   Sartre	   above	  Hegel,	   Beethoven	   and	  Goethe,	  the	  Mission	  Culturelle	  attempted	  to	  overshadow	  German	  ‘monoculture’	  with	  the	  French	  ‘grande	  nation.’239	  	  Like	  its	  American	  counterpart,	  French	  cultural	  policy	  attempted	  to	  use	  film	  to	  reeducate	   the	  German	  populace,	   an	   endeavor	   that	   quickly	   failed.	   Laurence	  Thaisy	  estimates	   that	   there	  were	  twice	  as	  many	  French	   film	  screenings	  than	  German	  film	  screenings	  in	  the	  French	  Zone	  in	  1946;	  in	  turn,	  Germans	  purchased	  twice	  as	  many	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tickets	  for	  German	  films	  than	  French	  films,	  leading	  to	  46,272	  ticket	  sales	  in	  44	  days,	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  10.5	  million	  tickets	  purchased	  for	  American	  movies	  between	  1945	  and	  1946	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Sector	  of	  Berlin.240	  Other	  French	  cultural	   initiatives	  proved	  to	  be	   equally	   unsuccessful.	   Between	   October	   4	   and	   December	   29,	   1947,	   there	   were	  nineteen	   conferences,	   presentations	   and	   public	   lectures	   in	   the	   French	   Zone	   on	  topics	  ranging	  from	  “French	  Evolution	  from	  1918	  to	  1945”	  in	  the	  Berlin	  Kulturbund	  (Culture	  Association),	  “Major	  Trends	  in	  French	  Literature	  from	  1900	  to	  the	  Present”	  at	   the	   Zahlendorf	   Volkshochschule	   (Community	   School),	   and	   “French	   Medieval	  Architecture”	   in	   Grunewald.241	  Additionally,	   the	   Mission	   Culturelle	   commissioned	  two	   concerts	   and	   one	   theatre	   production	   each	  month	   in	   cities	   across	   the	   French	  Zone,	   including	   Baden-­‐Baden,	   Freiberg,	   Tübingen,	   Sarrebrück,	   Koblenz	   and	  Mainz.242	  In	   October	   1947,	   for	   example,	   there	   were	   twenty	   soloist	   and	   musical	  ensemble	   performances,	   fifteen	   Ballets	   des	   Champs	   Elysées	   performances,	   and	  thirty	   theatre	   performances	   of	   Musset	   and	   André	   del	   Sarte;	   in	   November,	   there	  were	   twenty	   violin	   performances,	   twenty	   performances	   of	   André	   Messager’s	  operetta	  Véronique,	  and	  twenty	  performances	  of	  Alexandre	  Arnoux’s	  play,	  Huon	  de	  
Bordeaux.243	  	  The	  Mission	  Culturelle	  also	  transformed	  German	  universities	  across	  the	  Zone.	  Although	  the	  British	  were	  the	  first	  to	  reopen	  German	  schools	  in	  Aachen	  on	  May	  15,	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1945	   and	   to	   reform	  German	   curricula	   using	   a	   total	   of	   nine	  Weimar-­‐era	   books,	   de	  Gaulle	   had	   personally	   ordered	   the	   reopening	   of	   universities	   in	   Freiburg	   and	  Tübingen	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  universities	  in	  Mainz	  and	  the	  Saar.244	  In	  addition,	  Lusset	   arranged	  visiting	   fellowships	   for	  professors	   and	   faculty	   lecturers	   at	   twelve	  universities,	  including	  in	  Berlin	  and	  Leipzig,	  and	  founded	  French	  language	  centers	  in	  Freiburg,	  Trier,	  Mainz	  and	  Tübingen.245	  Here,	   too,	   the	  French	  attempted	   to	  project	  cultural	   superiority	   over	   the	  German	  people.	   In	  October	  1946,	   a	   public	   lecture	  by	  Pierre-­‐Paul	  Sagave,	  a	  visiting	  professor	  from	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Letters	  at	  the	  University	  of	   Strasbourg,	   delivered	   a	   public	   lecture	   on	   “German	   Mentalities	   viewed	   by	   the	  French”,	  which	   analyzed	  German	  mentalities	   toward	   racism,	   authoritarianism	  and	  political	  education	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  legacies	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution	  and	  German	  liberal	  humanism.246	  Sagave	  spoke	  in	  front	  of	   large	  audiences	  ranging	   from	  three	  hundred	  to	  nine	  hundred	  people	   in	  cities	  across	   the	  Western	  Zones,	   including	  Tübingen,	  Frankfurt	  and	  Cologne,	   in	  order	  to	  further	  the	  “spiritual	  and	  political	  reeducation”	  of	  the	  German	  population,	  an	  initiative	  that	  was	  met	  by	  “harsh	  criticism”	   from	  German	  civilians.247	  It	  soon	  became	  evident	   that	   the	  German	  people	   had	   great	   difficulty	   relating	   to	   French	   cultural	   policy	   and	   that	   the	  
Mission	  Culturelle	  was	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  failing.	  Like	  the	  French	  denazification	  program,	  the	  Mission	  Culturelle	  operated	  in	  a	  very	  decentralized	  manner.	  As	  Tony	  Judt	  points	  out,	  Lusset’s	  objectives	  were	  more	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closely	  aligned	  with	   those	  of	  Alexander	  Dymschitz,	   the	  Soviet	  Cultural	  Commissar,	  than	   with	   the	   other	   Zones	   since	   Lusset	   intended	   to	   establish	   a	   “cultural	   axis	  reaching	  from	  Paris	  to	  Berlin	  and	  on	  to	  Leningrad.”248	  Lusset’s	  objectives	  were	  also	  far	   removed	   from	   those	   of	   the	   French	  Military	   Government,	   as	   he	   discloses	   in	   an	  interview	  with	  Der	  Spiegel	  on	  April	  17,	  1948:	  	  No,	   he	   does	   not	   belong	   to	   the	   French	  military	   government.	   “We	   stand	   on	   the	   edge	   of	   the	  occupation	  and	  are	  independent”...	  The	  head	  of	  the	  mission	  is	  in	  the	  far	  north	  of	  Berlin,	  in	  the	  suburb	   of	   the	   Villengesegneten	   Frohnau	   forest.	   He	   is	   also	   deputy	   director	   of	   the	   Culture	  Department	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  in	  Paris...	  In	  August	  1946,	  the	  mission	  traveled	  from	  the	  Quai	  d’Orsay	  to	  Berlin...	  “What	  we	  do	  is	  still	  modest.	  But	  there	  may	  just	  be	  no	  Franco-­‐German	  problem.	  I	  really	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  so...	   I	  do	  not	  do	  propaganda,	  not	  really,”	  he	  says	  with	  an	  ironic	  laugh.	  He	  attempts	  to	  ‘only’	  tear	  down	  fences.	  In	  Germany,	  for	  France.	  In	  France,	  for	  Germany.249	  	  Lusset’s	   interview,	  spoken	   in	  articulate	  German,	   reveals	   that	   the	  Mission	  Culturelle	  resided	   outside	   the	   sphere	   of	   the	   occupation	   administration	   and	   thus	   lacked	   a	  centralized	  means	  of	   exerting	   cultural	  hegemony	  over	  Germans	  across	   the	  French	  Zone.	   Officials	   in	   Paris	   soon	   began	   to	   take	   issue	   with	   the	   manner	   by	   which	   the	  
Mission	   Culturelle	  was	   being	   run,	   moreover,	   as	   the	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   in	  Paris	  expressed	  to	  the	  French	  Ambassador	  in	  Berlin	  in	  a	  letter	  of	  December	  6,	  1947:	  	  If	  the	  organization’s	  conference	  lecture	  tours	  abroad	  made	  any	  progress	  during	  the	  exercise	  of	   1946-­‐47,	   notably	   with	   regard	   to	   issues	   that	   interest	   men...	   our	   representatives	   are	  complaining	   in	   general	   about	   the	   excessive	   number	   of	   conference	   speakers	   who	   come	   to	  their	  region...	  The	  personality	  of	  the	  conference	  speakers	  and	  the	  topics	  they	  choose	  are	  also	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  criticism.	  It	  seems	  that	  excessive	  attention	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  Romantics,	  literary	  critics,	  and	  journal	  editors	  who	  treat	  subjects	  in	  a	  style	  that	  is	  much	  too	  obscure	  for	  the	  foreign	  public,	  in	  ways	  that	  seem	  designed	  for	  French	  and	  even	  Parisian	  audiences.250	  	  French	  officials	   also	   realized	   that	  Germans	  were	  growing	   increasingly	   resentful	  of	  the	  French	  occupiers’	  self-­‐proclaimed	  status	  as	  cultural	  arbiters	  and	  that	  this	  posed	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a	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  reconstruction	  program	  as	  a	  whole.	  French	  attitudes	  toward	  Germans	   in	   their	   Zone	   “lacked	   judgment	   in…	   relations	  with	   the	  Germans,	   both	   as	  individuals	   and	   the	   general	   population,”	   admits	   a	   French	   Liaison	   Officer	   in	   an	  August	  1947	  Report:	   “Although	   I	   recognize	   that	  our	  cultural	  propaganda	  has	  been	  the	  ‘most	  thought	  out’,	  its	  effectiveness	  has	  been	  neutralized	  by	  our	  general	  policies	  and	  our	  attitude	  in	  the	  occupied	  territories.”251	  	  Geography	   also	   played	   a	   role	   in	   engendering	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Mission	  
Culturelle.	  When	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  commissioned	  Lusset	  to	  begin	  the	  Mission	  in	  1946,	  he	  established	  his	  headquarters	   in	   the	   forests	  north	  of	   the	  French	  Sector	  of	  Berlin. 252 	  This	   made	   it	   difficult	   to	   draw	   six	   million	   Germans	   from	   Baden,	  Württemberg,	  Pfalz	  and	  the	  Saar	  into	  the	  French	  cultural	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  Lusset	  made	   a	   grave	   error	   by	   failing	   to	   treat	   Berlin	   as	   a	   strategic	   focal	   point	   of	   cultural	  policy,	   expresses	   a	   French	   journalist	   in	   an	   October	   1946	   newspaper	   article:	  “Underneath	   a	   pretext	   to	   facilitate	   Rhenish	   policy	   and	   to	   oppose	   Prussian	  centralism,	   we	   have	   refused	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   evidence:	   despite	   its	   ruins	   and	  turpitude,	  Berlin	  remains	  the	  capital	  of	  Germany	  as	  much	  on	  the	  political	  map	  as	  on	  the	   cultural	   map.”253	  Much	   like	   the	   ineffectiveness	   of	   the	   decentralized	   French	  denazification	   apparatus,	   the	   Mission	   Culturelle’s	   overly	   decentralized	   structure	  made	  reeducating	  the	  German	  people	  a	  near	  impossible	  feat.	  As	  the	  occupation	  wore	  on,	  it	  became	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  Mission	  
Culturelle	   had	   failed	   to	   meet	   its	   objectives,	   ultimately	   confirmed	   by	   Lusset’s	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dismissal	   in	   1948.254	  By	   October	   22,	   1948,	   the	   French	   occupation	   administration	  also	   acknowledged	   that	   French	   denazification	   and	   cultural	   reeducation	   initiatives	  had	  failed	  alongside	  British,	  American	  and	  Soviet	  efforts:	  “Today	  we	  can	  say	  that	  our	  reeducation	  attempts…	  have	  suffered	  a	  complete	  failure.	  The	  Anglo-­‐Americans	  have	  officially	   recognized	   this,	   and	   the	   Russians	   and	   French	   also	   know	   this	   but	   only	  amongst	   themselves.	   The	   cultural	   action...	   and	   the	   myth	   of	   the	   reeducation	   of	  Germans	  under	  occupation...	  were	  both	  doomed	   to	   fail.”255	  The	  Mission	  Culturelle’s	  failed	  attempts	  to	  import	  high	  French	  culture	  into	  the	  French	  Zone	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  failure	  of	  French	  cultural	  imperialism	  altogether.	  Lusset’s	  grand	  plan	  to	  arbitrate	  culture	   and	   to	   realize	   the	  Gaullist	   aim	  of	   transforming	  France	   into	   a	  world	  power	  was	  overshadowed	  by	  the	  hegemonic	  influence	  of	  two	  emerging	  superpowers.	  	  The	  total	  failure	  of	  Allied	  reeducation	  policy	  became	  especially	  clear	  once	  the	  Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany	  was	   founded	   in	   1949.	   The	  Allies’	   denazification	   and	  reeducation	   policies	   “did	   not	   establish	   collective	   identities	   that	   could	   bind	   West	  Germans	  together	  socially	  and	  politically”,	  Robert	  Moeller	  argues,	  causing	  the	  new	  Republic	  to	  be	  “neither	  National	  Socialist	  nor	  Communist”	  nor	  “American,	  British,	  or	  French.”256	  In	  the	  French	  Zone	  particularly,	  there	  were	  no	  denazification	  programs	  and	   cultural	   policies	   tailored	   specifically	   for	   German	   women,	   leaving	   German	  women	   to	   configure	   their	   own	   cultural	   identities	   throughout	   the	   course	   of	   the	  occupation.	   This	   overall	   lack	   of	   French	   policy	   toward	   German	   women	   ultimately	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disempowered	   women	   in	   the	   public	   sphere,	   where	   the	   absence	   of	   sanctioned	  women’s	  agencies	  stripped	  women	  of	  their	  social	  and	  political	  agency	  altogether.	  	  	  
	  Figure	  4:	  A	  map	  of	  Allied-­‐Occupied	  Berlin	  (August	  1,	  1945).	  Sector	  1	  is	  the	  French	  Zone,	  Sector	  2	  is	  the	  British	  Zone,	  Sector	  3	  is	  the	  U.S.	  Zone,	  and	  Sector	  4	  is	  the	  Russian	  Zone.257	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  __________________________________________________________________________________	  
Behind	  the	  ‘Silk	  Curtain’:	  	  
German	  Women	  in	  the	  Public	  Sphere	  	   	  
	  	  _______________________________________________________________________________________________	  	  	   During	   the	   First	   International	   Women’s	   Conference	   in	   Bad	   Reichenhall,	  Bavaria	  in	  September	  1950,	  two	  hundred	  women	  from	  fifteen	  nations	  met	  to	  discuss	  the	  theme	  of	  “The	  Individual	  Responsibility	  of	  Women	  in	  Meeting	  the	  Critical	  Issues	  of	  Today”:	  	  Certain	   overall	   aspects	   of	   women’s	   role	   in	   society	   emerged	   from	   the	   Conference.	   First,	   it	  became	   quite	   clear	   to	   all	   present	   that	   a	   fundamental	   change	   has	   taken	   place	   concerning	  women’s	   relation	   to	   society	   as	   a	  whole,	   a	   departure	   from	   the	  old	   idea	  of	  women’s	   limited	  sphere	   to	   the	   recognition	   of	   a	  wider	   area	   of	   responsibility.	  Women	   today	  have	   a	   duty	  not	  only	  to	  their	  own	  families,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  outside	  world.	  The	  average	  woman,	  however,	  is	  not	  aware	   of	   her	  wider	   sphere.	   Only	   in	   proportion	   to	   the	   number	   of	   women	  who	   accept	   and	  make	  intelligent	  use	  of	  this	  new	  role	  will	  women	  realize	  their	   full	  potential	  contribution	  in	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  society.258	  	  German	   women’s	   roles	   had	   indeed	   begun	   to	   shift	   by	   the	   spring	   of	   1945,	   when	  women	   rummaged	   the	   streets,	   foraged	   for	   food	   and	  built	   ersatz	   shelters	   to	  house	  children,	  the	  sick,	  the	  elderly,	  refugees	  and	  displaced	  persons.	  These	  women,	  whom	  Robert	  Moeller	  calls	   the	  Trümmerfrauen	  (women	  of	  the	  rubble),	  “cleared	  away	  the	  ruins	   of	   German	   cities	   to	   make	   way	   for	   a	   new	   beginning.”259	  In	   many	   ways,	   the	  backbreaking	   work	   of	   the	   Trümmerfrauen	   marked	   the	   beginning	   of	   German	  women’s	   social	   and	   political	   mobilization	   during	   the	   postwar	   period.	   By	   being	  bombed	   out	   of	   their	   homes,	   German	   women	   were	   literally	   forced	   out	   of	   the	  domestic	   sphere	   and	   into	   the	   public	   eye	   where	   they	   began	   the	   daunting	   task	   of	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reconstruction.	   The	   Soviet,	   British	   and	   American	   Military	   Governments	  acknowledged	   the	   instrumental	   role	   that	   German	   women	   played	   in	   the	  reconstruction	   effort	   by	   granting	   them	   relative	   degrees	   of	   social	   and	   political	  agency.	  The	  French,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  did	  not	  follow	  suit.	  	  Of	   the	   ‘Four	   D’s’	   laid	   down	   at	   Potsdam,	   democratization	   was	   the	   only	  principle	  upon	  which	  the	  four	  occupying	  powers	  agreed.	  Democratization,	  the	  act	  of	  making	   Germans	   politically,	   civically	   and	   morally	   responsible,	   was	   the	   next	   step	  after	  denazification.	  Democratization	  was	  also	  the	  provision	  that	  was	  most	   loosely	  interpreted	  by	   the	  Allies,	   Jennifer	  Fay	  argues,	   as	   it	  was	   shaped	  by	  each	  occupier’s	  ‘political	  myths’	  and	  ‘national	  heritage’:	  “Because	  the	  Allies	  promoted	  themselves	  as	  democracies	   and	   encouraged	   Germans	   to	   imitate	   their	   example,	   ‘democracy’	  became	   an	   elusive	   and	   always	   shifting	   abstraction	   that	   each	   of	   the	   Allies	   had	   to	  tether	   to	   other,	   more	   tangible	   concrete	   practices	   and	   systems	   of	   value.”260	  The	  democratization	  of	  the	  German	  people	  was	  thus	  very	  much	  subject	  to	  interpretation.	  	  	  	  
Women	  in	  the	  New	  Postwar	  Order	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
The	   catastrophic	   state	   of	   postwar	   society	   made	   it	   difficult	   to	   put	  democratization	   policies	   into	   effect.	   As	   Peter	   Duignan	   points	   out,	   “the	   very	  infrastructure	   required	   for	   political	   life	   seemed	   shattered	   beyond	   repair-­‐	  meeting	  halls	   and	   office	   buildings	   were	   in	   ruins,	   newspaper	   presses	   halted,	   funds	   scarce,	  Allied	  licenses	  required	  for	  all	  party	  work.”261	  Despite	  the	  turmoil	  of	  the	  immediate	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postwar	  situation,	  the	  Soviet	  Military	  Administration	  began	  to	  authorize	  Germans	  to	  mobilize	   into	   anti-­‐fascist	   political	   parties	   in	   June	   1945,	   which	   was	   followed	   by	   a	  similar	   course	  of	   action	   in	   the	  U.S.	   Zone	   in	  August	  1945.262	  The	  British,	  who	  were	  initially	  skeptical	  about	  authorizing	  the	  revival	  of	  political	  activity	  in	  their	  Zone,	  also	  authorized	  the	  formation	  of	  political	  parties	  in	  September	  1945,	  which	  soon	  led	  to	  the	   revival	   of	   social	   democratic	   and	   communist	   parties	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	   British	  Zones.263	  Although	   these	   advancements	   by	   no	   means	   symbolized	   an	   attempt	   to	  empower	   German	   women,	   they	   nevertheless	   marked	   a	   key	   step	   forward	   in	   the	  democratization	  of	  the	  civilian	  population.	  The	  democratization	  of	  German	  women	  in	  the	  French	  Zone	  unfurled	  in	  a	  different	  manner,	  if	  at	  all.	  Four	  regime	  changes	  in	  six	   years	   meant	   that	   France	   had	   its	   own	   dark	   legacy	   to	   contend	   with. 264	  Democratizing	  women	  under	  French	  occupation	  was	  also	  something	  of	  an	  anomaly	  considering	  that	  Frenchwomen	  had	  only	  been	  enfranchised	  in	  1944.	  	   Ironically,	   the	  Soviets	  were	   the	   first	   to	   ‘democratize’	  German	  women	  despite	  the	   mass	   rape	   of	   women	   by	   the	   Red	   Army	   during	   the	   spring	   of	   1945.	   After	  authorizing	  the	  Trümmerfrauen	  to	  assemble	  into	  anti-­‐fascist	  groups,	  members	  of	  the	  
Sozialistische	  Einheitspartei	  Deutschlands	  (Socialist	  Unity	  Party	  of	  Germany)	  rallied	  support	   from	   the	   Women’s	   Branch	   of	   the	   Soviet	   administration	   in	   1946,	   which	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Demokratischer	  Frauenbund	  Deutschlands	  (Democratic	  Women’s	  League)	  which	  boasted	  a	  membership	  of	  484,075	  by	  January	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1950.265	  Though	  the	  DFD	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  centralized	  Soviet	  apparatus	  in	  1949,	   it	  made	  the	   ‘housewife	  problem’	  central	  to	  its	  reeducation	  effort.266	  The	  first	  DFD	   Convention	   took	   place	   on	   International	   Women’s	   Day	   in	   1947	   and	   boosted	  female	   attendance	   by	   distributing	   “extra	   rations	   of	   money,	   groceries,	   and	  cigarettes”;	   the	   Convention	   featured	   open	   discussions	   and	   public	   lectures	   about	  women’s	  equality,	  women’s	  role	  in	  rebuilding	  and	  denazifying	  society,	  and	  women’s	  benefits	  as	  mothers	  and	  workers	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Zone.267	  In	  June	  and	  July	  of	  1948,	  Dr.	  Anne-­‐Marie	  Durand-­‐Wever,	  the	  first	  leader	  of	  the	  DFD,	  organized	  a	  public	  exhibition	  that	  featured	  a	  public	  lecture	  on	  “The	  Voice	  of	  Women	  to	  the	  Questions	  of	  the	  Day”,	  which	   addressed	   German	   women’s	   issues	   concerning	   abortion	   and	   reproductive	  health,	  nutrition,	  public	  housing	  services,	  and	  services	  for	  children,	  prisoners	  of	  war	  and	   persons	   infected	   by	   disease.268	  These	   initiatives	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   dramatic	  advancements	  in	  German	  women’s	  statuses,	  however.	  Norman	  Naimark	  points	  out	  that	  the	  “narrow	  views	  within	  the	  KPD	  and	  SED	  of	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  society	  and	  the	   party”	   stunted	   women’s	   political	   growth.269	  In	   this	   regard,	   although	   the	   DFD	  may	   have	   secured	   the	   welfare	   of	   left-­‐leaning	   German	   women,	   such	   measures	  ultimately	  served	  as	  a	  means	  of	  bolstering	  support	   for	  the	  Communist	  Party	  while	  keeping	  women	  marginal	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  male	  counterparts.	  	  
	   Democratization	   took	   on	   a	   unique	   character	   in	   the	   British	   Zone.	   Although	  Clement	  Atlee’s	  Labour	  government	  made	  impressive	  reforms	  that	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British	  welfare	  state,	  its	  stance	  on	  women	  remained	  relatively	  conservative.	  In	  fact,	  British	   women	   were	   the	   ones	   to	   initiate	   German	   women’s	   social	   and	   political	  revival,	  not	   surprising	  considering	   that	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  had	  a	   long,	   successful	  history	   of	   feminist	   activism.	   In	   August	   1946,	   the	   Townswomen’s	   Guild	   and	   the	  National	  Federation	  of	  Women’s	   Institutes	  petitioned	  the	  Labour	  Party	  to	   improve	  the	   status	   of	   German	   women	   in	   the	   British	   Zone;	   in	   November	   1947,	   six	   British	  women’s	   organizations,	   including	   the	   National	   Federation	   of	   Business	   and	  Professional	  Women’s	  Clubs,	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Women	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  YWCA,	   wrote	   to	   Foreign	   Secretary	   Ernest	   Bevin	   to	   ask	   that	   German	   women	   be	  included	   in	   the	   German	   reconstruction	   program.270	  Although	   their	   request	   was	  declined,	  a	  Women’s	  Affairs	  Branch	  of	  the	  British	  Military	  Government	  was	  formed	  in	  1947	  whose	  personnel	  began	   to	  collaborate	  with	   the	  Relief	  Team	  of	   the	  British	  Red	   Cross	   to	   address	   women’s	   issues.271	  Attempts	   to	   reeducate	   German	   women	  through	  civic	  education	  courses	  at	  the	  Volkshochschulen	  (community	  school)	  and	  to	  promote	  involvement	  in	  women’s	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Frauenring	  der	  Britische	  
Zone	   suggest	   that	   the	   British	   Military	   Government	   considered	   a	   democratized	  female	  population	  a	  crucial	  step	  toward	  German	  reconstruction.272	  
	   The	  Americans	  were	  next	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   importance	  of	   a	  democratized	  female	   population.	   Although	   American	   female	   journalists	   and	   politicians	   urged	  OMGUS	   to	   sanction	   women’s	   associations	   in	   the	   U.S.	   Zone	   as	   early	   as	   1946,	   the	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   Women’s	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occurred	  later	  than	  it	  did	  in	  the	  Soviet	  and	  British	  Zones.273	  In	  November	  1947,	  the	  Civil	   Administration	  Division	   of	   OMGUS	   asked	   the	  women	   of	   the	   Carrie	   Chapman	  Catt	  Memorial	   Fund,	   an	   organization	   that	   was	   founded	   in	   April	   1947	   to	   promote	  awareness	   about	   the	   workings	   of	   democracy,	   to	   establish	   a	   German	   women’s	  organization	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Zone	  and	  to	  sponsor	  women’s	  visits	  to	  the	  United	  States.274	  Following	  public	   pressure	   from	   female	   journalists	   in	   the	  New	  York	  Times,	  General	  Clay	  issued	  an	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  Women’s	  Branch	  on	  January	  23,	  1948:	  	  The	  Women’s	  Affairs	  Section	  is	  established	  within	  the	  Education	  and	  Religious	  Affairs	  Branch	  of	   the	   Internal	   Affairs	   and	   Communications	   Division,	   Headquarters,	   OMGUS,	   which...	   will	  advise	  and	  assist	  appropriate	  units,	  organizations	  and	  agencies	  of	  Military	  Government	  on	  all	  policies,	   programs	   and	   operations	   for	   fostering	   German	   women’s	   affairs	   including	   but	   not	  limited	   to	   education	   and	   religious	   affairs,	   health,	   safety,	   and	   welfare;	   labor	   relations	   and	  standards;	  civil	  and	  political	  affairs.275	  	  OMGUS’	  Women’s	  Branch	  also	   sanctioned	  German	  women’s	  participation	   in	   social	  and	  political	  affairs	  by	  authorizing	  the	  revival	  of	  women’s	  magazines	  in	  1946,	  many	  of	   which	   had	   been	   banned	   following	   Hitler’s	   seizure	   of	   power	   in	   1933.	   These	  magazines,	   including	  Die	  Welt	   der	   Frau	   (The	  Woman’s	  World),	   celebrated	   German	  women’s	   return	   into	   public	   life	   and	   even	   promoted	   women’s	   participation	   in	  traditionally	  male-­‐dominated	  jobs.	  Women’s	  activities	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Zone	  were	  thus	  not	  just	  politically	  rooted,	  as	  they	  also	  created	  awareness	  about	  women’s	  civic	  duties	  as	  mothers	  and	  workers.276	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  Figure	  5:	  German	  women	  doing	  ‘men’s	  jobs’	  (Der	  Welt	  die	  Frau,	  August	  1946).277	  	  
	   Although	  Anglo-­‐American	  feminist	  organizations	  initially	  drove	  the	  British	  and	  American	  Military	  Governments’	  efforts	  to	  democratize	  German	  women,	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   French	   feminist	   activists	   attempted	   to	   influence	   the	  democratization	   of	   German	  women	   in	   the	   generally	   anti-­‐feminist	   climate	   of	   post-­‐Liberation	   France.	   Women’s	   changed	   postwar	   statuses	   can	   nevertheless	   be	  contextualized	   within	   the	   body	   of	   influential	   feminist	   texts	   that	   were	   being	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published	   during	   this	   time.	   In	   1946,	   sociologist	   Viola	   Klein,	   a	   Jewish	   Austrian	  refugee	   in	  Britain,	  published	  The	  Feminine	  Character:	  History	  of	  an	  Ideology,	  which	  argues	   that	   ‘femininity’	   is	  determined	  sociologically	  and	  biologically;	   the	   ‘feminine	  conflict’	   is	   contradictory,	   Klein	   posits,	   in	   that	   women	   are	   forced	   to	   occupy	   the	  domestic	  and	  business	  spheres	  while	  man	   is	  only	  expected	  to	  occupy	  the	   latter.278	  The	  publication	  of	  Simone	  de	  Beauvoir’s	  Le	  Deuxième	  Sexe	  in	  Paris	  in	  1949	  shattered	  prewar	  rhetoric	  concerning	  women;	  since	  woman	   is	  depicted	  as	   the	   ‘Other’,	   she	   is	  “determined	   and	   differentiated	   in	   relation	   to	   man,	   while	   he	   is	   not	   in	   relation	   to	  her.”279	  Women	  also	  lack	  the	  necessary	  means	  to	  assemble	  and	  occupy	  the	  political	  sphere	  due	  to	  their	  sexual	  and	  economic	  dependence	  on	  men,	  de	  Beauvoir	  argues,	  and	  consequently	  “have	  no	  past,	  no	  history,	  no	  religion	  of	  their	  own”	  with	  which	  to	  advance	  themselves.280	  American	  Anthropologist	  Margaret	  Mead’s	  Male	  and	  Female,	  published	  in	  1949,	  comparatively	  studied	  men	  and	  women	  on	  seven	  Pacific	  islands	  and	  men	   and	  women	   in	   postwar	  America	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   social	   and	  political	  divisions	  between	  the	  sexes	  are	  universally	  and	  culturally	  constructed.281	  	  Women’s	  inequality	  and	   “envy	  of	   the	  male	   role”	  derive	  as	  much	   from	  “an	  undervaluation	  of	  the	   role	   of	   wife	   and	   mother	   as	   from	   an	   overvaluation	   of	   the	   public	   aspects	   of	  achievement	  that	  have	  been	  reserved	  for	  men.”282	  	  Public	   acknowledgement	   of	  women’s	   shifting	   roles	   in	   the	   postwar	   era	  was	  not	   just	   theoretical,	   however.	   The	   United	   Nations	   Commission	   on	   the	   Status	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Women	   (UNCSW),	   established	   in	   1946,	   became	   a	   central	   organism	   of	   the	   UN	  Economic	   and	   Social	   Council.283	  The	   UNCSW’s	   first	   delegation,	   of	   which	   Eleanor	  Roosevelt	  was	   an	   ex-­‐officio	  member,	   consisted	  of	   fifteen	  women	   including	  French	  delegate	  Marie-­‐Hélène	  Lefaucheux,	  a	  key	  member	  of	  the	  Resistance,	  British	  delegate	  Mary	  Sutherland,	  and	  American	  delegate	  Dorothy	  Kenyon.284	  On	  June	  21,	  1946	  the	  UNCSW	  mandated	  to	  protect	  “women’s	  rights	  in	  political,	  economic,	  civil,	  social	  and	  educational	   fields”	   and	   to	   construct	   solutions	   for	   “urgent	   problems	   requiring	  immediate	  attention	   in	   the	   field	  of	  women’s	   rights.”285	  The	   ratification	  of	   the	  UN’s	  Universal	   Declaration	   of	  Human	  Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms	   on	  December	  10,	  1948	  marks	  a	  further	  watershed	  in	  the	  status	  of	  postwar	  women.	  By	  reaffirming	  “the	  dignity	  and	  worth	  of	  the	  human	  person”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  “equal	  rights	  of	  men	  and	  women”,	   the	  Charter	  mandates	   the	   “recognition	  of	   the	   inherent	  dignity	  and	  of	   the	  equal	   and	   inalienable	   rights	   of	   all	   members	   of	   the	   human	   family”	   by	   making	   a	  commitment	  to	  treat	  human	  beings	  in	  a	  lawful	  and	  dignified	  fashion.286	  British	  and	  American	  attempts	  to	  democratize	  German	  women	  led	  to	  a	  marginal	  improvement	  in	  women’s	  statuses	  and	  reflect	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	  UNCSW.	  The	  lack	  of	  policy	  toward	  women	  in	  the	  French	  Zone,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  created	  the	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necessary	  means	  to	  socially	  and	  politically	  marginalize	  women,	  and	  thus	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  stifled	  democracy.	  	  	  	  
A	  Stifled	  Democracy	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Although	   the	   creation	   of	   Women’s	   Branches	   in	   the	   Soviet,	   British	   and	  American	  Military	  Governments	  reflected	  a	  growing	  awareness	  about	  women’s	  new	  positions	   in	   postwar	   society,	   the	   French	   Military	   Government	   did	   not	   formally	  recognize	   the	   need	   to	   democratize	   women	   in	   their	   Zone.	   Its	   insistence	   on	  decentralizing	  all	  activity	  during	  Allied	  postwar	  planning	  thwarted	  the	  possibility	  of	  inter-­‐Allied	   democratization	   efforts.	   This	   proved	   to	   be	   especially	   true	   when	   the	  French	  vetoed	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  proposal	   to	  establish	  an	   inter-­‐zonal	  passage	   for	  German	   civilians	   in	   December	   1945,	   as	   well	   as	   when	   they	   vetoed	   another	   Allied	  proposal	  to	  allow	  German	  political	  parties	  to	  operate	  on	  a	  national	  basis.287	  	  The	  relative	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  British	  and	  American	  Military	  Governments	  democratized	   German	   women	   becomes	   especially	   clear	   when	   analyzing	   the	  emergence	  of	  German	  women’s	  organizations	  during	  the	  postwar	  period.	  Between	  1945	  and	  1949,	  numerous	  women’s	  organizations	  were	  founded	  and	  reestablished	  in	  the	  British	  and	  Americans	  Zones,	  of	  which	  many	  had	  existed	  during	  the	  German	  Empire	   and	   the	   Weimar	   Republic	   only	   to	   be	   banned	   during	   the	   Third	   Reich.	  Astonishingly,	  not	   a	   single	  of	   these	  organizations	  was	   founded	  or	   reestablished	   in	  the	  French	  Zone.	  The	  founding	  of	  the	  World	  Movement	  of	  Mothers-­‐	  German	  Section	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





288 This information has been compiled from Informationsdienst für Frauenfragen, Handbuch Deutscher 
Frauenorganisationen (Druck: Druckerei der Frankfurter Neuen Presse, 1952), AdF.  
German Women’s Organizations ? ?  ? Zone of Occupation? ? Year ? ?
Federation of German Catholic Women’s Organizations ? Cologne?(British Zone, BZO) ? Founded: 1946
Association for the Education of Girls and Women-? ? Kiel (BZO)? ? ? Reestablished: 1947
Union of Teachers of all Types of Schools ? ? ? ? ?
Irenenring Association of Protestant Women ?? ? Stuttgart (American Zone, AZO) ? Founded: 1947
Young German Women’s Protestant Association? ? Gelnhausen (AZO) ? ? Founded: 1949
Burckhardthaus (YWCA) ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Association of Professional Catholic Social? ? ? Essen (BZO)? ? ? Reestablished: 1946
Welfare Workers? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
German Housewives’ Association? ? ? ? Frankfurt/Main (AZO)? ? Reestablished: 1949
Union of German Catholic Youth? ? ? ? Altenberg (BZO) ?? ? Reorganized: 1947
Women’s Auxiliary of German Cooperative Societies? ? Hamburg (BZO)? ? ? Founded: 1948
Trade Union of German Employees-? ? ? Hamburg (BZO)? ? ? Founded: 1945
Women’s Section?? ? ? ? ? ? ?
World Movement of Mothers- German Section? ? Paris, France? ? ? Founded: 1947
W.O.M.A.N. World Organization of Mothers of ? ? Hamburg (BZO)? ? ? Founded: 1948
all Nations- German Section? ? ? ? ? ?
Association of German Catholic Women Teachers? ? Essen (BZO)? ? ? Reestablished: 1945
Protestant Women’s Work in Germany? ? ? Frankfurt/Main (AZO)? ? Reestablished: 1945
Girls‘ Friendly Society? ? ? ? ? Stuttgart (AZO) ? ? ? Reestablished: 1945
Association of German Red Cross Training Schools? ? Frankfurt/Main (AZO)? ? Reestablished: 1948
Federation of German Nurses’ Associations? ? ? Hanover (BZO)? ? ? Founded: 1948
Association of Women Lawyers and Economists? ? Dortmund (BZO)?? ? Founded: 1948
Association of Women Employees? ? ? ? Hanover (BZO)? ? ? Reestablished: 1949
Elly Heuss Knapp Foundation, German Mothers‘ ? ? Stein near Nuremberg (AZO) ? Founded: 1949
Recreation Service? ? ? ? ?
Gedok Association of German Women Artists ? ? Hamburg-Blankenese? ? Reestablished: 1947
and Patrons? ? ? ? ? ?
Protestant Women’s Aid Society in Germany-? ? Münster/Westphalia? ? Founded: 1949
West Section? ? ? ? ? ?
German Association of University Women? ? ? Hamburg (BZO)? ? ? Reestablished: 1949
German National Council of Women? ? ? Berlin-Charlottenburg ? ? Founded: 1949
? ? ? ? ? ? ? (British Sector) ? ? ?
Information compiled from Handbuch Deutscher Frauenorganisationen (Bonn: Druckerei der Frankfurter Neuen Presse, 1952)
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in	  Paris	  in	  1947	  is	  an	  exception	  to	  this	  observation.	  Founded	  as	  an	  international	  and	  apolitical	   non-­‐profit	   organization	   by	   women	   from	   numerous	   nations,	   the	   World	  Movement	   of	   Mothers	   (WMM)	   passed	   the	   “The	   Mother’s	   Charter”	   in	   1947	   that	  mandated	   to	   recognize	   the	   “fundamental	   equality	   between	   a	   man	   and	   a	   woman	  while	   recognizing	   their	   complementary	   nature.”289	  Although	   the	   founding	   of	   the	  WMM	   certainly	  marked	   an	   integral	   step	   forward	   in	   reaffirming	   German	  women’s	  postwar	  status,	   the	  WMM	  was	  by	  no	  means	  an	   initiative	  of	  German	  women	  under	  French	   occupation,	   nor	   is	   there	   any	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   this	   organization	  operated	   in	  the	  French	  Zone.	  This	  suggests	   that	  German	  women	  were	  socially	  and	  politically	   disempowered	   to	   a	  much	   greater	   extent	   than	   their	   counterparts	   in	   the	  other	  Western	  Zones.	  	  The	   magnitude	   to	   which	   German	   women	   were	   rendered	   passive	   in	   the	  French	  Zone	  becomes	  clearer	  within	  the	  context	  of	  German	  women’s	  high	  degree	  of	  political	   involvement	   during	   the	   Weimar	   era.	   Having	   secured	   the	   vote	   in	   1919,	  German	  women	  were	  amongst	  the	  most	  democratic	  and	  politically	  active	  of	  Western	  Europe.	   Between	   1919	   and	   1933,	   Weimar	   Germany	   witnessed	   one	   hundred	   and	  eleven	   female	   politicians	   in	   parliament	   from	   centrist	   and	   left-­‐leaning	   parties.290	  German	   women’s	   political	   activism	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   late	   nineteenth	  century,	   when	   bourgeois	   women’s	   movements	   and	   a	   dynamic	   youth	   movement,	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often	   clashing	   in	   ideology,	   became	   two	   of	   the	   largest	   feminist	   movements	   in	   the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  Great	  War.291	  West	   Germany	   also	   witnessed	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   political	   activism	   amongst	  German	   women.	   In	   1949,	   7.1	   percent	   of	   the	   first	   West	   German	   Bundestag	  (parliament)	  was	  composed	  of	  women.292	  By	  2012,	  fifty	  percent	  of	  Green	  Party	  and	  leftist	   party	   seats	   in	   the	   Bundestag	   belonged	   to	   female	   politicians,	   and	   gender	  quotas	   in	   social	   democratic	   parties	   require	   that	   forty	   percent	   of	   its	   members	   of	  parliament	  be	  female.293	  That	  German	  women	  occupied	  33	  percent	  of	  the	  Bundestag	  by	   2012	   becomes	   especially	   interesting	   when	   comparing	   their	   high	   degree	   of	  involvement	   to	   the	   lower	   percentages	   of	   female	   political	   activism	   in	   the	   former	  occupation	   countries:	   at	   the	   federal	   level,	   the	   rate	   of	   female	   participation	   is	   27	  percent	   in	   France,	   22	   percent	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom,	   17	   percent	   in	   the	   United	  States,	   and	   14	   percent	   in	   Russia.294	  Since	   German	   women	   represent	   one	   of	   the	  highest	  rates	  of	  political	  involvement	  in	  any	  Western	  democracy,	  it	  is	  surprising	  to	  learn	  that	  they	  were	  once	  given	  limited	  degrees	  of	  agency	  in	  the	  Soviet,	  British	  and	  American	  Zones	  and	  no	  agency	  at	  all	  in	  the	  French	  Zone.	  	  The	  total	  absence	  of	  sanctioned	  women’s	  agencies	  in	  the	  French	  Zone	  can	  be	  explained	   more	   generally	   by	   French	   attitudes	   toward	   women,	   both	   in	   their	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occupation	  zone	  and	  at	  home.	  A	  set	  of	  provisional	  instructions	  from	  March	  24,	  1945	  reveals	  that	  the	  French	  occupation	  administration	  itself	  was	  highly	  gendered:	  	  a)	  Male	  Personnel:	  Male	  personnel	  include	  administrative	  control	  personnel	  and	  Liaison	  Officers	  from	  Allied	  organisms.	  The	  personnel	  from	  these	  different	  categories	  are	  only	  distinguished	  by	  their	  functions.	  They	  may,	  if	  necessary,	  pass	  from	  one	  occupation	  to	  another	  through	  single	  mutation.	  	   b)	   Female	   Section:	   Female	   personnel	   (non-­‐limited	   enumeration)	  may	   assume	   the	  following	  functions:	   -­‐	  Interpreters	  	  -­‐	  Editors,	  secretaries,	  accountants,	  archivists,	  	  	  	  	  stenographers,	  etc...	  -­‐	  Transmissions	  operators,	  standardizers	  	  -­‐	  Nurses,	  social	  assistants,	  dentists	  -­‐	  Eventually,	  drivers.295	  	  The	  division	  of	  administrative	  tasks	  into	  separate	  male	  and	  female	  spheres	  suggests	  that	  the	  French	  occupation	  administration	  was	  very	  much	  a	  man’s	  world	  with	  little	  room	   for	   female	   advancement.	   The	   French	   Military	   Government’s	   political	   and	  ideological	   stance	   on	   the	   ‘Woman	   Question’	   likely	   shaped	   French	   occupiers’	  attitudes	  toward	  women.	  By	  1945,	  France	  was	  home	  to	  the	  largest	  communist	  party	  in	  Western	  Europe.	  The	  French	  Communist	  Party,	  known	  as	   the	   “parti	  des	  75,000	  fusillés”	   for	   their	   vital	   role	   in	   the	   Resistance,	   occupied	   148	   seats	   in	   the	   National	  Assembly	  and	  was	  the	  largest	  faction	  of	  de	  Gaulle’s	  French	  Provisional	  Government	  from	   1944-­‐1946.296	  Its	   influence	   grew	   as	   it	   occupied	   146	   seats	   in	   the	   tripartite	  Gouin	   government	   in	   1946	   and	   then	   165	   seats	   following	   the	   November	   1946	  elections.297	  By	  1946,	  twenty-­‐six	  seats	  belonged	  to	  Frenchwomen.298	  In	  addition,	  the	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founding	   of	   the	  Women’s	   International	   Democratic	   Federation	   (WIDF)	   in	   Paris	   in	  1945	  marked	  a	  tremendous	  step	  forward	  for	  women	  during	  the	  postwar	  era,	  in	  that	  it	   was	   established	   by	   the	   Union	   des	   Femmes	   Françaises	   (UFF),	   an	   organization	  composed	  mostly	  of	  socialist	  and	  communist	  female	  Resistance	  fighters.299	  Founded	  during	   a	   meeting	   in	   Paris	   on	   November	   26,	   1945	   that	   was	   attended	   by	   eight	  hundred	   women	   from	   forty-­‐one	   countries,	   the	   WIDF	   created	   a	   straightforward	  mandate:	   “(1)	   The	   eradication	   of	   all	   remnants	   of	   Fascism	   in	   every	   country	   in	   the	  world,	   and	   the	  maintenance	   of	   world	   peace;	   (2)	   The	   advance	   of	   women	   into	   full	  economic,	  political	  and	  legal	  status;	  and	  (3)	  The	  full	  protection	  of	  children	  in	  health,	  in	  education	  and	  the	  realization	  of	  their	  special	  talents	  and	  abilities.”300	  These	  social	  and	   political	   advancements	   reflect	   a	   shift	   in	   women’s	   postwar	   statuses,	  developments	  that	  in	  turn	  stirred	  anxiety	  amongst	  the	  French	  Military	  Government	  who	  feared	  a	  communist	  infiltration	  into	  their	  Zone.	  To	   socialist	   and	   communist	   circles	   in	   Paris,	   General	   Koenig	  was	   a	   Vichyite	  and	  a	  mild	  fascist.301	  Criticism	  no	  doubt	  intensified	  when	  Koenig,	  a	  staunch	  Gaullist	  and	   social	   conservative,	   purged	   his	   occupation	   administration	   of	   West	   German	  Communists	   in	   1947	   and	   1948. 302 	  As	   an	   “iron	   curtain	   descended	   across	   the	  Continent”	   and	   the	   Cold	  War	   alliance	   began	   to	   take	   shape,	   as	   famously	   coined	   in	  Churchill’s	  Iron	  Curtain	  Speech	  of	  March	  5,	  1946,	  the	  postwar	  dynamic	  between	  the	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Americans,	  the	  British	  and	  the	  French	  began	  to	  shift.303	  General	  Clay	  recalls	  that	  the	  French	   viewed	   the	   decentralization	   of	   Allied	   reconstruction	   efforts	   as	   a	  means	   of	  countering	  the	  spread	  of	  communism	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Zone,	  as	  French	  opposition	  to	  such	  proposals	  prevented	  the	  occupiers	  from	  “creating	  agencies	  which	  would	  have	  been	  vehicles	  for	  Communist	  expansion.”304	  The	  French	  Military	  Government	  was	  so	  fearful	  of	  communist	  expansion	  that	  it	  sent	  the	  majority	  of	  Communists	  in	  its	  Zone	  into	   the	   British	   and	   American	   Zones,	   who	   soon	   housed	   ninety	   percent	   of	   West	  German	   Communists.305 	  The	   British	   and	   American	   Military	   Governments	   even	  began	   to	   mock	   French	   attempts	   to	   “seal	   off	   her	   zone”	   from	   communists	   “behind	  what	  her	  western	  partners	  only	  half-­‐jokingly	  dubbed	  the	  ‘silk	  curtain.’”306	  	  While	  the	  British	  and	  Americans	  gave	  a	  limited	  degree	  of	  agency	  to	  German	  women	   in	   their	   Zones,	   which	   in	   turn	   reinforced	   a	   Capitalist	   sphere	   of	   influence	  against	   which	   the	   Soviet	   sphere	   would	   contend,	   the	   French	   were	   simply	   not	  interested	  in	  mobilizing	  their	  predominantly	  female	  population	  against	  communist	  expansion.	  Conversely,	   the	  French	  did	   little	  to	  bring	  about	  German	  women’s	  social	  and	   political	   regeneration,	   an	   attitude	   that	   reflects	   the	   disenfranchisement	   of	  Frenchwomen	  before	  1944.	  When	  de	  Gaulle	  gave	  Frenchwomen	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  by	  general	  decree	  on	  April	  25,	  1944,	  he	  had	  intended	  to	  distance	  liberated	  France	  from	  the	   misogynist	   policies	   of	   the	   Vichy	   Regime	   while	   also	   hoping	   that	   the	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enfranchisement	   of	   women	   would	   limit	   popular	   support	   for	   the	   Communists.307	  Granting	  Frenchwomen	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  was	  also	  “long	  overdue”,	  Patricia	  Prestwich	  argues,	  and	  the	   little	  public	  commentary	   it	  received	  symbolized	  “relief	   that	  France	  had	  now	  caught	  up	  with	  other	  western	  democracies.”308	  Despite	  these	  reforms	  and	  advancements,	  however,	  women	  in	  the	  French	  Zone	  and	  in	  France	  remained	  socially	  and	  politically	  marginal,	  both	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  at	  home.	  	  By	   1948,	   the	   Soviet,	   British	   and	   American	   Military	   Governments	   each	  acknowledged	   German	   women’s	   shifting	   roles	   in	   postwar	   society	   by	   establishing	  women’s	   branches	   in	   their	   occupation	   administrations.	   The	   French,	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	  remained	  the	  only	  Zone	  without	  a	  women’s	  branch.	  Furthermore,	  the	  British	  and	  American	   administrations	   granted	  German	  women	   a	   relative	   degree	   of	   social	  and	  political	   agency	  by	  authorizing	   them	   to	   form	  numerous	  women’s	   associations	  between	  1945	  and	  1949.	  Not	   a	   single	  women’s	   association	  was	  established	   in	   the	  French	  Zone,	  however,	  which	  ultimately	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  stifled	  democracy.	  	  German	  women’s	  lack	  of	  agency	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  had	  dire	  consequences	  on	   their	   traditional	   functions	   in	   the	   private	   sphere.	   Post-­‐Liberation	   demographic	  anxieties	   and	   Gaullist	   immigration	   reforms	   drastically	   altered	   French	   occupation	  policy	  and	  radically	  subverted	  German	  motherhood	  in	  the	  process.	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  __________________________________________________________________________________	  
Reconstructing	  the	  ‘French	  Race’:	  	  
Gender,	  Populationism,	  and	  Gaullist	  ‘Grandeur’	  
	  __________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  	   The	   postwar	   German	   population	   was	   a	   nightmarish	   fusion	   of	   Holocaust	  victims,	  displaced	  persons,	  occupation	  soldiers	  and	  prisoners	  of	  war.	  Ironically,	  the	  “Aryan	  master	  race”	  now	  had	  to	  “transform	  itself	  into	  a	  welfare	  community	  made	  up	  of	   disabled	   veterans,	   widows,	   orphans,	   refugees,	   expellees,	   and	   the	   homeless”,	  Konrad	   Jarausch	   points	   out. 309 	  The	   inherently	   gendered	   experiences	   of	   aerial	  bombing,	  rape	  and	  mass	  starvation	  meant	  that	  German	  women	  were	  now	  assuming	  the	  traditional	  male	  roles	  of	  protector	  and	  provider	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  functions	  of	  mother	  and	  nurturer.	  Their	   attempts	   to	   care	   for	   children,	   the	  elderly	  and	   the	   sick	  meant	   that	   “the	   sphere	   of	   domesticity	   expanded	   dramatically,”	   Robert	   Moeller	  argues,	   in	   that	   the	   shift	   in	   traditional	   female	   roles	   caused	   “women’s	   normally	  invisible	  work	  [to]	  became	  quite	  visible.”310	  	  Women’s	  assumption	  of	  traditional	  male	  and	  female	  gender	  roles	  led	  to	  what	  Karen	   Hagemann	   calls	   the	   ‘re-­‐gendering	   postwar	   society’	   across	   each	   occupation	  Zone.311	  Although	   this	   process	   usually	   entailed	   a	   relative	   degree	   of	   social	   and	  political	  advancement	  for	  women,	  it	  had	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  German	  women	  in	  the	  French	  Zone.	  Here,	  ambitious	  Gaullist	  reforms	  in	  family	  and	  immigration	  policy	  led	  to	  the	  radical	  subversion	  of	  German	  motherhood.	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The	  Demographic	  Crisis	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
The	   three	   basic	   objectives	   of	   de	   Gaulle’s	   Provisional	   Government	   were	   to	  modernize	   the	  French	  public	   service,	   to	  nationalize	   industry	   and	   to	   reform	   family	  and	  immigration	  policies.312	  The	  third	  objective,	  reforming	  family	  and	  immigration	  policies,	   had	  a	  direct	   effect	   on	  German	  women	   in	   the	  French	  Zone.	  De	  Gaulle	  was	  fixated	  on	  strengthening	  the	  French	  demographic,	  a	  concern	  that	  had	  long	  been	  an	  obsession	   of	   the	   Left	   and	   Right,	   and	   sought	   ways	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   French	  population	   in	   order	   to	   secure	   French	   ‘grandeur’	   in	   the	   new	  postwar	   order.	   In	   his	  state	   of	   the	   nation	   speech	   delivered	   during	   the	   spring	   1945,	   de	   Gaulle	   told	   the	  French	  people	  that	  “since	  the	  French	  population	  would	  not	  multiply,	  and	  since	  the	  French	   nation	   could	   not	   be	   a	   bright	   light	   going	   out,”	   France	   needed	   to	   produce	  “twelve	  million	  bonnie	  babies	  in	  ten	  years”	  by	  decreasing	  infant	  mortality	  rates	  and	  introducing	  new	  immigration	  schemes.313	  De	  Gaulle	   then	  alluded	  to	  a	  “grand	  plan”	  that	  would	   fix	   the	  demographic	   crisis,	  one	   that	  would	   “bring	  advantages	   for	   some	  and	  sacrifices	  for	  others	  so	  that	  every	  objective	  be	  met	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  vital	  and	  sacred	  result.”314	  	  The	  plan	  to	  which	  de	  Gaulle	  is	  referring	  is	  none	  other	  than	  the	  repatriation	  of	  displaced	  and	  orphaned	  German	  children	  of	  assumed	  French	  paternity	  to	  France.	  A	  shift	  from	  the	  pronatal	  policies	  that	  had	  long	  dominated	  French	  domestic	  policy,	  de	  Gaulle’s	  Repatriation	  Program	  was	   strongly	   rooted	   in	   ‘populationism’,	   an	   ideology	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that	  Karen	  Adler	  argues	  attempted	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  French	  demographic	  through	  a	   highly	   selective	   process	   that	   revolved	   around	   “nation,	   race,	   ethnicity,	   and	  gender.”315	  	  Pronatal	   and	  populationist	   schemes	  were	   by	   no	  means	   an	   invention	   of	   the	  French	   Provisional	   Government.	   They	   were	   a	   continuation	   of	   western	   society’s	  racist,	   sexist	   and	   nationalist	   traditions,	   where	   nations	   like	   Fascist	   Italy,	   Stalinist	  Russia,	  Vichy	  France	  and	  Nazi	  Germany	  experimented	  with	  ways	  to	  strengthen	  their	  populations	  through	  birthing	  incentives	  and	  eugenics	  programs.	  Benito	  Mussolini’s	  unsuccessful	   pronatal	   policies	   were	   designed	   to	   act	   as	   a	   ‘demographic	   jolt’	   and	  included	   bachelor	   taxes	   and	   harsh	   penalties	   for	   those	   who	   illegally	   underwent	  abortions.316	  Stalinist	   pronatal	   policies	   were	   designed	   in	   a	   similar	   vein	   and	   were	  also	   unsuccessful;	   the	   criminalization	   of	   abortion	   in	   1936	   and	   generous	  compensation	   for	   women	   who	   had	   six	   or	   more	   children	   marked	   attempts	   to	  increase	  the	  national	  birthrate.317	  	  Nazi	  pronatal	  policies	  were	  the	  most	  radical	  of	  all.	  Designed	  to	  drive	  ‘racially	  pure’	   German	   women	   into	   the	   domestic	   sphere,	   Nazi	   family	   policy	   encouraged	  women	   to	   produce	   as	   many	   ‘racially	   pure’	   children	   as	   possible.	   German	   women	  formed	  the	  crux	  of	  what	   Jill	  Stephenson	  calls	   the	  tripartite	   ideal	  of	  Nazi	  society,	   in	  which	  women	  would	  populate	   the	  Reich	  with	   ‘racially	   pure’	   babies	  while	   soldiers	  would	  secure	  more	  Lebensraum	  (living	   space)	   for	   the	  German	  people	  and	   farmers	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would	  fulfill	  Hitler’s	  agrarian	  vision	  for	  the	  Reich.318	  Pronatal	  programs	  such	  as	  the	  Law	  for	  the	  Encouragement	  of	  Marriage	  (1933)	  and	  the	  Honour	  Cross	  of	  the	  German	  Mother	   (1938)	   worked	   in	   conjunction	   with	   harrowing,	   anti-­‐Semitic	   antinatal	  policies,	  such	  as	  the	  Law	  for	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Genetically	  Diseased	  Offspring	  (1933)	  and	  the	  Nuremberg	  Laws	  (1935),	  policies	  that	  prevented	  millions	  of	  Jews,	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses,	  Roma	  people,	  members	  of	  left-­‐leaning	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  who	  were	   deemed	   physically	   and	   psychologically	   impaired	   from	   having	   children.	   Nazi	  eugenics	  became	  even	  more	  radical	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  when	  Himmler’s	  
SS	  Lebensborn	   program,	   established	   by	   the	  Race	   and	  Resettlement	  Office	   in	   1940,	  became	  a	  breeding	  ground	  where	  German	  girls	  and	  women	  could	  become	  pregnant	  by	  ‘racially	  pure’	  SS	  officers	  and	  give	  birth	  anonymously.319	  In	  many	  ways,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  Nazi	  family	  policy	  was	  intensely	  ‘populationist’,	  in	  that	  its	  pronatal	  and	  antinatal	   policies	   worked	   in	   tandem	   with	   one	   another	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   ideal	  German	  population	  along	  highly	  selective,	  racialized	  lines.	  	  Demographic	   concerns	   plagued	   interwar	   France	   as	   well.	   Many	   French	  citizens	  moved	  from	  urban	  to	  rural	  areas	  in	  search	  of	  a	  better	  quality	  of	  life	  during	  the	   ‘country-­‐to-­‐city’	  exodus,	  which	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  grave	  danger	   to	   the	  French	  demographic	   by	   Jacques	   Bertillon	   in	   1901,	   the	   founder	   of	   the	   Alliance	   Nationale	  (AN)	   pronatalist	   movement.320	  The	   criminalization	   of	   contraceptives	   in	   1920,	   the	  introduction	  of	  harsher	  penalties	  for	  women	  who	  terminated	  their	  pregnancies,	  and	  the	   introduction	   of	   family	   allowances	   and	   financial	   compensation	   for	   childbirth	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became	  components	  of	  French	  domestic	  policy	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War.321	  The	  low	  French	   birthrate	  was	   used	   as	   propaganda	   to	   justify	   revanchisme	   after	   France	  was	  defeated	  in	  the	  Franco-­‐Prussian	  War	  in	  1871,	  a	  national	  sentiment	  that	  was	  further	  intensified	  by	  Germanophobia	  and	  fear	  of	  German	  militarism	  following	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  Great	  War	  which	  had	  left	  half	  of	  Frenchmen	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  eighteen	  and	  thirty-­‐five	   dead	   by	   1918.322	  The	   need	   to	   transcend	   the	   horrors	   of	   the	   First	  World	  War	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   reaffirming	  women’s	   roles	   as	  mothers,	  moreover.	   Mary	  Louise	  Roberts	  argues	  that	  postwar	  French	  natalism	  movements	  stemmed	  from	  the	  need	   to	   “heal	   the	  wounds	  of	  war”;	  by	  portraying	   the	  French	  mother	  as	   “a	   cultural	  representation	   of	   this	   longing	   to	   heal	   and	   forget”,	   the	   reaffirmation	   of	   “female	  domesticity”	  brought	  about	  the	  moral,	  cultural	  and	  social	  regeneration	  of	  France,	  a	  phenomenon	  Roberts	  believes	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  “reassurance	  of	  bourgeois	  domesticity.”323	  The	   domestication	   of	   postwar	   Frenchwomen	   revived	   traditional	  gender	  roles	  and	  allowed	  society	  to	  return	  to	  its	  prewar	  pace,	  one	  that	  was	  quick	  to	  forget	  the	  advancements	  that	  women	  made	  during	  the	  Great	  War.	  	  The	   interwar	  French	  government	  also	  mobilized	  race	   in	   its	  struggle	  against	  depopulation.	  The	  government	  experimented	  with	  the	  immigration	  of	  workers	  and	  labourers	   from	   French	   North	   Africa,	   Southeast	   Asia,	   and	   Eastern	   and	   Southern	  Europe	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War	  and	  extended	  citizenship	  rights	  to	  many	  of	  these	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individuals.324	  Yet	   ‘race’	   soon	   became	   an	   issue	   for	   French	   pronatalists.	   French	  authorities	  had	  brought	   over	  500,000	   ‘nonwhite’	   colonial	  workers	   and	   soldiers	   to	  sustain	   the	  war	   effort	  during	   the	  First	  World	  War,	  which	   in	   turn	   stirred	  anxieties	  about	   the	   possibilities	   of	   ‘miscegenation’	   and	   “the	   danger	   of	   love	   across	   the	   color	  line”	   between	   ‘nonwhite’	   men	   and	   ‘white’	   Frenchwomen. 325 	  The	   presence	   of	  ‘nonwhites’	  on	  French	  soil	  thwarted	  demographers’	  and	  policy	  makers’	  attempts	  to	  engineer	  the	   ‘ideal’	  French	  population.	  These	  racial	  anxieties	  set	   the	  precedent	   for	  Gaullist	  populationist	   initiatives	  during	  the	  post-­‐Liberation	  period	  that	   formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  French	  Repatriation	  Program.	  	  Demographic	  concerns	  continued	  to	  saturate	  the	  French	  Third	  Republic	  until	  the	  eve	  of	   the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Daladier’s	   introduction	  of	   the	  Code	  de	  la	  Famille	  (Family	  Code)	  on	  July	  29,	  1939	  included	  a	  set	  of	  pronatal	  laws	  that	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  many	  Vichyite	  and	  Gaullist	  natal	  policies.	  The	  Code	  made	  demography	  a	  mandatory	  subject	   in	   the	   French	   curriculum,	   included	   stricter	   penalties	   for	   abortion,	   and	  provided	   a	   bonus	   for	   every	   first-­‐born	   child	   born	   within	   the	   first	   two	   years	   of	  marriage.326	  Various	  pronatal	   groups	   also	   echoed	   these	  demographic	   concerns.	  By	  1939,	   the	   Alliance	   Nationale	   pour	   l’Accroissement	   de	   la	   Population	   Française	   had	  25,335	   members	   and	   was	   the	   largest	   pronatal	   movement	   in	   France;	   founded	   in	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1896,	   the	  Alliance	   supported	   the	   taxation	  of	  unmarried	   individuals	  and	   legislation	  that	  would	  criminalize	  public	  information	  about	  birth	  control.327	  From	   1940	   to	   1944,	   the	   Vichy	   Regime	   took	   population	   anxieties	   to	   a	   new	  height.	   Abortion	   was	   made	   a	   capital	   offense	   in	   1941.328	  Vichy	   familialism	   also	  created	   gendered	   social	   spheres	   in	   which	  women	  were	   expected	   to	   be	   nurturing	  mothers	  and	  dutiful	  housewives	  while	  men	  were	  to	  be	  patriarchs	  and	  providers.329	  Fernand	  Boverat,	   the	   leader	  of	   the	  Alliance	  Nationale,	  wrote	  to	  Pétain	  and	   insisted	  that	  in	  order	  to	  “defeat	  depopulation”	  it	  had	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  “a	  family	  that	  produces	   only	   two	   children	   in	   each	   generation	   is	   condemned	   to	   disappear...	   The	  minimum	  family	  is	  the	  family	  of	  three	  children,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  more	  indispensable	  truth	   to	   be	   imposed	   on	   the	   minds	   of	   Frenchmen	   than	   this.” 330 	  Demographic	  anxieties	   also	   led	   to	   Vichy	   eugenics	   programs.	   The	   Foundation	   for	   the	   Study	   of	  Human	   Problems,	   founded	   in	   November	   1941	   by	   Alexis	   Carrel,	   was	   allocated	   an	  annual	   budget	   of	   forty	   million	   franks	   to	   research	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   French	  population	   could	   be	   physically	   and	   morally	   strengthened	   by	   encouraging	   the	  ‘strongest’	  and	  ‘fittest’	  people	  to	  procreate.331	  These	  contentious	  legacies	  carried	  on	  into	   the	   post-­‐Liberation	   period	   as	   well.	   Boverat’s	   ideas,	   for	   example,	   formed	   the	  ideological	   basis	   of	   postwar	   conservative	   pronatal	   groups,	   including	   the	   Union	  
Nationale	   des	   Associations	   Familiales	   and	   its	   fight	   against	   abortion	   campaign	   in	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1947.332	  The	   replacement	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Health	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Population	  and	   Public	   Health	   in	   1945	   is	   also	   testimony	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   French	   demographic	  anxieties	  were	  as	  rampant	  as	  ever.333	  Frenchwomen’s	  marginal	  status	  during	  the	  post-­‐Liberation	  period	  provided	  a	   space	   in	  which	   Gaullist	   population	   anxieties	  would	   flourish.	   Although	   de	   Gaulle	  enfranchised	   women	   in	   1944,	   there	   remained	   limitations	   and	   contradictions	   in	  French	  family	  law	  that	  likely	  coloured	  French	  attitudes	  toward	  women	  in	  the	  French	  Zone	   as	   well.334	  Article	   1	   of	   the	   October	   1946	   Constitution	   states	   that	   “the	   law	  guarantees	  to	  women	  rights	  equal	  to	  men’s	  in	  all	  spheres”	  and	  was	  complemented	  by	  the	  ‘equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work’	  law	  on	  June	  20,	  1946.335	  Yet,	  despite	  constitutional	  reforms,	   French	   policymakers	   did	   not	   alter	   the	   status	   of	   married	   women	   as	  prescribed	   in	   the	  Napoleonic	  Code,	  where	  the	  droit	  de	  l’autorité	  paternelle	   (Law	  of	  Paternal	   Authority)	   allowed	   a	   French	   husband,	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   chef	   de	   famille	  (head	  of	  the	  family),	   to	  refuse	  his	  wife	  the	  right	  to	  work	  or	  travel	   if	  such	  activities	  were	   deemed	   “contrary	   to	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   family.”336	  This	   law	   also	   states	   that	  Frenchwomen	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  their	  fathers	  and	  husbands	  regarding	  financial	  matters	  and	  guardianship	  over	  their	  children.337	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337 Frenchwomen had to wait until 1965 to have the right to work without their husbands’ permission as 
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Depopulation	  anxieties	  had	  long	  saturated	  European	  family	  policies	  and	  led	  to	   pronatal	   and	   antinatal	   schemes,	   which	  were	   harrowingly	  murderous	   and	   anti-­‐Semitic	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Nazi	  Germany.	  These	  policies	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  Western	   Europe’s	   longstanding	   tradition	   of	  misogyny,	   in	   that	   they	   created	   the	  means	  necessary	   to	  disempower	  women	   in	   a	  manner	   that	   limited	   their	   agency	   as	  mothers	  and	  nurturers.	  	  These	   demographic	   concerns	   took	   on	   a	   radically	   different	   connotation	   in	  post-­‐Liberation	  France,	  however.	  Cast	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  two	  emerging	  world	  powers	  while	   its	   own	   influence	   abroad	   was	   waning,	   the	   French	   Provisional	   Government	  introduced	   ‘populationist’	   schemes	   that	   were	   designed	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   ideal	  ‘French	  race’	  to	  make	  France	  a	  worthy	  contender	  on	  the	  world	  stage.	  These	  policies	  culminated	   in	   the	   repatriation	   of	   children	   of	   presumed	   French	   paternity	   in	   the	  French	  Zone,	  a	  program	  that	  had	  drastic	  consequences	  on	  the	  German	  women	  who	  were	  the	  mothers	  of	  such	  children.	  	  	  
Subverting	  German	  Motherhood:	  The	  Repatriation	  of	  ‘Besatzungskinder’	   	  
In	   1946,	   Pierre	   Pfimlin	   of	   the	   French	   Ministry	   of	   Public	   Health	   and	  Population	   stated	   that	   many	   of	   the	   orphaned	   and	   displaced	   children	   of	   occupied	  Germany	  had	  “French	  blood	  in	  their	  veins”	  and	  were	  a	  potential	  “blood	  transfusion”	  for	  the	  dwindling	  French	  population:	  “From	  a	  demographic	  point	  of	  view	  the	  child	  is	  the	   ideal	   immigrant	   because	   he	   constitutes	   a	   human	   asset	   whose	   value	   is	   all	   the	  more	  certain	  since	  his	  assimilation	  is	  guaranteed.”338	  Pfimlin’s	  ideology	  formed	  the	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basis	  of	  the	  ‘transnational	  claims	  of	  kinship’	  that	  shaped	  French	  repatriation	  policy	  during	   the	   postwar	   period.339	  Such	   children,	   born	   under	   occupation	   or	   displaced	  and	  orphaned	  by	  war,	  quite	  literally	  became	  the	  lifeline	  of	  French	  nationhood.	  By	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   occupation,	   there	   were	   tens	   of	   thousands	   of	  displaced,	  orphaned	  and	  occupation	  children	  who	  created	  what	  Tony	  Judt	  calls	  the	  “human	   flotsam	   of	   war.”340 	  By	   1949,	   it	   is	   estimated	   that	   there	   were	   94,000	  
Besatzungskinder	   (children	   of	   occupation)	   in	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany,	  3,000	  of	  whom	  were	  black	  occupation	  children.341	  These	  figures	  do	  vary,	  however.	  A	  French	  newspaper	  from	  May	  1946	  reported	  that	  there	  were	  over	  300,000	  children	  born	   to	   French	   fathers	   in	   the	   French	   Zone.342	  In	   1956,	   the	   Federal	   Bureau	   of	  Statistics	   in	   Wiesbaden	   estimated	   that	   68,000	   children	   were	   fathered	   by	   Allied	  occupation	   soldiers	   and	   raised	   by	   single	   mothers;	   of	   this	   figure,	   37,261	   children	  were	  fathered	  by	  American	  GIs,	  3,137	  by	  the	  Red	  Army,	  and	  3,194	  were	  conceived	  through	   rape,	   leaving	   us	   to	   assume	   that	   there	   were	   24,418	   children	   fathered	   by	  French	  and	  British	  occupation	  soldiers.343	  	  It	   is	  generally	  agreed	  that	   the	  Red	  Army	  raped	  at	   least	   two	  million	  German	  women	  during	   the	  spring	  of	  1945,	  giving	  us	   reason	   to	   suspect	   that	   the	  number	  of	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children	   fathered	   by	   Red	   Army	   soldiers	   was	   much	   higher	   than	   that	   of	   the	  neighboring	  Western	  Zones.	  Tony	  Judt	  estimates	  that	  between	  150,000	  and	  200,000	  children	  were	  fathered	  by	  Red	  Army	  soldiers	  between	  1945	  and	  1946.344	  Although	  abortion	   figures	   for	   the	   Western	   Zones	   remain	   unknown,	   abortion	   rates	   in	   the	  Soviet	  Zone	  were	  noticeably	  elevated.	  Since	  abortion	  was	  difficult	   to	  obtain	  under	  Brandenburg	  Law,	  in	  that	  an	  abortion	  was	  only	  legal	  if	  the	  victim	  reported	  the	  rape	  within	  two	  weeks	  of	  its	  occurrence,	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  German	  police	  force	  during	  the	  immediate	   postwar	   period	   suggests	   that	   many	   women	   were	   forced	   to	   undergo	  underground	   abortions.345	  For	   many	   women,	   becoming	   pregnant	   with	   a	   child	   of	  Russian	  paternity	  was	  the	  ultimate	  sign	  of	  shame	  and	  defeat.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  rape	  of	  German	  women	  was	  a	  racialized	  experience,	  as	  the	  dark	  legacies	  of	  Nazi	  ideology	  and	   ‘racial	   purity’	   may	   have	   encouraged	   certain	   women	   to	   terminate	   their	  unwanted	   pregnancies.	   This	   racialized	   perspective	   did	   not	   necessarily	   translate	  onto	   other	   contexts,	   however.	   In	  many	   cases,	   German	  women	   chose	   to	   fraternize,	  marry,	   and	   even	   start	   families	   with	   African	   American	   GIs	   and	   French	   colonial	  occupation	  soldiers	  from	  Algeria,	  Morocco,	  Tunisia	  and	  French	  Indochina.346	  	  Although	  the	  French	  Military	  Government	  considered	  occupation	  children	  in	  the	   French	   Zone	   an	   essential	   “blood	   transfusion”,	   the	   other	   Allies	   and	   German	  civilians	   did	   not	   regard	   these	   children	   in	   the	   same	   way.	   To	   Germans,	   children	  fathered	  by	  French,	  American	  and	  British	  soldiers	  were	   ‘illegitimate’	  and	  although	  they	   were	   granted	   German	   citizenship	   under	   the	   Nationality	   Law	   of	   1913,	   these	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children	  were	  a	  stark	  reminder	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  German	  women	  had	  ‘betrayed’	  their	  nation	  by	  fraternizing	  with	  the	  enemy	  occupier.347	  	  In	   the	   Russian	   Zone,	   East	   German	   officials	   declared	   the	   Russenkinder	  (Russian	   children)	   to	   be	   ‘fatherless	   children’,	   in	   that	   they	   had	   denied	   the	   rape	   of	  German	  women	  in	  order	  to	  forget	  the	  humiliating	  defeat	  that	  followed	  the	  collapse	  of	  Nazism	  in	  1945.348	  In	  the	  British	  and	  American	  Zones,	  children	  of	  Allied	  paternity	  were	   also	   considered	   illegitimate,	   as	   they	   were	   not	   recognized	   as	   British	   or	  American	  nationals	   and	  were	   therefore	  not	   eligible	   for	   state-­‐sponsored	  assistance	  or	  government	  benefits.349	  In	  Bavaria,	  for	  example,	  German	  state	  officials	  had	  asked	  the	   American	   Military	   Government	   to	   grant	   American	   citizenship	   to	   occupation	  children	  who	  were	   fathered	  by	  GIs;	  although	   this	  request	  may	  have	  been	  partially	  motivated	  by	  lingering	  Nazi	  ideology	  concerning	  ‘racial	  purity’,	  these	  children	  were	  denied	   U.S.	   citizenship	   and	   were	   instead	   granted	   German	   citizenship. 350 	  The	  American	  Military	   Government	   also	   forbade	   officials	   from	   conducting	   censuses	   in	  the	  U.S.	  Zone	  designed	  to	  determine	  the	  official	  number	  of	  children	  fathered	  by	  U.S.	  occupation	   soldiers.351	  Attitudes	   toward	  Besatzungskinder	  were	   radically	   different	  in	  the	  French	  Zone,	  however,	  where	  occupation	  officials	  were	  more	  than	  willing	  to	  grant	  such	  children	  French	  citizenship.	  The	   French	   occupation	   of	   post-­‐Nazi	   Germany	  was	   not	   the	   first	   instance	   in	  which	   French	   authorities	   dealt	   with	   children	   of	   mixed	   French-­‐German	   blood.	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Fabrice	   Virgili’s	   groundbreaking	   research	   on	   French	   Wehrmachtskinder	  (Wehrmacht	   children)	   suggests	   that	   there	   were	   200,000	   children	   with	   German	  paternity	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  German	  occupation	  of	  France	  in	  1944.352	  Although	  many	  of	  these	  children	  were	  called	  derogatory	  names	  such	  as	  “bâtards	  de	  Boches”	  (Boche	  bastards),	   “têtes	   carrées”	   (square	  heads),	   and	   “parasites”,	   these	   children	  were	  not	  subject	   to	   harsh	   medical	   examinations	   and	   were	   not	   denied	   state	   benefits	   and	  French	   citizenship,	   thus	   suggesting	   that	   the	   French	   were	   not	   nearly	   as	  Germanophobic	   as	   they	   had	   been	   after	   the	   First	   World	   War.353 	  The	   relatively	  civilized	  treatment	  of	  Wehrmachtskinder	  provides	  insight	  into	  French	  willingness	  to	  repatriate	  German	  children	  of	  assumed	  French	  paternity	  after	  the	  war.	  Yet,	  although	  these	  occupation	  children	  were	  well	  treated,	  it	  is	  certain	  that	  the	  French	  mothers	  of	  these	   children	  were	   subject	   to	   harsh	  punishment	   and	  public	   humiliation	  once	   the	  German	  occupation	  had	  ended,	  a	  reality	  similar	  to	  German	  women’s	  situations	  once	  the	  French	  occupation	  began	  in	  1945.	  	  From	  1945	  to	  1947,	  orphaned	  and	  displaced	  children	  of	  Allied	  parents	  were	  initially	   cared	   for	   by	   the	   United	   Nations	   Relief	   and	   Rehabilitation	   Administration	  (UNRRA)	  and	  were	  called	  “United	  Nations’	  nationals.”354	  By	  April	  1946,	  the	  UNRRA	  established	  fourteen	  children’s	  centers	  in	  the	  British	  Zone,	  six	  in	  the	  American	  Zone	  and	  five	  in	  the	  French	  Zone.355	  The	  UNRRA	  was	  not	  mandated	  to	  aid	  orphaned	  and	  displaced	   German	   children,	   however.	   Deemed	   “enemy	   nationals”,	   these	   children,	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including	  approximately	  1.5	  million	  child	  expellees	  from	  the	  East,	  received	  little	  or	  no	  aid	   from	  the	  UN.356	  This	  humanitarian	  crisis	  marginally	   improved	  by	   July	  1947	  when	  the	  International	  Refugee	  Organization	  (IRO)	  replaced	  the	  UNRRA	  and	  aided	  12,843	  “unaccompanied	  children”	  under	  the	  age	  of	  sixteen	  who	  were	  by	  definition	  German	  and	  Austrian	  children	  without	  close	  family	  members.357	  In	  the	  French	  Zone	  particularly,	  the	  task	  of	  locating	  and	  caring	  for	  children	  was	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Direction	  of	  Displaced	  Persons.	  By	  December	  1945,	  this	  task	  was	  transferred	  to	  the	  French	  Red	  Cross	  in	  Germany.358	  	  Despite	  an	  absence	  of	  policy	  toward	  women	  in	  the	  French	  Zone,	  the	  French	  Military	   Government	   regarded	   the	   Repatriation	   Program	   as	   an	   utmost	   priority.	  General	  Koenig	  observed	  as	  early	  as	  March	  1946	  that	  repatriating	  children	  from	  the	  French	  Zone	  to	  France	  would	  form	  “the	  ideal	  solution”	  for	  the	  French	  demographic	  crisis	  in	  that	  it	  would	  avoid	  the	  need	  “to	  introduce	  young	  people	  in	  France	  who	  are	  already	   formed-­‐	   or	   rather	   deformed”	   by	   instead	   repatriating	   children	   who	   are	  “easily	   assimilable.” 359 	  The	   repatriation	   process	   began	   by	   placing	   children	   of	  assumed	   French	   paternity	   in	   pouponnières	   (nurseries)	   and	   maisons	   d’enfants	  (children’s	   houses)	   across	   the	   French	   Zone.	   By	   March	   8,	   1948	   there	   were	   four	  
pouponnières	  and	  maisons	  d’enfants:	  one	  in	  Appenthal,	  one	  in	  Bad-­‐Durkheim,	  one	  in	  Nordrach	   and	   one	   in	   Unterhausen.360 	  Both	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Public	   Health	   and	  Population	  and	  the	  French	  Military	  Government	   instructed	  each	  nursery	  to	  “house	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children	   who	   are	   up	   to	   and	   including	   fourteen	   years	   old,	   of	   French	   origin	   or	  presumably	  as	  such	  found	  in	  Germany,	  and	  are	  to	  be	  repatriated	  to	  France.”361	  Conditions	  in	  the	  pouponnières	  and	  maisons	  d’enfants	  were	  just	  as	  difficult	  as	  they	  were	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Zone.	  Although	  there	  were	  certainly	  instances	  in	  which	  children	  of	  assumed	  French	  paternity	  were	  given	  special	  treatment,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  August	  1947	  when	  a	   “colony”	  of	   two	  hundred	  French	   children	  were	   reportedly	  receiving	  special	  fruit	  and	  vegetable	  rations	  while	  the	  majority	  of	  Germans	  did	  not	  receive	  “a	  single	  gram	  of	  fat”,	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  children	  also	  suffered	  from	  grave	  food	   shortages	   and	   malnutrition.362	  The	   only	   Pouponnière	   in	   Berlin,	   for	   example,	  reported	  a	  desperate	  shortage	  of	  nursing	  staff,	  clothing,	  flour	  and	  milk	  in	  February	  1947.363	  A	   French	   Red	   Cross	   worker	   in	   Berlin	   similarly	   reported	   that	   low	   food	  rations	  meant	   that	   children	  between	  one	  and	  six	  years	  of	  age	   received	  only	  half	  a	  liter	  of	  milk	  per	  day;	  many	  of	  these	  children,	  she	  adds,	  did	  not	  have	  suitable	  shoes	  and	   clothing.364	  A	   frustrating	   shortage	   of	   ambulances	   and	   medical	   supplies	   often	  prevented	  Red	  Cross	  workers	  from	  repatriating	  children	  in	  occupied	  Berlin,	  states	  a	  memo	  dated	  August	  22,	  1945,	  in	  that	  more	  ambulances	  were	  needed	  to	  “retrieve	  the	  French	  who	  are	  still	  hospitalized	  in	  German	  hospitals	  in	  the	  Russian	  Zone.”365	  In	  this	  regard,	  a	  case	  can	  be	  made	  that	  the	  Repatriation	  Program	  was	  as	  much	  an	  attempt	  to	   relieve	   a	   grave	   humanitarian	   crisis	   as	   it	   was	   a	   scheme	   to	   bolster	   French	  ‘grandeur’.	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A	  November	  25,	  1947	  notice	  from	  Koenig	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  in	  Paris	  states	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  “French	  children	  or	  presumably	  such”	  were	  to	  be	  repatriated	  to	  France:	  	  The	  children	  in	  question	  are	  broken	  down	  into	  3	  categories:	  	  	  a) Children	  who	  have	  been	  indefinitely	  abandoned	  by	  their	  families	  or	  born	  to	  unknown	  French	  parents,	  b) A	  child	  who	  has	  at	  least	  one	  unknown	  or	  missing	  parent,	  c) Children	  for	  repatriation	  whose	  parent(s)	  have	  asked	  for	  an	  extended	  delay.	  	  	   Children	  in	  these	  last	  two	  categories	  must	  remain	  in	  nurseries	  until	  	  	   -­‐	  The	  investigation	  is	  finished...	  -­‐	  The	  families	  can	  collect	  them.366	  	  The	   conditions	   by	   which	   “French	   children	   or	   presumably	   such”	   were	   chosen	   for	  repatriation	  were	   highly	   selective	   and	   thus	   suggest	   that	   de	   Gaulle’s	   populationist	  policies	  were	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  racialized	  conceptions	  of	  French	  nationhood.	  The	   term	   ‘repatriation’	   is	   in	   itself	   suggestive	   of	   one’s	   rightful	   claim	   to	   French	  nationhood,	   and	   these	   ambiguous	   repatriation	   criteria	   suggest	   that	   the	   selection	  process	   was	   highly	   racialized	   and	   subjective.	   Georges	   Mauco,	   de	   Gaulle’s	   leading	  French	   immigration	  expert,	  was	  notorious	   for	  racializing	   the	  postwar	   immigration	  process.	  He	  had	  created	  categories	  of	  ‘preferred	  immigrants’	  as	  early	  as	  1945,	  citing	  Germans,	  the	  English,	  Belgians,	  the	  Swiss	  and	  Scandinavians	  as	  ideal	  candidates	  for	  French	  citizenship.367	  Mauco	  believed	  that	  Mediterraneans	  were	  prone	  to	   ‘criminal	  behavior’	   and	   that	   Armenians,	   Russians	   and	   Arabs	   lacked	   the	   capacity	   to	   be	  ‘economically	   productive’;	   Jews,	   he	   believed,	   were	   physically	   and	   psychologically	  ‘weakened’	  from	  their	  persecution	  in	  Nazi	  concentration	  camps	  and	  were	  therefore	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unsuitable	   candidates	   for	   repatriation.368	  Postwar	  French	   immigration	  policy	   even	  favoured	   Jewish	   children	   over	   Jewish	   adults	   because	   Jewish	   children	   were	  reportedly	  easier	  to	  assimilate	  into	  French	  society.369	  	  It	   was	   not	   only	   impossible	   to	   establish	   the	   ethnicities	   of	   these	   children,	  especially	  in	  cases	  where	  children	  were	  too	  young	  to	  speak	  or	  recall	  their	  parents’	  names,	  but	   it	  was	  also	  difficult	  to	  determine	  the	  ages	  of	  these	  individuals.	  Many	  of	  these	  children	  were	  actually	  adolescents	  who	  appeared	  much	  younger	  due	  to	  “years	  of	  malnourishment”	   that	  had	  “robbed	  refugee	  children	  of	   inches	  and	  pounds.”370	  A	  child’s	   presumed	   nationality	   nevertheless	   became	   a	   decisive	   factor	   in	   the	   French	  repatriation	   selection	   process.	   By	   December	   1945,	   the	   pouponnières	   in	   Tübingen	  and	   Bad	   Durkheim	   reportedly	   housed	   forty-­‐seven	   French,	   fifteen	   Belgian,	   seven	  Russian,	   six	  Greek,	   five	  Polish	  and	   three	   Italian	   children	  between	   the	  ages	  of	   zero	  months	   and	   four	   years;	   the	   sub-­‐director	   of	   the	   nursery	   stated	   that	   she	   could	   no	  longer	   accommodate	   “foreign	   children”	   because	   there	   were	   too	   many	   French	  children	   whose	   parents	   were	   missing	   or	   being	   detained	   and	   were	   consequently	  unable	   to	   collect	   their	   children.371	  Since	   it	   was	   not	   always	   possible	   to	   determine	  whether	  a	  displaced	  child,	  an	  orphaned	  child	  or	  a	  child	  of	  occupation	  was	  of	  French	  paternity,	   a	   case	   can	   be	   made	   that	   children	   who	   were	   of	   a	   certain	   physical	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appearance	  and	  ‘racial’	  disposition	  were	  chosen	  to	  become	  members	  of	  the	  ‘French	  race’	  while	  others	  were	  deemed	  unsuitable.	  	  The	  dark	  legacies	  of	  Nazi	  racial	  policy	  also	  factored	  into	  repatriation	  motives.	  Tara	  Zhara	  argues	  that	  the	  nationalist	  pedagogues	  of	  the	  time	  alleged	  that	  children	  who	  were	   left	  with	  German	   foster	   families	  did	  not	  have	   “a	   clear	   sense	  of	  national	  identity”	  and	  were	  thus	  “doomed	  to	  become	  psychologically	  and	  morally	  defective	  adults.”372	  These	   contentions	   remain	  groundless,	  however,	   in	   that	   the	   implications	  of	   the	   Repatriation	   Program	   and	   the	   effects	   that	   it	   had	   on	   German	   women	   and	  children	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  studied.	  A	  1949	  magazine	  poll	  discovered	  that	  ‘mixed-­‐blood’	  children	  were	   better	   cared	   for	   by	   German	  mothers	   than	   by	   English	   and	   Japanese	  mothers;	  while	   it	  was	  determined	  that	  English	  mothers	  often	  placed	   ‘mixed-­‐blood’	  children	  in	  orphanages	  and	  that	  Japanese	  mothers	  often	  resorted	  to	  infanticide,	  the	  poll	   revealed	   that	   “in	   Germany	   not	   only	   is	   infanticide	   unthinkable	   but	   even	  separation	  is	  rarely	  considered.”373	  	  German	  women	  did	  not	  always	  have	  authority	  over	  the	  children	  in	  their	  care,	  however.	   German	   law	   prescribed	   that	   children	   lacking	   a	   father	   or	   legal	   male	  guardian	   became	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   state	   and	   were	   therefore	   eligible	   to	  receive	   public	   support	   and	   benefits. 374 	  The	   gendered	   nature	   of	   defeat	   and	  occupation	  also	  dealt	  a	  cruel	  hand	  to	  German	  women	  who	  gave	  birth	  to	  children	  as	  a	  result	   of	   rape	   and	   fraternization.	   These	   children	   often	   angered	   and	   embittered	  German	   men	   after	   returning	   home	   from	   POW	   camps	   and	   the	   Eastern	   Front.	   To	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German	  men,	   these	  Besatzungskinder	  were	   a	   humiliating	   symbol	   of	   defeat.	   It	  was	  not	  uncommon	  for	  a	  German	  husband	  to	  have	  “contested	  paternity	  and	  petitioned	  to	  be	   absolved	   of	   his	   legal	   and	   financial	   responsibilities”,	   which	   in	   turn	   placed	   the	  mothers	  of	  these	  unwanted	  children	  in	  difficult	  predicaments.375	  It	  becomes	  evident,	  then,	  that	  German	  men	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  facilitating	  the	  repatriation	  of	  displaced,	  orphaned	   and	   occupation	   children.	   The	   dark,	   racist	   legacies	   of	   Hitler’s	   ruthless	  Germanization	   policies	   that	   were	   carried	   out	   in	   Poland,	   Bohemia	   and	   the	  Sudetenland	  did	  not	  completely	  dissipate	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Third	  Reich.	  Nazi	  racial	   ideology	   regarding	   children	   of	   ‘mixed-­‐blood’	   was	   still	   very	   much	   a	   part	   of	  certain	  Germans’	  worldviews,	  much	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  these	  faceless	  children.	  It	  can	  certainly	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  pouponnières	  and	  maisons	  
d’enfants	  in	  the	  French	  Zone	  marked	  a	  large-­‐scale	  humanitarian	  effort	  to	  clothe,	  feed	  and	  shelter	  displaced,	  orphaned	  and	  occupation	  children.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  ignore	  that	   this	   policy	   further	   disempowered	   German	   women.	   The	   mass	   hodgepodge	   of	  nameless	   children	   in	   postwar	   Germany	   provided	   French	   authorities	   with	   a	  convenient	   means	   of	   selecting	   ‘ideal’	   candidates	   for	   repatriation	   in	   order	   to	  reconstruct	   a	   ‘French	   race’	   worthy	   of	   realizing	   de	   Gaulle’s	   grand	   vision	   of	  transforming	  France	   into	  a	  world	  power.	   In	  many	  ways,	   the	  Repatriation	  Program	  served	   as	   the	   ultimate	   ‘francization’	   policy,	   in	   that	   it	   successfully	   transformed	  Germans	   into	   Frenchmen	   in	   ways	   that	   denazification	   and	   the	   Mission	   Culturelle	  failed	   to	  do.	  This	  scheme	  had	  grave	  consequences	  on	  German	  women’s	   traditional	  social	   roles,	   moreover.	   The	   repatriation	   of	   children	   of	   assumed	   French	   paternity	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was	   a	   process	   by	   which	   “relationships	   between	   biological	   parents	   and	   child	   are	  ruptured	   abruptly,	   violently,	   or	   prematurely.”376	  Already	   socially	   and	   politically	  marginal	  in	  a	  chaotic	  postwar	  order,	  German	  women’s	  maternal	  agency	  was	  further	  undermined	   as	   race,	   gender	   and	   nationalism	   intersected	   to	   regenerate	   French	  nationhood.	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On	   Armistice	   Day	   in	   1942,	  Winston	   Churchill	   told	   the	   House	   of	   Commons	  that	  "the	  problems	  of	  victory	  are	  more	  agreeable	  than	  those	  of	  defeat,	  but	  they	  are	  no	   less	  difficult."377	  The	  catastrophic,	  war-­‐ravaged	  state	  of	  post-­‐Second	  World	  War	  Europe	   certainly	   confirmed	   Churchill’s	   apprehensions.	   The	   immediate	   postwar	  situation	  was	  especially	  devastating	   in	  Germany,	  however,	  where	  aerial	  bombings,	  mass	   rape	   and	   severe	   food	   shortages	   created	   inherently	   gendered	   experiences	   of	  defeat	  and	  occupation	  for	  a	  predominately	  female	  population.	  	  The	  rape	  of	  German	  women	  by	  Allied	  and	  Soviet	  soldiers	  during	  the	  spring	  of	  1945	   linked	   together	   race	   and	   gender,	   as	   both	   the	   occupiers	   and	   the	   occupied	  struggled	   to	  come	  to	   terms	  with	   the	  presence	  of	   ‘nonwhite’	  occupation	  soldiers	   in	  their	   Zones.	   Rape	   and	   hunger	   soon	   engendered	   fraternization	   between	   German	  women	  and	  occupation	   soldiers,	   as	  women	   sought	  ways	   to	   transcend	   the	  difficult	  realities	  of	  defeat.	  The	  collective	  experience	  of	  defeat	  radically	  changed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  gnawing,	   demoralizing	   hunger,	   moreover,	   as	   the	   German	   population	   began	   to	  depend	  on	  the	  Allies	  for	  rations	  that	  were	  twice	  below	  the	  bare	  minimum	  of	  calories	  needed	   to	   survive.	   In	   the	   French	   Zone,	   whose	   food	   ration	   plummeted	   to	   450	  calories,	   the	   German	   population	   was	   forced	   to	   survive	   off	   half	   of	   what	   civilians	  received	  in	  the	  American	  and	  British	  Zones.	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In	  the	  wake	  of	  mass	  violence	  and	  hunger,	  women’s	  social	  roles	  began	  to	  shift.	  As	   the	   predominant	   portion	   of	   the	   postwar	   population,	   German	   women	   often	  assumed	   the	   traditional	   masculine	   roles	   of	   protector	   and	   provider	   in	   addition	   to	  those	  of	  mother	  and	  nurturer.	  Yet,	   the	  French	  Military	  Government	  did	  not	  design	  policy	  to	  reeducate	  women	  and	  to	  secure	  their	  social	  and	  political	  advancement,	  nor	  did	   it	   create	   an	   efficient	   denazification	   apparatus	   to	   reconstruct	   German	   society.	  Caught	   in	   the	   shadow	   of	   two	   emerging	   world	   powers,	   France	   instead	   sought	   to	  assert	   cultural	   hegemony	   over	   Germany	   through	   the	  Mission	  Culturelle,	  a	   form	   of	  cultural	   imperialism	   whose	   benighted	   policies	   only	   created	   a	   larger	   disconnect	  between	   the	   occupiers	   and	   the	   civilian	   population.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   failure	   of	  denazification	   and	   cultural	   policy	   led	   to	   the	   failure	   of	   reeducation	   in	   the	   French	  Zone	  altogether.	  	  French	   efforts	   to	   democratize	   German	  women	   also	   failed.	   The	   Soviets,	   the	  British	   and	   the	  Americans	   each	   acknowledged	  women’s	   changing	   positions	   in	   the	  new	  postwar	  order	  by	  granting	  German	  women	  relative	  degrees	  of	  agency	  through	  the	   establishment	   of	   women’s	   branches	   and	   the	   authorization	   of	   women’s	  organizations.	   The	   French,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   made	   no	   attempt	   to	   recognize	   the	  shifting	  status	  of	  women	  in	  their	  Zone,	  nor	  did	  they	  create	  the	  necessary	  policy	  to	  democratize	  German	  women.	  The	  absence	  of	  women’s	  agencies	  and	  organizations	  in	  the	  French	  Zone	  created	  a	  stifled	  democracy	  that	  stripped	  women	  of	  their	  social	  and	  political	  agency	  altogether.	  German	   women	   remained	   marginal	   in	   the	   domestic	   sphere	   as	   well.	  Longstanding	  demographic	  concerns	  engendered	  the	  creation	  of	  French	  family	  and	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immigration	  policy	  designed	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  ‘French	  race’	  through	  the	  interaction	  between	  gender,	  race	  and	  nationalism	  in	  order	  to	  fulfill	  de	  Gaulle’s	  visions	  of	  French	  ‘grandeur’.	   This	   occupation	   policy,	   which	   sought	   out	   and	   repatriated	   children	   of	  assumed	   French	   paternity	   to	   France,	   successfully	   transformed	   Germans	   into	  Frenchmen	   in	   ways	   that	   denazification	   and	   the	   Mission	   Culturelle	   did	   not.	   The	  reconceptualization	   of	   French	   ‘nationhood’	   had	   devastating	   consequences	   on	  German	   women,	   however,	   whose	   lack	   of	   maternal	   agency	   left	   them	   as	  disempowered	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  as	  they	  were	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  This	   dissertation	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   policies,	   and	   frequent	   lack	  thereof,	   that	   shaped	  German	  women’s	   experiences	  under	  French	  occupation	  were	  radically	   different	   from	   their	   Allied	   counterparts.	   In	   doing	   so,	   this	   study	   has	   also	  exposed	  some	  of	   the	  historiographical	   lacunae	   that	  are	   in	  need	  of	   future	  scholarly	  elaboration.	   The	   interaction	   between	   gender,	   race,	   nationalism	   and	   occupation	  policy,	  for	  example,	  is	  an	  interplay	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  studied	  within	  the	  larger	  context	  of	   German	   reconstruction	   and	   European	   integration.	   Concepts	   of	   citizenship,	  nationhood	  and	   the	  postwar	   state	  need	   to	  be	   reconsidered	   as	   factors	   that	   shaped	  governmental	   and	   institutional	   attitudes	   toward	   civilians,	   reordered	   postwar	  society,	  and	   facilitated	  reconciliation	  between	   former	  belligerents	  during	  the	  early	  Cold	  War	  era.	  These	   topics	   are	  but	   several	   of	   the	  pertinent	   areas	  of	   research	   that	  have	  been	  excluded	  from	  significant	  historical	  scrutiny.	  	  By	   examining	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   occupation	   policy	   disempowered	   German	  women	   in	   the	   French	   Zone,	   an	   occupation	   Zone	   that	   is	   in	   itself	   under-­‐researched	  and	  marginal,	  this	  dissertation	  has	  begun	  to	  address	  the	  silence	  on	  German	  women’s	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experiences	   under	   French	   occupation.	   Perhaps	  we	   can	   now	   hope	   to	   get	   a	   clearer	  perspective	   of	   the	   role	   that	   the	   French	   occupation	   played	   in	   determining	   the	  emergence	   of	   East	   and	  West	   Germany,	   an	   historical	   watershed	   that	   continues	   to	  shape	  Europe	   today.	  By	   reasserting	   agency	  onto	   a	  people	  who	  have	  been	  omitted	  from	  the	  postwar	  narrative,	  we	  can	  now	  begin	  to	  excavate	  forgotten	  histories	  within	  the	  forgotten	  Zone.	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